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ABSTRACT 
 
In the last three decades, nearly two hundred South Asian men have died in gang violence in 
Lower Mainland British Columbia. These deaths, coupled with the fear that young men in the 
community are susceptible to joining gangs, have both triggered and constructed a regional panic 
over South Asian gangs.  This thesis examines the problematization and governance of this 
phenomenon through 34 in-depth, qualitative interviews with law enforcement officials, 
educators, and representatives of community organizations who are on the frontlines of gang 
programing in lower mainland BC. Drawing on the insights of governance scholarship as well as 
critical studies on moral panics, race, and masculinities, this thesis illuminates the explanations, 
folk heroes, and villains that play out in official responses to South Asian gang violence.  The 
analysis reveals the multiple ways in which respondents draw on mainstream ideas on culture to 
explain gang involvement of South Asian boys and men. Assuming this group possesses a 
distinct value system at odds with mainstream society, interviewees attributed the appeal of gang 
affiliation to the desire for a ‘gold-collar lifestyle.’  The effect is the pathologization of South 
Asian ‘culture’ as inherently criminogenic and the neglect of analytical distinctions between 
‘culture’ and structural factors. The thesis further examines how the community is differentially 
enlisted to manage the South Asian gang involvement. Focusing on a controversial strategy 
known as the BRE program as well as the various programs delivered by ethno-specific South 
Asian community organizations, the analysis reveals the ways in which community is mobilized 
for the contradictory objectives of social exclusion and inclusion.  The dissertation concludes 
with an examination of the cultural mythology surrounding the notorious South Asian gangster, 
Bindy Johal.  Drawing attention to his status as both a folk devil and hero, the discussion reveals 
two duelling narratives framing his legacy. On the one hand Johal is perceived as a contemporary 
folk devil who continues to draw South Asian youth to gangs today.  On the other, he is 
perceived as an anti-hero or sympathetic figure who overcame racism and the diminishing of 
South Asian masculinity. The overall effect of these contradictory narratives is the 
overshadowing of racism, class oppression and related structural factors that underlie why gang 
involvement may appeal to some disenfranchised boys and men in the South Asian community. 
Overall, this study makes an important contribution to the growing literature on the role of 
community in the governance of crime as well as on the topic of South Asian gang involvement, 
which has received little empirical attention.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
I would say three risk factors are… I would say some of the cultural traditions. You know 
if you get into that Jatt mentality. A little bit of that bravado kind of thing. I think that 
probably comes into play. That also overlaps into parents maybe, if you're talking mostly 
boys, maybe not providing as much oversight when they should early on and nipping things 
in the bud, rather than just saying: "boys being boys". … I think another risk factor would 
be again the culture and tradition that's been created here of kind of the Indo gangster, kind 
of I guess phenomena. That it's a cool thing, it's almost kind of elevating it to a different 
level. Well I think some of that, again anecdotally, comes from you know, there's the 
movies made about it now. So much of that stuff can be more hyped up. The history that 
we've had here over the last 30 years of Indo-Canadian gangsters. As far as I know, I've 
never heard that phenomenon anywhere else in the world other than here. So it's kind of, 
you sit here with the Blacks and the Crips and all these kinds of gangs, and now you kind 
of got that quote-on-quote trademark here. It’s almost kind of emulating that subculture 
here. People think that's cool.   
  
This quote is from police officer “Ranjit” and provides several common insights on the 
“problem” of South Asian gangs and gang involvement that exists in British Columbia (BC). 
First, when outlining risk factors some tend to pathologize South Asian “culture” as being risky 
due to a set of distinct values and orientations that is believed to be inherently criminogenic. 
Second, “culture” is used to suggest that a unique “gang culture” exists in BC, with its own set of 
explanations, symbols and folklore, and rich history. The legend of notorious gangsters, like 
Bindy Johal for example, are told for decades as they become folk devils to some and heroes to 
others.  Finally, Officer Ranjit’s commentary provides an indication that such a regional problem 
requires innovative policies and strategies to tackle the problem. For example, later in his 
interview, Ranjit discusses a controversial bar and restaurant ejection (BRE) program that is used 
in many municipalities across BC, a policy premised on the social exclusion of undesirable 
people. Thus, this dissertation explores three distinct, yet interrelated facets of the South Asian 
gang involvement “problem” in BC that touch on these major themes.  
The South Asian gang “problem” in Canada finds its earliest roots in the bloody gang 
wars of the 1980s and 1990s between high profile Indo-Canadian gangsters, most notoriously 
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among them being Bindy Johal. In the two-decades since Johal’s murder in 1998, the concern by 
local politicians, law enforcement officials, educators, anti-gang workers and activists, as well as 
ordinary citizens has intensified as more young South Asian men are killed in suspected gang 
violence, which has caused concern that these victims are following in the footsteps of Bindy 
Johal or other notorious gangsters.  Between the years of 1990 to 2006 over a hundred young 
South Asian males in BC were murdered in gang-related violence (HC deb, 2006). That number 
has risen since then, leading to the perception that the problem has only gotten worse and 
mobilizing the community to speak out against gang violence. For example, a 2018 anti-gang 
violence rally in Surrey brought out over 1,000 community members in the wake the murders of 
two teenage South Asian boys (Ferreras, 2018). The event entitled “wake up” was a coordinated 
effort by community activists, gang workers, and citizens to demand action by the police and 
policy makers.  In addition, these incidents have been extensively covered by the local news 
media leading to a very regional story and panic surrounding South Asian gang involvement.    
The call to action, coupled with the extensive media attention, has caught the attention of 
law enforcement who have developed polices, such as the controversial BRE program, to 
respond to the problem. The BC Integrated Gang Task Force, a special unit within the 
Vancouver Metropolitan police force, attributes an alarmingly high rate of gun violence, 
trafficking and drug use to South Asian males, while an RCMP annual report ranks South Asian 
gangs third in terms of strength and organization (Totten, 2012). Further, South Asian gang 
violence has often been described as extreme in nature compared to other more structured gangs 
active in Canada, such as motorcycle or Asian gangs (Totten, 2012). The perceived brazenness 
of South Asian gang violence, such as the murder Bindy Johal in a crowded nightclub, has 
placed the impetus on police to craft unique solutions to gang violence. Most notably, BRE 
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utilizes police-community partnerships to remove gang members and others from public spaces 
and is used to counteract the perceived extreme nature of South Asian gang violence.    
South Asian gangs have been associated with a wide assortment of criminal activities, 
ranging from drug distribution to murder, often attracting youth between the ages of 14 to 25 for 
membership (Totten, 2008). Johal operated one of the most successful South Asian gangs in 
Canada prior to his murder in 1998 by an associate. At its peak, Johal’s gang earned a profit of 
$4 million annually, largely generated from the gang’s most troubling activity, contract killing 
(Pearce, 2009). His gang also engaged in drug trafficking and selling, automobile theft, money 
laundering, fraud and extortion (Pearce, 2009). Although it has been twenty years since his 
death, Johal’s notoriety still resonates among some South Asian males who view him as a legend 
and hero, and likely inspiring them to become involved in gangs as well (Pearce, 2009). It seems 
much of the current gang offending by South Asians is now more loosely structured and less 
organized since the Johal era, primarily involving young men engaging in dial-a-dope operations. 
Dial-a-dope refers to a delivery system where each “foot solider” is given a geographic territory 
and telephone number for customers to call when in need of illicit drugs, particularly marijuana.  
Considering how South Asian gangs and gang involvement have been constructed as a 
significant problem by authorities, this study finds its place in the criminological research on 
subcultural theory, moral panic, theorizations on masculinities and crime, and governance 
scholarship.  This thesis contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it adds to a body of 
research on subcultural theory by examining how South Asian “culture” is imagined as risky and 
leads to certain values and orientations that make gang offending more likely. Second, an 
important contribution is made to the governance literature through an analysis of how 
community is mobilized for the contradictory purposes of social exclusion and inclusion when 
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responding to the South Asian gang problem. Finally, the last chapter contributes to the literature 
on moral panics as well as the theorizing on masculinities and crime by arguing that the 
community’s fear towards notorious gangster Bindy Johal and his dangerous hold and influence 
on young men largely overlooks or conceals a greater and more significant crisis involving 
masculinity plaguing young South Asian men in the community.     
 
Theoretical orientations  
In lieu of a traditional book-style dissertation format, I have chosen to produce three-
relatively independent, standalone manuscripts that, with further revision, will be submitted to 
academic journals. This approach provides me the intellectual freedom to pursue three different, 
yet interrelated, discourses on South Asian gang involvement in Western Canada. The 
overarching theoretical questions that brings this collection together can be articulated as 
follows: how is the problem of South Asian gang involvement governed? What logics and 
practices are deployed in this governance project? And how do the racial dimensions of the 
“problem population’ structure how the problem is represented and made actionable? Each 
chapter examines different dimensions of these questions. The second chapter examines how risk 
is conceptualized by key authority figures and how South Asian “culture” is identified as 
criminogenic and South Asian men are constituted as risky. The third chapter examines how the 
problem of South Asian gangs and gang involvement is responded to through various logics of 
governance, which results in the mobilization of ‘community’ for contradictory outcomes of both 
social exclusion and inclusion. Finally, the fourth chapter provides an intimate look into how the 
legacy of one notorious gang member, Bindy Johal, has been imagined and reacted to as both a 
folk devil and a sympathetic folk hero.  
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These manuscripts share an overarching theoretical scheme and relate to the under-
explored area of South Asian gangs and gang involvement. However, multiple and different 
theoretical frameworks are deployed and form the basis of the analysis in each chapter. Central 
to each manuscript are subcultural theories, Foucauldian theorizing on governance, moral panics, 
and masculinities and crime.  
 
Neoliberal government and police regulation 
 The overarching theoretical approach this dissertation adopts is derived from the body of 
work by Michel Foucault and several other critical scholars who have contributed to the studies 
of governmentality by examining the governance and construction of social problems. Foucault’s 
work remains influential for his ability to map out centuries of governmental power, from its 
early pastoral form, to a period of police regulation and sovereign power, and to the more 
contemporary neoliberal governmental power that exists today. This collection focuses on two 
main and inter-related components of neoliberal governance; including: 1) how local authorities 
are constituted as “experts” and their knowledge is solicited so that they can think and act on 
problems, and 2) the responsiblization of non-state actors so that community itself can 
autonomously manage problems, such as gangs, themselves. Eliciting the support of and 
mobilizing the community to develop knowledge and strategies of crime control are indicative of 
neoliberal style of governing Foucault labels as governmentality, or the art of governing.  
Governmentality  
In his seminal lectures Security, Territory and Population, Foucault (2007) introduces the 
concept of governmentality, a concept that has had a profound impact on numerous academic 
fields. Notably, the discipline of criminology has used Foucault’s ideas to better understand the 
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crime control strategies used by authorities (Garland, 1997). Foucault defines governmentality 
as: 
The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the 
calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of 
power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political 
economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security (Foucault, 1979, p. 
20).   
 
Other scholars have provided a more straightforward definition of governmentality. Murphy 
(2010) defines governmentality as “the techniques for directing human conduct, techniques 
found not only in the bureaucracies of the modern nation-state, but also in a wide range of 
institutions from schools to businesses.” (p. 71).  In essence, governmentality concerns a 
collective way of thinking about governing and government (Lippert and Stenson, 2010). It is 
this reason why government is defined as the ‘conduct of conduct’ and as a form of activity that 
shapes, guides or affects the conduct of individuals (Burchell et al., 1991).  
Ilcan and Basok (2004) suggest that government seeks the engagement of citizens by 
engaging in partnerships with the community. This form of governing through the community 
shifts the task of responsibilizing citizens to non-government agencies, becoming an increasingly 
popular form of rule (Ilcan and Basok, 2004). Hence, central to governmentality is the idea that 
human conduct is regulated primarily by non-government agencies and individuals with limited 
involvement by the state. Mobilizing the community to regulate the conduct of citizens is 
premised on the notion that civil society, with its own set of values, remain autonomous and free 
from minimal state regulation (Rose, 1999). Thus, the community must collectively develop 
knowledge on problems, like gang involvement, and implement its own programmes and 
techniques of government. This conforms to the idea that there are limitations when it comes to 
the state’s ability to govern certain aspects of social life (Garland, 1996). Precisely, a clear 
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distinction should emerge between the state and civil society, the latter of which should be able 
to better govern social life (Garland, 1996). Thus, a responsiblization strategy exists where non-
government agencies are mobilized to act on crime. Yet the state does not relinquish complete 
control or simply watch over these organizations, but instead, takes on the role of coordinator by 
activating these groups to self-govern or providing funding so they can carry out strategies of 
governance (Garland, 1996). 
While there is a fair amount of research examining the governance of gang violence few 
studies have utilized a governmentality perspective to understand the phenomenon of ethnic 
gangs, particularly South Asian groups active in Canada. The literature on how gangs are 
governed points to two types of intervention strategies most commonly used: suppression and 
intervention and prevention models. Suppression tactics tend to include practices such as hot spot 
policing, saturation patrols, enforcement of exclusionary zones, and gang sweeps (Tita and 
Papachristos, 2010). Much research on suppression tends to look at the effectiveness of such 
practices (Braga, 2005; Fritsch et al., 1999; Sherman, 1990). A practice like the BRE program, 
could qualify as a suppression tactic without fully being characterized as a law enforcement 
strategy due to its community-lead emphasis. This project examines such community-police 
partnerships that allow for this type of programing to operate. A governmentality approach is not 
so much concerned with evaluating the effectiveness of a program like BRE, but rather, is 
interested in the perceived outcomes when such modes of governing are exercised. For example, 
taking a more critical look at a community-based program, such as BRE, that essentially serves 
as a social rejection project.  
 Intervention and prevention methods, on the other hand, attempt to address the 
underlying causes of gang involvement, focusing on the conditions that give rise to gangs or help 
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youth exit them (Linden, 2010). These programs tend to draw support from the community and 
community organizations, which is where governmentality scholarship becomes especially 
relevant. By adopting a governmentality approach, this analysis captures the narratives of 
community gang outreach workers, along with other community actors, on how they 
conceptualize South Asian gang involvement.   
From a methodological standpoint, research on the governance of gangs has been limited 
to positivist inquiries into the causes of gang violence and involvement.  Much of this research 
tends to rely on taken for granted assumptions of ‘culture’ as criminogenic.  This dissertation 
remedies this gap by examining two dimensions of governance: 1) how “culture” is imagined as 
criminogenic and deployed to govern racialized men; and 2) how community agencies and actors 
are mobilized to govern the problem of South Asian gang involvement with minimal state 
influence through contractual agreements and other technologies of governance.   
 
 The contemporary appearance of police and pastoral power in neoliberal societies  
 As contemporary governance is centered on devolution so that the community is 
mobilized and encouraged to govern itself as a separate entity (i.e. civil society) from the state, 
other historic logics of power however, including pastoral and police regulatory power, have not 
entirely disappeared (Stenson, 1999). The highly dogmatic form of pastoral power is 
concentrated on the salvation of souls and relies on scripture to guide a folk of individuals from 
straying from gospel (Foucault, 2007). Police regulation, on the other hand, emphasizes stricter 
control of citizen behaviour and the removal of threats that impact the moral functioning of 
society in part through the regulation of space (Valverde, 2017). As these traditional and historic 
forms of power still exist they are now influenced by neoliberal principles of freedom and 
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autonomy. In this sense, neoliberal governmentality has transformed modern practices of 
pastoral power or police regulation so that the community is mobilized to govern crime 
themselves. This is exemplified through a controversial bar ejection program that allows the 
police to enter certain businesses and remove gang members and their associates, appears to be 
an exercise of police regulation (see chapter 3). Nevertheless, this program is only carried out if 
businesses and the police enter into a contractual agreement, requiring private establishments to 
essentially initiate their involvement and primarily operate the program themselves with law 
enforcement playing a key supporting role. This illuminates a contemporary display of police 
regulation where the community is mobilized and supported by officials as to limit the state’s 
coercive power and govern a problem like gangs through the actions of autonomous agents.  
 
Expert knowledge and criminological theory  
Part of fostering the support of the community and non-state actors to implement their 
own strategies of crime control is allowing them to develop and exchange knowledge on 
problems such as crime. According to Garland (1996), crime is treated as a routine social hazard 
where strategies to manage it requires thinking and knowledge generation to effectively respond 
to it.  Consequently, Foucault describes neoliberal governance as critical and problematizing 
(Burchell, 1996). Central to liberal democratic governance then is the role of expert knowledge 
and professional expertise in problematizing and developing knowledge which is then translated 
into particular technologies of government (Lupton, 2006). For Foucault, neoliberal strategies 
that aim to responsibilize individuals rely on expert knowledge of human conduct which is 
derived from the social and human sciences (Burchell, 1996). This is achieved when governing 
institutions collaborate with each other to develop and exchange information, which is then used 
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to facilitate strategies of control (Ericson & Haggerty, 1999). Consequently, knowledge is a 
valuable property or resource that guides action and decision-making (Ericson & Haggerty, 
1999).  In summary, as Townley (1993) best articulates, government “rationality is dependent 
upon specific knowledges and techniques of rendering something knowable and, as a result, 
governable. Governmentality, therefore, is a reference to those processes through which objects 
are rendered amenable to intervention and regulation” (p. 520). As Chaskin (2010) notes, most 
gang prevention strategies rely on theory and knowledge to operate.  
Foucault believed criminological theories constitute a form of disciplinary knowledge, 
used to legitimize disciplinary crime control strategies and justify punishment (Garland, 1996). 
He suggests that criminologists and other experts identify the causes of crime to justify the use of 
power by using such discourses to enhance regulatory, disciplinary or biopolitical control 
(Valverde, 2017). In other words, these theories are complicit in the formation of expert 
knowledge and used to develop certain technologies aimed at managing the threat crime poses, 
and used to extend control over the governance of social problems. 
While it is unclear if local actors possess any knowledge of key theories of crime when 
conceptualizing risk, it is evident that many do draw on mainstream ideas of culture to argue that 
South Asian “culture” promotes values and orientations that are conducive to gang involvement. 
Additionally, criminological theories relating to moral panics are used in the fourth article of this 
collection to examine how notorious South Asian gangster Bindy Johal has been conceptualized 
as a folk devil and evoked a particular counter-reaction. This vilification of Johal is contrasted 
with a competing conception by some respondents that is more sympathetic, suggesting that his 
“heroic” appeal emerges from his affirmation of South Asian masculinity within a hegemonic 
system that typically subordinates the masculinity of racialized men. While less explicit in its 
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analysis, this article also relates to the governmentality literature and the use of criminological 
theory to understand how such constructions of a legendary figure fall into line with long-
standing theories of crime and deviance.  
In summary, mainstream ideas on culture tend to be adopted in the everyday explanations 
for gang involvement by respondents in this present study yet should also be subject to 
examination under the same critical lens as traditional subcultural theories of crime.  Below I 
elaborate on how I supplement this theoretical orientation with other schools of thoughts and 
analytical orientations that are influential in this collection.  
(1) Subcultural theories versus structural theories  
 The first article examines how risk is conceptualized in the governance of South Asian 
gang involvement in BC. These conceptions are largely in line with how subcultural theories of 
crime imagine the phenomenon by emphasizing cultural values that explain crime. Subcultural 
theories have significant influence in criminological theory and are premised on the notion that 
certain groups have values, beliefs, and orientations that are more conducive to violence and 
criminal offending. Early theorists like Cohen (1955) and Miller (1958) argued that lower-class 
youth are most likely to develop values oriented towards crime. For Cohen (1955) deviance is a 
reaction to the frustration lower-class youth experience as the result of failing to achieve 
culturally approved goals, facilitating a value system that condones the use of violence. Miller 
(1958) expands on Cohen’s (1955) analysis by developing a distinct set of values and focal 
concerns that are prevalent among lower-class delinquents, including trouble, toughness, 
smartness, excitement, fate and autonomy.  
 While Cohen (1955) and Miller (1958) focused on lower-class communities more 
generally, the deviant values of racialized minorities groups becomes the focus for theorists such 
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as Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967), who examine the question of why African American men in 
Philadelphia had higher rates of violent crime than White offenders. They suggest that African 
American men likely developed values and orientations that viewed violence as acceptable 
through family practices such as child rearing and social conditioning. This line of theorizing 
would be revisited by Anderson (1999) decades later, suggesting that African American men 
living in ghettoized neighbourhoods may be inclined to violence as the result of the economic 
and social conditions of their communities and the failure to adopt “middle-class values”. 
Anderson (1999) advances the notion of the ‘code of the street’ a set of informal rules that 
governs the use of interpersonal violence in dealing with violence and threats to masculinity. 
Although Anderson (1999) suggests that not all people in these communities fully adhere to this 
code, most are willing to draw on it under certain conditions (i.e. a decent father who is 
protecting his family from external threats).   
Subcultural theories can be contrasted with those that focus more on the structure of 
society that cause crime rather than on “culture,” and the associated variables of norms and 
values.  Of the most prominent structural theories is Merton’s (1938) theory of strain, which 
focuses on how economically constrained individuals innovate through criminal behaviour to 
achieve the universally desired economic goals they are blocked from obtaining. Social 
disorganization theories are also structural in nature and centre on how poorly disorganized 
neighbourhoods fail to adequately control criminal behaviour due to a lack of community 
cohesion (Shaw and McKay, 1942). These theories focus on economic conditions and how they 
influence offending while subcultural theories examine criminal values and beliefs that are 
believed to have developed among various subcultures and groups in society.  
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Subcultural theories have been challenged for: a) failing to articulate the relationship between 
“culture” and “structure” and b) pathologizing the racialized offender (Covington, 1995; 
Wacquant, 2002; Case, 2008). First, theorists like Cohen (1955) suggest that lower class 
delinquency is the result of a repudiation of middle-class values while Miller (1958) argues that 
lower-class youth have a distinct set of values that form the basis of their offending. These 
theories however, do not do a good job explaining how structural factors, like socioeconomic 
status or neighbourhood, might influence or lead to the development of values and orientations 
that are conducive to crime (Rosner-Kornhauser, 1978). Second, these theories may be used to 
pathologize racialized minorities as being inherently deviant or criminal. Thus, these theories can 
have racist implications where populations, particularly African Americans, become defined as 
“risky” and having a set of values that are considered antisocial. Pathologizing in such a manner 
might overlook the role of structural factors, such as poverty, discriminatory racial practices in 
the criminal justice system, or a lack of legitimate opportunities, in explaining the 
overrepresentation of certain racial minority groups amongst the justice statistics (Wacquant, 
2002). In other words, these knowledges enhance control over racialized populations.  
(2) Moral panics and folk devils 
Central to the fourth article of this collection is literature on moral panics and folk devils. 
This perspective, developed by theorists like Cohen (2011) and Hall and colleagues (1978) 
reflects some the fears and anxieties surrounding gang involvement and the hold one particular 
gangster, Bindy Johal, has on a generation of young South Asian men in BC. Cohen (2011) 
defines a moral panic as a condition or episode of time where a person or group of people are 
defined as a threat to societal values and interests (p.1). These targeted “folk devils” represent 
the most dangerous elements of society, are blamed for particular types of criminal acts, and are 
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subject to immediate action by agents of social control. In summary, folk devils are viewed as an 
existential threat to a morally decent society (Cohen, 2011).  Thus, moral panics centre on a 
concern over a potential threat; hostility that is directed at certain targets; the reaction to them is 
often disproportionate to the actual level of harm folk devils might inflect; and are considered 
volatile since these panics can disappear just as fast as they appear (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 
1994). Hall et al., (1978) examined the moral panic fear over muggings in Britain during the 
1960s and 70s.  They argued that this moral panic was manufactured for the purposes of 
diverting the public’s attention away from the recession, a deeper or more pervasive crisis, to a 
specific group of people (Black youth) that were a much easier target.  
Some have criticized Cohen’s (2011) analysis as being outdated, arguing that morality is 
no longer universal with different groups having their own interpretation of moral boundaries 
(Hier, 2008). This suggests that any universal reaction to moral panics is replaced with the idea 
of different groups reacting differently to certain situations. This leads to the creation of a 
morally ambiguous gray area that can elicit multiple reactions. For instance, certain individuals 
defined as folk devils by some may receive sympathy and support by others. This suggests that 
as soon as a moral panic develops, groups with dissenting voices emerge to challenge and make 
counter-claims that are oppositional to the ones made by initial alarmists. Cohen (2011) himself 
understood the need to adjust his theory by introducing the concept of a ‘generalized moral 
stance’ to reflect the changing nature of contemporary moral panics. Instead, moral panics today 
emerge from a web or stream of endless anxieties that plague the public conscience, like the fear 
of crime, and are a part of living in a risk society (Hier, 2008). 
While there is an abundance of literature theorizing folk devils, the concept of a folk hero 
has not received as much sociological analyses in relation to the broader moral panic literature 
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(Flinders and Wood, 2015). As folk devils become defined from certain events and conditions 
that amplify the public’s fear and anxieties, heroes too can be shaped from events and conditions 
that have the opposite effect from moral panics (i.e. produce euryopia, excitement, or happiness). 
Further, Flinders and Wood (2015) note the moral ambiguity that some folk devils might 
possesses, which suggests that some of these “villains” might actually be considered “heroic” or 
“anti-heroes” by some. This relates to a body of literature on how some criminals become 
romanticized when they are perceived to be in opposition to some social injustice that has 
inflected them or others (Duncan, 1991). In relation to the problem of South Asian gang 
involvement and how a folk devil like Bindy Johal may also be perceived as a heroic or a 
sympathetic figure by some, it is necessary to turn to the literature on hegemonic masculinities. 
This area of theorizing sheds light on the perceived social injustice that Johal is considered to be 
fighting and why he may be admired by some.  
(3) Hegemonic masculinities and crime 
The question of why men commit more violent crimes than women forms the basis of the 
literature on hegemonic masculinities and crime. This theorizing is premised on the idea that a 
dominant, hence hegemonic, form of masculine identity exists and is typically allocated to white-
heterosexual males who display traits such as aggression and sexual prowess (Connell, 1995). 
This hegemonic masculinity defines power relations in society and ensures that men who meet 
this ideal can hold their dominance over not only women but other men who fail to meet this 
standard. For these men, their masculinity is considered subordinate (Connell, 1995). Thus, 
subordinated males may often resort to violence and aggression to achieve their “manliness” and 
reclaiming their position on the hegemonic masculine hierarchy. This idea has been used to 
explain the gang offending of numerous minority males who often find their masculinity 
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subordinated in such a manner. For instant, hypermasculinity through crime helps alleviate some 
of the struggles and threats to self-esteem that plague working class males (Messerschmit, 1997).  
 
Literature on South Asians offending/gang involvement  
For South Asian men in particular, several scholars note how their masculinity is often 
subordinated by being perceived as effeminate and emasculated (Kalra, 2009; George and 
Rashidi, 2014). Frost (2010) notes how South Asian men in Canada have to do masculinity 
differently, particularly those who get involved in gangs. Frost (2010) suggests that the readiness 
to use violence, treat women as sexual objects, and adopt a style of dress and appearance is a 
way for boys, referred to as “Surrey Jacks”, to reclaim their masculinity. Navigating masculinity 
in such a way becomes a means to carve out their identity under feelings of cultural isolation and 
experiences of racism these boys experience. This suggests a crisis exists in the region and that 
hypermasculinity through gang involvement and violence might be an alternative way of doing 
masculinity. Thus, by examining the legacy of Bindy Johal, who in many ways represents the 
“Surrey Jack” archetype, this analysis provides a deeper look into the perceived identity crisis 
plaguing South Asian males in Lower Mainland BC. 
South Asian culture and gang violence is the focus of Buffam’s (2016) piece on cultural 
confessions. In his analysis, Buffam (2016) notes how editorials and other forms of media have 
given South Asians a forum to denounce the sins of “culture” and a way to scrutinize the South 
Asian family who, as an institution, has contributed to the “gang problem” as well as other 
problems (i.e. domestic violence) in the community. This analysis expands on such cultural 
analyses by examining the narratives of those on the frontlines of BC’s gang intervention 
strategies and programming and how they often South Asian “culture” is often constituted as 
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criminogenic (Chapter 2). These theoretical insights on South Asian masculinity provides some 
much-needed context in terms of how risk is imagined in relation to South Asian gang 
involvement as well as how the legacy of Bindy Johal is framed.  
 
Clarification of key terms, concepts and terminologies 
 
 
‘South Asian gangs’ versus ‘South Asian gang involvement’  
A debate central to this analysis is over the distinction between “South Asian gangs” and 
“South Asian gang involvement”. While these two concepts appear to suggest the same thing, 
they actually represent two entirely different meanings. The term “South Asian gang” refers to a 
gang that is largely comprised of South Asian individuals, suggesting an entity that is culturally 
and racially homogenous. The concept of “South Asian gang involvement” represents the 
process of South Asian youth or young adults getting involved in gangs. Although South Asian 
gang involvement could result in individuals getting involved in exclusively “South Asian 
gangs”, they may also be getting involved in more ethnically diverse gangs. Thus, several 
respondents caution against using the term “South Asian gang” since it fails to account for what 
they believe is the involvement of South Asian youth in gangs that are not divided along racial 
lines. Indeed, some respondents argue that the concept of a “South Asian gang” carries a racist 
connotation that only South Asians are getting involved in gangs, ignoring the ethnic 
heterogeneity of gangs in their area and contributing to the perception that this is a South Asian 
problem or a consequence of “South Asian culture.”  
 This debate is explored further in the first article of this collection. Nevertheless, for 
present purposes, this project makes use of both terms depending on the context. For example, 
gangs comprised of mostly South Asian members did likely exist in the days of Bindy Johal 
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before becoming more diverse. Additionally, some respondents argue that “South Asian gangs” 
are a real entity and so in order to accurately capture their perceptions on the phenomenon, it is 
necessary to draw on the language they use directly.  
 
‘South Asian’, ‘Punjabi’, ‘Indo-Canadian’, or ‘Sikh’ 
 There is also some ambiguity around how to characterize the racial and ethnic 
backgrounds of individuals getting involved in gangs. The term “South Asian” is largely used in 
this analysis because it is more inclusive and recognizes a broader range of ethnic subsets that 
fall under its umbrella. For example, while most gang members are viewed as “Punjabi”, a few 
research participants argue that Pakistani and Fijian youth are also involved in gangs. 
Nevertheless, some respondents use the terms Punjabi, Indo-Canadian, or Sikh to refer to the 
race or religion of gang members as they see it. Thus, while relying mainly on the concept of 
“South Asian”, this study will occasionally purposefully slip between various terminologies 
when deemed relevant. This includes providing contextual meaning where differentiation is 
necessary. For example, the concept of ‘Sikh youth’ is used when examining particular anti-gang 
responses that utilize Gurdwaras (Sikh temples) to deliver gang programing due to the religious 
backgrounds of these individuals. Further, various different concepts are contingent on 
terminology captured in direct quotes from the research participants themselves. In this sense, if 
a research participant uses the term “Indo-Canadian”, for example, in the course of an interview, 
that concept is used for analytical purposes to ensure their perspective on the issue is accurately 
captured. Further, it is not the purpose of this study to develop a definitive set of concepts that 
should be uniformly applied, but rather, take into consideration how research participants 
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view/conceptualize the problem and how they interpret the racial backgrounds of those involved 
in gangs.   
 
Methods 
 
This collection examines stakeholders’ perceptions on issues related to South Asian gang 
involvement. Therefore, in-depth semi-structured interviews with 34 professionals with some 
first-hand knowledge and expertise on South Asian gangs is used to address this study’s research 
questions and objectives. Accordingly, this study has undergone review from the University of 
Waterloo’s Office of Research Ethics and received ethical clearance. All interviewees are fully 
informed prior to their involvement and have given their consent to participate. To respect the 
confidentiality and anonymity of participants names have been altered. Since most research 
participants are South Asian, pseudonyms are racially and ethnically sensitive.  
Both in-person and telephone interviews were conducted from August 2016 through 
January 2017 in the Lower Mainland of BC. This includes cities such as Metro Vancouver, 
Surrey, Delta, Richmond, and Abbotsford. Research participants fall into three organizational 
categories, which includes: community organizations (such as anti-gang programs, immigrant 
settlement groups, youth organizations, and legal and court advocacy groups), law enforcement, 
and education (n=16). Law enforcement includes police officers that serve on gang units or 
engage in some related community work on their spare time (n=6). Educators interviewed 
include school principals, vice-principals, teachers, counsellors and district level employees 
(n=12). The diversity in backgrounds of research participants supports the reflexive and 
interpretive nature of this study as it allows us to make comparisons and understand the 
differences among perceptions of different categories of participants.  
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A combination of snowballing and purposive sampling techniques was used to gain 
access to appropriate research participants. This sampling scheme gave me an opportunity to 
reach out to suitable candidates and then elicit their support to recruit other participants so that 
the sample could grow. Data collection stopped when I reached theoretical saturation, a point 
where no new and relevant information was being derived from interviews. With the permission 
of participants, interviews were audio-recorded on an MP3 device. These interviews were 
transcribed and analyzed using NVivo 11.4.0 qualitative analysis software. A process of open 
coding was used to develop some key concepts, categories, and proprieties from the raw data. 
Particularly, the constant comparative method was used to develop some insights on how 
participants problematized South Asian gangs or understood risk.  To account for validity in this 
qualitative study, the process of member checking was used when appropriate. This technique 
requires a researcher to seek clarify on data and interpretations with the research participants 
themselves (Creswell and Miller, 2000). It is important to be accurate in capturing how 
participants problematize the issue of South Asian gangs and drawing any tentative and 
preliminary conclusions.  
 
Overview of dissertation  
 
 This collection of articles tackles the phenomenon of South Asian gang involvement in 
Western Canada. Since each article examines a different aspect of the problem, an overview of 
each article, including individual research questions and findings, is necessary.  
 Chapter 1examines local conceptions of risk and centres in particular on the question of 
how culture is used and problematized when authorities respond to “South Asian gangs” or 
South Asian gang involvement.  Many authorities and stakeholders tend to adopt subcultural 
explanations, suggesting that some South Asian families have a distinct value system that 
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emphasizes materialism, which orientates boys and young men towards gangs. By adopting the 
language of traditional criminological theories of subculture, these frameworks tend to 
pathologize South Asians ‘culture’ as inherently conducive to gangs. Additionally, these 
accounts often neglect the complex relationship between structure and culture.  
 Chapter 2 examines how South Asian gang involvement is governed by focusing on the 
question of how these anti-gang strategies reflect various logics of governance. Adopting a 
Foucauldian analysis, I argue that the response to South Asian gang involvement involves a 
complex assemblage of various logics of governance including more historic forms of police 
regulation and pastoral power. However, these practices are influenced by contemporary 
neoliberal governmental practices where the state fosters the support and mobilizing community 
actors and agencies to manage the problem of gangs directly. Community is then used for the 
contradictory purposes of exclusion, through a controversial BRE program, and inclusion 
through various community-based programming.  
 Finally, Chapter 3 takes a look at one of the most notorious South Asian gangsters in 
Western Canadian history, Bindy Johal. This analysis aims to discover how Bindy Johal has been 
conceptualized by authorities and how these conceptualizations influenced practices of 
governing others. Johal has evoked two legacies, one where he is viewed as a contemporary folk 
devil who, despite being dead for over 20 years, still pushes youth to gangs, and second, an anti-
heroic or sympathetic figure who was able to secure recognition and reclaim masculinity for 
South Asian men. Each constructed legacy can be better understood through moral panic 
literature and theorizing on hegemonic masculinities and crime. I argue that the fear over Johal’s 
influence largely masks or conceals a far greater crisis of masculinity South Asian boys might be 
experiencing.    
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Scholarly contributions and intention of work 
 
 This research makes an important contribution on several different fronts. First, it adds to 
what I hope is a growing body of research on South Asian gang involvement in Canada (Frost, 
2010; Buffam, 2016).  Noticeably, there is very little academic attention on this issue despite the 
perception that it is a major problem by community members, law enforcement, educators and 
policy makers. Second, this thesis also contributes to the governance literature by examining 
how this understudied phenomenon is conceptualized by authorities. This is in relation to how 
risk is problematized as well as how the legacy of notorious gangster Bindy Johal is imagined. 
This analysis contributes to the governance literatures by examining how the problem has been 
governed through the community, a key feature of neoliberal rule. The conclusions drawn from 
this analysis can help stakeholders understand the various “explanations” of South Asian gang 
offending that exist. The purpose of this is not to necessarily influence policy or action but for 
stakeholders to conduct some introspection and debate as to where these ideas come from and 
how they might influence their reaction to the problem in terms of implemented strategies and 
programing.   
 My reasons for choosing the sandwich dissertation option is because it provides relative 
flexibility, adding both depth, in terms of exploring each topic in detail, as well as breadth, 
allowing me to examine various different aspects of the problem of South Asian gang 
involvement. I intend to submit all three manuscripts to reputable peer review journals for 
publication. The first article on problematization will be submitted to the Canadian Journal of 
Criminology with Dr. Rashmee Singh as the second author. The second article on 
exclusion/inclusion (to be second-authored by Dr. Boyle), will be submitted to either the British 
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Journal of Criminology or Theoretical Criminology. Finally, I will submit the article on moral 
panics and Bindy Johal to Men and Masculinities.   
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Chapter Two: Re-examining the issue of “culture” as a risk factor for South Asian gang 
involvement in Western Canada 
From the moment a Punjabi boy opens his eyes, his parents hand him the keys to the 
Porsche of life. From now on, his mother will ride in the back seat, literally and figuratively, 
putting her son ahead of the world. Her boy will have the privilege of eating a warm meal, 
without the chore of clearing the dishes alongside his sister. In a fit of childhood rage, he 
will kick and punch his mother, as his father and grandmother look on, taking great pride 
in their boy’s supposed courage (Bakshi, 2002).  
 
The arguments advanced by this quote, taken from a controversial Macleans Magazine essay 
written by contributor Anu Bakshi sparked wide-spread debate among the local South Asian 
community in the Lower Mainland of BC. Faced with the murders of nearly 100 young South 
Asian men in gang-related violence, the concept of a “South Asian gang” or ‘South Asian gang 
involvement’ was predominately constructed as a significant problem. Despite this 
characterization, there remains no clear consensus among authorities and key stakeholders when 
it comes to constructing a definition of these gangs or identifying the underlying root causes or 
risk factors for South Asian gang involvement despite attempts to address the problem through 
various forms of programing. This chapter will not attempt to put forward a theory on South 
Asian gang involvement, but rather, will try to understand the various narratives and perspectives 
of those who are on the frontlines of the problem with the objective of understanding how the 
concept of the “South Asian gang” is imagined and constructed. Precisely, this chapter will 
attempt to understand how the South Asian gangs are conceptualized and problematized by 
stakeholders such as law enforcement, educators, frontline anti-gang workers and other 
representatives from community organizations.  
Problematizing is a feature of the public policy process, as a problem must first be known 
before appropriate action is taken. Modern penal strategies stress the importance of collaboration 
between various institutions and state and non-state actors with the purpose of developing and 
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exchanging information or knowledge in order to guide decision-making and facilitate effective 
strategies of crime control (Ericson and Haggerty, 1999). This perspective is a departure for 
many, more positivist-oriented criminologists who tend to grand-theorize when explaining 
criminal behaviour patterns. In relation to South Asian gangs, this theoretical perspective is not 
interested in the question of why South Asians might join gangs, but to understand how south 
Asian gangs are conceptualized, thought about, and acted upon. From a methodological 
standpoint, this provides theoretical flexibility to account for various competing and 
contradictory accounts of South Asian gangs and which ones tend to get picked up as the 
normative explanation for gang involvement.  
For instance, subcultural theories suggest that certain groups have values and orientations 
that are supportive of violence or conducive to criminal behaviour. Anderson (1999), for 
example, focuses on African Americans males in urban Philadelphia and suggests that criminal 
behaviour, such as gang involvement, can be attributed a distinct value system (i.e. the code of 
the street) that legitimizes the use of violence under certain conditions. Consequently, similar 
ideas to the ones that inform subcultural theories become the go-to explanations used by 
authorities to explain South Asian gang violence.  
Drawing on the narratives of key stakeholders, this chapter examines an important 
theoretical question: How has “culture” been used in the construction of a “South Asian gang” or 
South Asian gang involvement? In other words, this chapter explores how various authorities 
understand the phenomenon and ultimately pathologize South Asian ‘culture’ as risky. This 
chapter draws on in-depth interviews with 34 such stakeholders with some expertise on South 
Asian gang involvement through their role in anti-gang programing. Interview participants are 
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selected from a variety of organizational fields and backgrounds including law enforcement, 
education, and community agencies across BC. 
In examining the narratives of key stakeholders then, such as the police, school officials 
or gang workers, this analysis reveals that these authorities tend to draw on mainstream ideas of 
culture and the language of risk to construct an image of the “South Asian gang”. However, this 
article asserts that most stakeholders conflate or fail to distinguish “culture” and “structure”, a 
common criticism of subcultural perspectives on gang delinquency (Ball-Rokeach, 1973; 
Rosner-Kornhauser, 1978).  Additionally, I argue that when “culture” is used to pathologize gang 
involvement, it accentuates key differences that exist with South Asians that are imagined unique 
to or different than the offending of other groups including that of racialized minorities.  
Consequently, some of the risk factors identified are intertwined with the diasporic, racial 
and cultural challenges faced by the South Asian community and have not been identified in the 
broader gang literature. For example, cultural explanations of gang involvement centre on the 
“South Asian family”, where the title of “the golden boy” or “prince” is bestowed on male 
offspring, or are characterized by the pursuit of materialism or the ‘gold collar lifestyle’. These 
explanations for South Asian gang offending revitalize the debate regarding cultural deviance 
theories by adding legitimacy to a school of thought that emphasizes distinct cultural risk factors 
in the offending patterns of a racialized minority group. However, structural factors such as the 
issue of racism, the socioeconomic backgrounds of gang members, or the racialized division of 
labour have further complicated our understanding of “South Asian gangs” and the relationship 
they have on “cultural” factors, like value orientations towards materialism.  Ultimately, cultural 
accounts need to be examined through a more critical lens that examines how culture-centric 
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explanations are influenced by structural factors and how ideas on a “culture of crime” are 
rendered commonsensical knowledge by authorities.   
This analysis begins with a brief overview of theory, including an examination of the 
criminological theory on gangs and delinquency with an emphasis on subcultural theories. The 
next section examines how interviewees such as police, educators, and representatives from 
community gang organizations conceptualize the South Asian gang, including their perceptions 
of the problem and its scale and scope. Using the rich narratives of my research participants, the 
next section will examine how risk is conceptualized and how it accentuates the cultural 
distinctness of South Asians as a key contributor of young South Asian men getting involved in 
gangs.  
 
Literature review  
 
 The existing literature on subcultural theory provides an important starting point in 
understanding two relevant thematic debates central to this analysis. First, it is necessary to 
examine how subcultural theories have been critiqued for overlooking the relationship between 
and conflating “structure” and “culture.” Second, a common criticism found in the literature is 
the tendency of subcultural theories to use “culture” as a way to pathologize different racial 
groups. Here, culture becomes the basis of pointing out things that are wrong with a racialized 
population. Nevertheless, these debates illuminate how the typical subject is constructed in the 
literature and how the South Asian gang member is imagined. Also included in this literature 
review is a brief overview of the limited work on South Asian gang involvement and how the 
South Asian male has been characterized as risky.  
Subcultural and structural theories: The relationship between culture and structure 
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One of the major criticisms of subcultural theories is that these theories fail to adequately 
articulate the relationship between “culture” and “structure” or how these factors interact to 
explain criminal offending. However, an overview of some ‘classic’ cultural deviance and 
structural theories is first necessary. Theoretical perspectives on gang delinquency are plentiful 
in the criminological literature. These perspectives are quite diverse and offer unique accounts on 
why individuals get involved in gangs and enable stakeholders to position the problem of South 
Asian gangs. For present purposes, two perspectives on gang delinquency will be examined: 
subcultural and structural perspectives. 
  Subcultural deviance models are premised on the notion that there are conflicting 
cultures that exist in a differentiated society (Rosner-Kornhauser, 1978). This perspective has 
been put forward by several theorists and claims that violent behaviour is value driven, and that 
certain individuals adhere to a set of values or beliefs that condones violence (Ball-Rokeach, 
1973). In other words, those who adopt antisocial values and attitudes may act more violent 
when motivated (Markowitz, 2003). These values and beliefs are typically developed through a 
process of socialization that condones such behaviour (Rosner-Kornhauser, 1978). 
Unfortunately, there is no consensus as to what role gangs play in the socialization of these 
values. Mainly, it is unclear whether youth who already have violent values join gangs or if 
youth develop these beliefs after joining gangs. The result is circular arguments where theorists 
have a difficult time explaining if pro law-breaking values and orientations proceed gang 
involvement or are formulated afterwards. Nevertheless, many theorists have contributed 
important ideas to the subcultural perspective, especially in the case of gang delinquency. The 
communal or group nature of gangs makes the assertion easy to accept that a shared value system 
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exists and is reinforced through a process of learning among its members (Miller, Cohen and 
Bryant, 1997).  
Albert Cohen (1955) one of the earliest contributors to the subcultural perspective, argues 
that youth from lower-class families experience frustration at being held to the same academic 
standards as their middle-class counterparts. Cohen (1955) advanced the concept of ‘reaction 
formation,’ suggesting that delinquency was the result of the frustration youth experience from 
failing to achieve culturally approved goals. This condition allows for a delinquent subculture to 
emerge where values and beliefs that condone delinquency and violence become prevalent. Like 
Cohen (1955), Walter B. Miller (1958) suggests that delinquency is a reaction to the extreme 
conditions youth in lower class communities are subject to and is a direct repudiation of middle-
class norms. To Miller (1958) lower class youth develop a set of focal concerns, defined as a set 
of values, a way of life, and a pattern of behaviour, characterized by trouble, toughness, 
smartness, excitement, fate and autonomy, which provide lower class youth with the status they 
need to navigate their social worlds (Miller, 1958).  
In contrast to the subcultural perspective, structural theories emphasize the economic, 
social and class structure of society and how they might influence offending. Strain theories 
predominate in structural accounts of gang involvement. Merton (1938) notes that emphasis on 
socially desirable material and economic success without access to legitimate means to achieve 
these desired goals results in working class youth experiencing strain. One way to adapt to such a 
strain is to innovate (i.e. criminal offending) (Merton, 1938). Agnew (1992) contributes to strain 
theory by adding the role of negative emotions, where individuals who experience strain may be 
angry at the social system that excludes them from legitimate means to achieve success. This 
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anger, and other related negative emotions, largely mediates the relationship between strain and 
delinquency (Agnew, 1992).  
Like strain theories, social disorganization theories also fall under the umbrella of 
structural perspectives. Shaw and McKay (1942) examine certain high crime neighbourhoods, 
noting that these socially disorganized communities have low levels of solidarity, cohesion and 
integration among citizens, leading to poor informal social control. This low level of community 
efficacy results in increased crime in these communities (Shaw and McKay, 1942).  
Some scholars have argued that both structural and cultural factors work together to 
explain delinquent behaviour. Heimer (1997) argues that many studies fail to find the link 
between social and economic structure of society in shaping delinquent or violent beliefs. Oliver 
(2013) suggests that institutional racism has prevented African American access to legitimate 
opportunity structures. This institutional racism stems from Caucasian dominance over 
institutions, which is based on the desire to maintain the European appearance and achievement 
of such institutions (Oliver, 2013). This has directly led to the erosion of a cultural identity 
among Blacks, and what Oliver (2013) classifies as a dysfunctional cultural adaptation. Among 
other things, this adaptation takes the form of distorted definitions and beliefs of manhood. This 
might explain offending as the result of coping with the stress of ghetto life (Oliver, 2013). This 
perspective has led to a body of literature on hegemonic masculinities and crime (Connell and 
Messerschmit, 2005).   
Cultural theories are not without some general criticisms and largely fell out of favour in 
the 1970s for their perceived lack of theoretical foundation, ignoring the role of social 
disorganization and economic strain, and their tautological reasoning (Rosner-Kornhauser, 
1978). At this time, the civil rights movement caused a paradigm shift in criminology where the 
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focus went to social structure as well as an emphasis on labelling theory (Miller, Cohen and 
Bryant, 1997). One of the most common criticisms of subcultural theories is that they tend to 
focus primarily on explaining the offending of lower-class delinquents and do not do an adequate 
job accounting for the offending of middle or upper-class populations. Sutherland (1945) is an 
exception to this as he wrote extensively on the offending of white-collar criminals. For 
Sutherland (1945), a capitalist society produced values oriented towards greed and selfish 
gratification. Criminal behaviour, such as white-collar crime, is the result of a materialistic 
society that equates wealth with personal worth. It is society and the push to achieve the 
“American Dream” that explains the behaviour of white-collar criminals. Other criticisms of the 
subcultural perspective include a lack of clear definition of subculture; the subcultural status 
serving to marginalize youth further; and overestimating crime in lower-class communities 
(Nwalozie, 2015).  
Rosner-Kornhauser (1978) is well regarded in her criticisms of subcultural theories, with 
one such central argument being that they fail to adequality show how social structure and 
culture work together to produce criminal behaviour. It has been long regarded that the marriage 
between structural factors (i.e. socio-economic status) and cultural factors (i.e. distinct value-
orientations) remains unsuccessful despite research suggesting they are independently strong 
predictors of criminal behaviour (Hiemer, 1997). According to the literature this could be 
corrected in two ways. The first way is to better integrate culture and structure when theorizing 
about crime, something Hiemer (1997) attempts to do through an analytical model that integrates 
socio-economic factors, parental supervision, discipline, and the learning of ‘subcultural 
definitions favourable to violence’.  The second way is to disregard certain structural variables 
like social class altogether. Here Nwalozie (2015) calls for a new post-subcultural theory that 
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underplays the significance of class and social inequalities and instead emphasizes the dynamics 
of contemporary youth culture. According to these scholars, removing social class in cultural 
theories broadens its scope, making it applicable to middle and upper-class offenders, as well as 
offering a solution to the poorly articulated culture/structure relationship.  
 
Subcultural theories as a way to pathologize the racialized offender  
 Another common criticism of some subcultural theories is their tendency to use ‘culture’ 
as a way to pathologize different racial groups. Precisely, when describing the offending of 
racialized minorities, inherent cultural differences becomes the primary explanatory factor, 
causing these individuals to be regarded as socially or psychologically abnormal. These theories 
tend to promote the idea that a distinct pro-law breaking or violent value system exists among 
particular groups which are transmitted and reinforced through a process of social learning 
(Hawkins, 1983). However, early subcultural theories were primarily concerned with explaining 
variations in crime among White offenders but did not attribute crime to a White culture or a 
distinct set of values and orientations associated with White populations (Covington, 1995). 
Instead, these theories focused on explaining the crimes of lower-class male offenders, which 
were attributed to a lower-class value system.  
Subculture theories eventually shifted from a focus on lower class crimes to crimes 
committed by racialized offenders, particularly African American offenders. Indeed, these 
theories were used to make sense of police data that showed Blacks were more likely than 
Whites to be arrested and overrepresented in the justice system (Covington, 1995). By focusing 
on racial identity and cultural characteristics, social scientists were largely able to minimize, or 
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even completely overlook the role structural factors, such as poverty or institutional racism, in 
accounting for differences reflected in the police data (Case, 2008). 
Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967) were some of the earliest theorists to focus on Black 
offenders and were primarily concerned with the question of why African American men in 
Philadelphia had higher rates of violent crime like homicide than White individuals. Wolfgang 
and Ferracuti (1967) draw on psychological, biological, and sociological accounts to argue that 
certain subcultures tend to have values and orientations, either through child-rearing practices 
and social conditioning and learning, that promote violence and view it an acceptable response to 
conflict. Nevertheless, Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967) stress that not all members of a subgroup 
support the use of violence. This work touched off a significant amount of statistical analysis that 
generally rejected the subculture of violence thesis attributed to Black homicide rates (Dixon and 
Lizotte, 1987; Loftin and Hill, 1974; Parker and Smith, 1979). In other words, research found no 
evidence that Black offenders had a distinct set of values that explained higher rates of violent 
offending like homicide.  
Despite some of the criticisms levied against such accounts, some scholars continued 
pathologizing Black offenders in such a manner. One of the more recent contributions to the 
subcultural perspective in this regard is Elijah Anderson’s (1999) seminal book the Code of the 
Street. Similar to Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1966), Anderson (1999) advances a theory of 
offending by Black males in urban Philadelphia. Anderson (1999) suggests that some poor 
African American men may be inclined to violence due to their adoption of violent values, which 
they embrace for the objective of survival in ghettoized neighbourhoods. These individuals adopt 
what Anderson (1999) refers to as the code of the street, which he defines as a set of informal 
rules that govern interpersonal violent behaviour. Individuals may resort to violence to settle 
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disputes, particularly when they feel their respect has been threatened. For Anderson (1999) 
violence under the code functions as a form of cultural adaption to social conditions in the urban 
neighbourhood, which most notably includes the loss of manufacturing jobs that has resulted in 
high unemployment among African American men, coupled with the historical realities of 
slavery and segregation. Through hyper-masculine forms of aggression, the code of the street 
allows African American men the ability to reclaim their perceived loss of masculinity and 
survive under the harsh conditions of the ghetto. The code is crucial for people to protect 
themselves when they are faced with threats of interpersonal violence and aggression. Thus, the 
code offers a set of behaviour patterns associated with a system of values and beliefs that can 
literally keep people alive in dangerous inner cities.  
Anderson (1999) outlines two types of families and categories of people that reside in 
these communities: ‘street’ and ‘decent’. Street oriented families and individuals are considered 
selfish and angry, perform parental duties sporadically, socialize their children under the code, 
and often resort to violence when they feel disrespected (Anderson, 1999). Street families are 
also largely headed by single-mothers or grandmothers and the presence of a strong authoritative 
father is absent. This aligns with the arguments made by earlier theorists, such as Messner and 
Sampson (1991), who outline how family disruption and the prevalence of female-run 
households in Black communities causes violent juvenile offending. Decent families, in contrast, 
have some hope for the future. They work hard and are thought to value the role of a man in a 
family as a role model and form of informal social control. While not as heavily invested in the 
code as street families, decent families understand the necessity of resorting to the threat of 
violence if necessary (Anderson, 1999). For Hazlehurst and Hazlehurst (1998), the assertion of 
 35 
masculinity is what motivates some African American males, particularly when they feel 
disrespected.  
Despite some of the relevance of Anderson’s writing, there are some general critiques 
that cannot be overlooked. First, Anderson’s use of the mutually exclusive categories of ‘street’ 
and ‘decent’ is generally problematic as it ignores social or structural mechanisms that might 
push one individual or family down a particular orientation than the other (Wacquant, 2002). 
Precisely, the code must work in conjunction with other social forces that are active in the ghetto, 
including lax gun laws and the ‘prisonization’ of street life (Wacquant, 2002). Second, 
Anderson’s analysis fails to adequately address the issue of causation. Are street families poor 
because of their morality and value orientations or does their position and state of destitution 
shape their values (Wacquant, 2002)? Anderson also adopts a moralistic tone, clearly taking and 
vindicating the side of the ‘decent’ father, grandmother, or family.  
Relevant to this analysis is concern over whether Anderson is simply perpetuating racist 
stereotypes of African Americans living in disadvantaged communities. Calling out the 
detrimental nature of such theorizing, Case (2008) suggests that the tendency of cultural theories 
to pathologize among racial lines works to increase the sense of “otherness” associated with 
minority populations. This may ultimately obscure what are believed to be more relevant 
structural factors, such as systemic discrimination in the justice system, an unequal access to 
opportunities, and family-structure. As much of subcultural theory pertains to Black offenders, 
these perspectives are not extended to other racialized minority groups, particularly those that are 
not typically pathologized as “risky”, such as South Asians. The next section examines how the 
South Asian “gangster” has been constructed in the very limited literature on South Asian gang 
involvement.  
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“The keys to the Porsche of life”: The problematization of “South Asian culture” in mainstream 
media 
An influential essay by Anu Bakshi (2002) caused a local controversy among some in the 
South Asian community when it was first published in Macleans Magazine in December 2002 
and remains a source of contention and debate today. Bakshi begins her article by posing a 
question asked by B.C Supreme Court Justice Wally Oppal: “why has the Indo-Canadian 
community raised a disproportionate number of killers?” Bakshi argues that the South Asian 
community has likely ignored this question out of denial. Adopting a moralistic position, Bakshi 
overtly suggests that the Punjabi boy is inherently aggressive and has contempt for the law, 
situating blame directly on the parents who have given the boy “the keys to the Porsche of life”. 
Bakshi posits that sons are given every comfort at the expense of others in the family. Moreover, 
displays of aggression, like kicking or punching their mother, is often looked upon with pride by 
fathers and grandmothers as an indication of their son’s courage. Bakshi paints a bleak picture of 
the Punjabi household, where a cycle of alcohol abuse, domestic violence and a sense of bravado 
among males is responsible for producing the gang violence that has occurred in the greater 
Vancouver area. This essay produced significant debate among the South Asian community with 
some arguing that Bakshi forwarded racist ideas that the Punjabi male was inherently violent as 
well as stereotypes of the Punjabi family, even being reposted on the racist website Immigration 
Watch. However, others believed Bakshi’s article launched an important debate that needed to 
occur in the community to address the gang problem.  
Dissecting Bakshi’s arguments, Buffam (2016) wrote one of the few articles on South 
Asian gang offending in Canada and is more critical on the use and construction of “South Asian 
 37 
culture” as risky. Analyzing media editorials and letters in local newspapers and magazines from 
the South Asian community on the gang problem, Buffam (2016) argues that these texts are 
‘cultural confessions’ that aim to renounce the sins of culture that contributing to the South 
Asian gang problem. Buffam (2016) argues that the Punjabi home has been framed as a space 
that is culturally distinct and patriarchal, and ultimately antithetical to the practices of modern 
‘Western’ norms that value and promote things like gender equality. Buffam (2016) challenges 
Bakshi’s assertation that much of the blame of gang delinquency falls on cultural beliefs, 
traditional practices, and the dynamics of the South Asian family and argues such confessions 
form the basis of racial differentiation.  
Bakshi’s account attributes the South Asian gang ‘problem’ to cultural conditions where 
the bad behaviour of sons, as the preferred gender, is overlooked and subject to less control by 
parents. According to Buffam (2016), people like Bakshi are considered ‘cultural insiders’, 
people who have the ability to provide authoritative accounts on the cultural differences that 
exist and contribute to the gang violence the community is witnessing. Buffam’s (2016) study, 
while illuminating, relies on archival data to critically challenge any cultural explanations that 
arise for gang involvement. This chapter aims to identify how the “South Asian gang member” is 
constructed by directly interviewing individuals Buffam (2016) would consider ‘cultural 
insiders’.    
Making sense of how factors such as patriarchy influence gang offending deviates from 
how “culture” and “structure” are typically problematized in the subcultural literature. This is 
further complicated by the construction of South Asians as a ‘model minority’ among immigrant 
groups. Walton-Roberts and Pratt (2005) deconstruct the ‘model minority’ myth often ascribed 
to South Asians in Canada and offer some clarity in terms of reconciling the idea that South 
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Asians can both be perceived as model immigrants and at the same time as having a culture that 
is more patriarchal and oppositional to the West. Immigrants tend to be conceptualized as 
patriarchal in both positive and negative ways, where the ‘good’ model minorities are those with 
productive and entrepreneurial extended patriarchal families. ‘Bad immigrants or minorities’ are 
viewed as such because of their economic dependency or violent patriarchy norms (Honig, 
1999). Okin (1999) takes this type of analysis one-step further by suggesting multiculturalism 
may promote and protect negative patriarchal practices, while undermining Western principles of 
gender equality and women’s rights.  
Like Buffam (2016), Walton-Roberts and Pratt (2005) draw on the infamous Bakshi 
article to note how South Asian gang offending has been attributed to such patriarchal practices 
where sons are believed to be raised in a “testosterone fueled environment run by an iron-fisted 
patriarch” and where violence is often a tool used by the head of household against his wife or 
subordinate members in the family hierarchy. Walton-Roberts and Pratt (2005) caution against 
viewing patriarchy in such a way, suggesting that analyses of patriarchy fail to consider its 
intersectional nature and how it might manifest itself differently in Canada than it would abroad. 
For Walton-Roberts and Pratt (2005), patriarchy is not something people bring with them from 
the ‘third-world’, but rather, something that is shaped through an adjustment to the existing 
social conditions they experience in their new host countries. For instance, Hage (1998) argues 
that patriarchal authority is often a defensive strategy for immigrants within hostile societies, 
with Thobani (1999) suggesting that Canadian immigration policy itself reinforces and produces 
patriarchy since immigrant women are often placed in conditions of dependency on male 
breadwinners and heads of households.  
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Much of this limited research on South Asian gang offending does not consider the 
narratives of those on the frontline of the issue. This is important for two reasons. First, from a 
governmental standpoint, it is critical to understand how these stakeholders conceptualize a 
social problem since they play a significant role in delivering programming or enforcement. 
Secondly, how stakeholders conceptualize the problem or imagine risk does not have to be 
grounded in reality. The perception that South Asian “culture” is inherently criminogenic will 
have real consequences in everyday life in terms of how they manage the “problem.” 
 
Conceptualizing the problem  
 
 
South Asian gangs versus South Asian gang involvement  
 When defining the concept of a ‘South Asian gang’ a problem becomes immediately 
apparent: do South Asian gangs actually exist as a homogenous entity of entirely South Asian 
members or does the construct refer to individuals of South Asian descent getting involved in 
gangs? On the surface both concepts of “South Asian gangs” and ‘South Asian gang 
involvement” might appear to be synonymous and interchangeable or at least related. However, 
when conceptualizing the problem of South Asian gangs, some respondents emphasize the 
difference between ‘South Asian gangs’ and ‘South Asian gang involvement’. The former is 
racially homogenous, implying that there might be something unique about South Asian ‘culture’ 
that contributes to gang involvement. The latter describes South Asian involvement in gangs that 
may be multi-ethnic.  
 Some respondents felt their community had a South Asian gang problem. Others felt that 
the problem was more of an issue of South Asians getting involved in gangs. A few suggested 
that both dynamics exist. Nevertheless, accurately conceptualizing the phenomenon was 
 40 
important for many participants because of the perceived social ramifications. These individuals 
felt that a distinction was required, due to concerns that references to a “South Asian gang 
problem” could result in perpetuating discriminatory and racist beliefs about South Asians. Anju, 
a researcher and member of an organization that does advocacy and public education in the area 
of South Asian gang involvement, makes an important observation: 
There was a study that was done by the Vancouver Sun media and they were trying to see 
what the perception was of the public of who are the gang members and the majority of 
people thought it was South Asian.  But, when you look at the actual statistics, they're not. 
It's members of the Hells Angel. It's people of Caucasian extraction. So, the fact that we 
have this convenient language, South Asian, it's not South Asian gangs, it's members of the 
South Asian community. Cause if we’re to say Italian gangs, well we don't have Italian 
gangs. We have Italian members that are very involved in Hell's Angels. 
 
Anju, along with other stakeholders, cautions against the label of ‘South Asian gangs’ since it 
might stigmatize the South Asian community. Here, some respondents suggest that the term 
‘South Asian gangs’ carries the damaging connotation that this is a distinctly South Asian 
problem, neglecting or overlooking the gang involvement of non-South Asians in their 
community. Many respondents recognize however that because some communities, like Surrey, 
have highly dense South Asian populations, their involvement in gangs is likely over-represented 
and that South Asians actually only represent a small percentage of gang members in BC as a 
whole.  
Some stakeholders acknowledge that the South Asian gang/gang involvement distinction 
might be temporally and geographically dependent. These respondents felt that distinct South 
Asian gangs may have proliferated in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a response to racism in 
Metro Vancouver but have now evolved into gangs that are less structured around race but 
instead are a formation of mostly (but not limited to) young South Asian males in suburban 
communities claiming a stake in the lucrative drug trade. Since the 1990s, many South Asians 
 41 
have settled in specific communities outside downtown Vancouver, such as parts of Surrey or 
Abbotsford. This has led to the creation of silos that are largely insular areas where South Asians 
have formed communities that may be somewhat closed off or not well integrated with the rest 
of the Lower Mainland. Whereas racism may have been a contributing factor for gang 
involvement thirty years ago, many respondents feel that South Asian gang involvement is 
associated with recent geographic settlement patterns forming communities where gang 
members are taking advantage of illicit opportunities available.  
 
The scope of the problem 
 “Massive”, “really big”, “huge”, and “a growing epidemic” are just some of the words 
used by a few respondents to describe how prevalent the issue South Asian gangs or South Asian 
gang involvement is in their community. For many stakeholders interviewed, the problem of 
South Asian gangs is a major source of concern. This is particularly true of police who generally 
feel the issue of South Asian gangs, as well as gangs in general, is a major problem in their 
communities. When describing the prevalence of the problem, officer Surjit, a gang specialist, 
argues:  
Oh, it absolutely is a problem. Like it's to the point where when we talk about 
overrepresentation, every street now has kids who are either getting into it or already in it. 
My neighbourhood there are two people that I know of that are heavily involved in these 
gangs and all these small pockets around the city, it's scary, a lot of kids are getting in to 
it. A lot of them. 
 
For Surjit, the problem is significant because of the ability of gangs to influence a great number 
of youths in his community, including individuals in his own neighbourhood. Other respondents 
draw on gang violence statistics to illustrate the scope of the problem. Many police officers in 
particular list the number of causalities from gang shootings in their community as evidence of 
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the severity of their community’s gang problem. As law enforcement is often the first to respond 
to gang violence and witness its outcome, they are likely to view it as a bigger problem than 
other respondents. 
 Although many respondents felt the problem was significant and of major concern, there 
were many that adopted a more pragmatic view. This shows that there is a disparity in how 
stakeholders imagine the scope of the problem. For these individuals, the media likely inflates or 
exacerbates the problem. Paul, a youth worker and former gang member, describes the media’s 
role in perpetuating a moral panic: 
So, when you look at the numbers of South Asian and really break it down to a percentage, 
what is the percentage of youth or South Asians getting involved in gang lifestyle? Well I 
don't think that number will break 2%, right? The media likes to glorify those that are in 
the lifestyle, those that are being killed, like the Bindy Johals 
 
For respondents like Paul, the media has glorified the lifestyle of notorious gangsters like the late 
Bindy Johal. For these respondents, media coverage is disproportionate to the actual threat posed 
by these gangs. Many stakeholders argue that the occurrence of high-profile violent incidents 
may contribute to the skewed perception of the problem. These sentiments are shared by Ash, a 
youth and family worker who works with the South Asian community: “what happened is a lot 
of these cases became very high profile, therefore it gave the impression that South Asian youth 
were overrepresented in gangs.” This perspective suggests that South Asian gang involvement 
may not be as massive a problem as argued by some other types of stakeholders, like the police, 
or at the very least there is not a community-wide consensus as to the scope of the problem. 
While these respondents are not minimizing the impact of South Asian gangs, and are indeed 
involved in programing, they feel the media, and its tendency to sensationalize a few high-profile 
incidents, creates an inaccurate picture of South Asian gang involvement. There are some 
negative consequences that stem from the media’s representation of the South Asian gang 
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problem. Mainly, some respondents felt the media was responsible for stigmatizing young South 
Asian males, which results in racial profiling and other racist outcomes.   
 
Conceptualizing risk for South Asian gang involvement  
 
Respondents were asked a series of questions to derive a sense of how they 
conceptualized risk in relation to offenders of South Asian descent. Although most respondents 
point to risk factors that are common among the literature, such as family, individual or the 
community, for many, these factors may be qualitatively different for South Asians. Precisely, in 
pathologizing South Asian culture as risky, many respondents point to a distinct value system 
that is inherent to South Asian communities that encourages and condones gang involvement, 
particularly among male offspring. Further, while risk is conceptualized in such a manner, there 
are still others who point to structural factors, including socio-economic status, as motivators for 
gang involvement. What makes these accounts more erratic is that both family wealth and 
poverty or working-class economic conditions are associated with gang involvement.  This 
suggests that South Asian gang involvement is perceived to fall anywhere on the socioeconomic 
spectrum.  Nevertheless, what is unclear is the relationship “culture” shares with “structure” 
based on these narratives.   
 
“The Golden Boy” and “Gold Collar Lifestyle” and its relationship to the ‘South Asian family’  
“I think that there's certain expectations, especially with young South Asian males, that 
they're put on a pedestal and they're given almost carte blanche and they can't really make 
mistakes in the eyes of their parents.” These are the words of Anita, who works with at-risk 
youth. According to stakeholders like her, culturally distinct family practices produce risk as 
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some South Asian families might create an environment that either overlooks, or at worst 
condones, the gang offending of sons. In other words, parents are more likely to excuse, dismiss, 
or rationalize the negative behaviour of male children. Here, respondents point to males being 
the preferred gender in some South Asian households, where their worth is often elevated above 
that of daughters. According to youth worker Ash, boys are often raised with a different set of 
principles that promote maintaining family honour, and using aggression to get their way. For 
Ash, growing up there is an expectation on boys to one day be the primarily breadwinner, 
making the financial lure of gangs more appealing since the lucrative illicit marijuana trade in 
BC has produced many opportunities for easy wealth. These respondents felt that parts of South 
Asian culture promote bravado and aggression in males, while also emphasizing the capacity for 
them to be financially successful, pushing them towards gangs. Aggression is an important 
component that is associated with the patriarchal structure of some South Asian families, mainly 
the use of violence.  
Youth worker Ash draws parallels between gang involvement and domestic violence, 
finding that both dynamics involve exercising power over others. Domestic violence then is 
constructed as a risk factor by a handful of respondents. Ash draws on her experience 
counselling South Asian male offenders of domestic violence and notices a connection to gangs. 
Many respondents point to incidents of domestic abuse in some immigrant families as risk 
factors for gangs as sons often learn violent behaviour from their fathers and reproduce it 
through their involvement in gangs. Police officer Gurjit describes the patriarchal class structure 
that exists in some South Asian homes, where the male is considered dominant and women play 
a more subservient role that is historically entrenched through the allocation of traditional gender 
roles that exist in India and are reproduced or transferred over in Canada. Like Ash, Gurjit 
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suggests that this mentality has a residual effect on younger generations and plays a role in their 
involvement in gangs.   
Nevertheless, many respondents argue that there is a lot of denial in South Asian 
families. While denial is not necessarily unique to South Asian families, it does relate to the 
notion of the “golden boy” mentality. Anti-gang educator Anju makes another important 
observation in this regard as to how sons are viewed in some South Asian homes: 
The other unique problem is, I think the big one, and I'm sure you've heard this a million times, 
is denial. And the denial is a problem and that is some South Asian families are always revering 
their sons as their ideal and it does not allow them to see some of the ugly side of activity and 
this constant protecting of their sons, in particular has allowed a lot of these boys to get away 
with particular kinds of behaviour and that does then translate later and then parents don't see 
the red flags early enough. 
 
Denial is a major attribute many interviewees felt exist in some South Asian homes with parents 
being oblivious or purposively blind to their sons’ activities.  
For the casual observer, the problem might play out as an issue of denial, however this 
denial appears to emerge from a patriarchal structure that places high value on male offspring as 
the “golden boy” or “prince” of the family. Interviewees suggest that many South Asian parents 
have a hard time accepting their son’s involvement in gangs or generally believe their sons can 
do no wrong. This perspective is highlighted by several officers and school principals who 
discuss their interactions with South Asian parents that have gang-involved sons. These 
interactions are often described as hostile towards authorities with many parents being in denial. 
According to school vice-principal Allen, parents are reluctant to even entertain the idea that 
their sons are lying to them about their involvement in gangs. For respondents like Allen, this 
denial is reflective of South Asian cultural forces that tend to want to handle problems and issues 
of shame at home. This relates to the tendency for some South Asian families to be closed off 
from authorities or other perceived outsiders. School principal David recounts a story of a former 
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student whose parents were reluctant to go to the police when their house was shot at by rival 
gang members or when they found a gun in their son’s room. David feels that some South Asian 
families want to manage problems themselves and avoid police interaction.   
David’s argument is not necessarily unique to the South Asian community as other 
racialized minority groups have historically had adversarial relationships with the police or have 
largely closed themselves off from law enforcement through a code of silence. For example, 
studies have shown that African Americans have been reluctant to contact or cooperate with 
police than Whites due to a lower perception of procedural fairness (Tyler, 2005). Also, Chinese 
triads and other ethnic organized crime groups tend to adopt a strict code of silence that prohibits 
members from cooperating with police investigators (Etter, 2011). Hence, David’s assertion that 
South Asians families tend to avoid police contact is actually a common response of many 
racialized communities that may be reluctant to contact or cooperate with authorities.   
Additionally, many respondents argue that the mother is the most resistant towards 
accepting their son’s lifestyle. This illuminates an important idea, which is that the South Asian 
mother often shares a heavier load of blame for the failures of children, particularly males. 
Mothers are often considered to be the ones hiding information from the police, school officials, 
and even their husbands, or generally condoning, rationalizing and enabling their son’s 
behaviour by protecting them. It is also indicative of the failures in child rearing, which is placed 
at the feet of mothers, an argument subcultural theorists like Anderson (1999) often assert.   
 Other interviewees stress the differences in how boys are raised than girls. These 
respondents draw on the concept of the ‘prince’ to illustrate the treatment of sons. John, a gang 
unit officer, makes an important observation: “The negative thing is some of the families would 
treat the boys like princes and the women would do all the work, go to school, take care of the 
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household so these kids, the males would be out there like the world's open to them.” For 
respondents like John, South Asian daughters are subject to stricter parental control and usually 
excel professionally in fields like medicine, law or business. Sons, on the other hand, are not 
subject to such parental control, as education and hard work are not as strongly promoted. This 
seems contrary to the broader literature, which suggests that South Asians are generally well 
educated (Xie and Goyette, 2003). According to respondents, this probably is not the case of 
Punjabi South Asians, who may be culturally ‘different’ than South Asians from other parts of 
India. Officer John draws on personal experience of having dealt with one family where the 
daughter became a doctor, but two sons from that family turned to gangs and were eventually 
murdered. John ties these divergent paths to a lack of responsibility instilled in the boys at an 
early age, the direct result of how some South Asian families raise their kids. The antisocial 
behaviour of boys is often chalked up to the adage of ‘boys will be boys’, which some 
respondents suggest is a component of South Asian culture.   
 Related to the ‘golden boy’ or ‘the prince’ concepts are that of materialism or a “gold 
collar lifestyle”. According to many interview participants, a large number of gang-involved 
South Asian youth reside in middle to upper-class neighbourhoods, and may live in multi-
millionaire dollar homes with expensive cars. The South Asian community has generally done 
financially well in Canada and is often considered a model immigrant group. Nevertheless, the 
socioeconomic backgrounds of these gang members are believed to be much different than what 
is found in the broader research, which often points to poverty as a major risk factor for gang 
involvement. Some respondents, like gang unit officer Ranjit, believe that these youth have 
access to many legitimate opportunities for success, particularly higher education, but are still 
drawn to gangs.  Thus, there would appear to be other forces at play, namely, the role of 
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materialism as a constructed risk factor and a culturally enshrined value, according to 
respondents.  
A number of respondents suggest that materialism is a risk factor for gang offending. 
Harjit, a community activist, describes the concept of ‘a gold collar’ lifestyle:  
I'm not sure if you're familiar with that term, "gold collar lifestyle". So, there's obviously 
the blue collar, white collar lifestyle and then there's something called the gold collar, 
where you want to ascertain a certain level of success without putting in next to nothing 
for effort. The Kim Kardashian, the Paris Hilton lifestyles and stuff like that.  
 
Harjit explains that this lifestyle creates a situation of self-entitlement, where young men are 
provided with an access to money, luxury cars, expensive clothing, and other material things. 
This gold collar lifestyle feeds into the appeal of gangs, where young men are lured into the 
supposed glamorous life of a gangster and promised money, cars, and women. For respondents 
like Harjit, the patriarchal structure of some South Asian families, and the value placed on sons, 
has not only perpetuated the gold collar lifestyle but has made gang involvement much easier. 
This line of thinking, which is repeated by many respondents, becomes adopted as common 
knowledge on South Asian gang involvement. However, these ideas actually find root in 
traditional criminological theories, including both subcultural theories and structural ones (i.e. 
Merton’s strain), though these theories do not typically explain middle-class offending.   
 Yet, much of the knowledge that is propagated centres on culture. School district 
employee Jaspal, who works with at-risk youth, provides a related commentary on what he refers 
to as consequences of a such a materialistic lifestyle: 
What the challenge now is that the individual male isn't at home or emotionally unavailable 
and you have these young, entitled, petulant, spoiled boys, who's dads work incredible hard 
to give them everything that the kid could want and so you grow at 16, 17, never having 
had any discipline. Never having put time and into a craft or skill or into your identity and 
you wake up at 17, 18 with a C- average, zero discipline, zero social skills, zero studying 
skills, zero work ethic and you're expected to go out and conquer the world. 
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Jaspal’s perspective is similar to others in that sons are often subjected to less control by parents 
on virtue of being born a male, where values such as hard work and dedication might be minimized 
in favour of spoiling them with material items. For these respondents, the treatment of ‘golden 
boys’ by their families is detrimental when they enter adulthood and are expected to earn a living 
and adapt to mainstream societal principles that emphasize a strong work ethic to earning wealth. 
The gold collar lifestyle or materialism that permeates in the dynamics of some families where 
socially accepted values such as hard work is deemphasized and replaced with instant gratification 
and wealth acquisition. 
Despite these narratives, Alexander (2008) warns against focusing too much on cultural 
factors, arguing that it often becomes the primary, and sometimes only, signifier in 
understanding South Asian communities. This is problematic as culture often serves as an excuse 
when things go wrong in a racialized community and individuals are looking to place blame 
(Alexander, 2008). In this present study, many respondents imagine the patriarchal structure of 
some South Asians families as a risk factor for gang involvement, yet some also recognize 
structural factors. However, the manner in which risk is constructed along cultural lines raises an 
important question:  if patriarchal family structures and South Asian ‘culture’ are to blame for 
the higher degree of gang delinquency among South Asian boys in BC, why has this 
phenomenon not been reproduced in other highly dense South Asian communities across North 
America, like the Greater Toronto Area or parts of the United States and the United Kingdom?  
A central critique of subcultural theories is their tendency to downplay the role of 
structural factors in producing deviant outcomes. According to activist Harjit, the gold-collar 
lifestyle exists because of the drug trade in British Columbia, or in other words, the structural 
characteristic of criminal opportunities available in the region:  
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But I can tell you right now, speaking with gangsters, knowing gangsters, being on the 
street level, spending 12 years on this, I can tell you wholeheartedly, 100% with accuracy 
and confidence, it's fucking about the marijuana trade. That's it. It lives and dies with the 
marijuana trade. 
 
For Harjit, the local gang problem should end with the legalization of marijuana. Respondents 
like Harjit conceptualize the problem of South Asian gang involvement as rising from a variety 
of cultural processes and/or structural factors where the negative aspects of South Asian 
“culture” are accentuated by factors such the structure of the criminal market.    
 
Culture and Punjabi media – glorification of the gang lifestyle 
It seems then that the story of South Asian gang involvement as seen through the eyes of 
respondents largely centres on materialistic values and opportunities available to engage in 
criminal activity. However, according to some respondents a materialistic lifestyle and the 
promotion of the gold collar lifestyle is not only validated by the family but is perpetuated by 
both the Western and the Punjabi media in particular. For these respondents, like Officer Scott, 
the glamorization of gangs has made some South Asian youth more susceptible to gangs than 
other cultural groups. Fellow Officer, John, makes a similar argument, noting that youth seek out 
the gang lifestyle after watching movies or videos. Gang unit officer Ranjit describes this 
cultural element of South Asian gangs as a distinctly BC phenomenon. In other words, when 
comparing the South Asian community in other parts of Canada, like Ontario, Ranjit believes 
South Asians in BC have developed a distinct subculture of their own that is not found 
elsewhere. Frost (2010) discusses the concept of a “Surrey Jack”, a form of masculine protest 
that developed in Surrey, BC and is indicative of a unique subculture that is specific to that 
region. According to Frost (2010):  
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Jacks are well known throughout Surrey, easily distinguishable by their spiky hair with 
blonde tips, chin strips, (intimidation) diamond stud earrings, low slung pants, and baggy 
tops. A Jack’s life revolves around partying, heavy drinking, doing, and in many cases, 
dealing drugs, picking fights, and “messing around” with different girls. Jacks are not 
concerned with school or potential careers, and many are expelled from or are unable to 
cope with attending regular public schools with their peers. (P.221-222) 
 
Further, Frost (2010) argues that Jacks tend to be negatively perceived by other, more prosocial, 
groups of South Asian youth, including the “Brown boys” and “Brown girls”.  Many South 
Asian youth in Frost’s (2010) study believe that boys who fit the profile of a “Surrey Jack” are 
directly responsible for the gang violence in their community. Notably, during the course of this 
study, no research participant mentioned the concept of a ‘Surrey Jack’ specifically, yet the 
associated behaviour pattern and values they possess were identified by respondents.   
 Officer Ranjit further elaborates on the distinct subculture that has emerged in BC by 
tracing the developing of South Asian gangs in the late 80s and early 90s during the lucrative 
criminal reigns of Bindy Johal and the Dhosanj brothers. Their criminal empires paved the way 
for a cultural image of the “Indo-Canadian gangster”, which was then glamorized in local 
movies, television and music and is emulated by the current crop of young South Asian males in 
the lower Mainland. 
 Countless respondents suggest that the legacies of Bindy Johal and Dhosanj brothers still 
resonate with South Asian men and are regarded as contemporary folk heroes in the region. This 
cultural element that appears to be distinctly Western Canadian provides an interesting 
perspective on South Asian gang involvement. School Principal Jessie suggests that figures such 
as these are negative role models to youth and idealised by the media. He argues that: “students 
see this in the community, young men who have got into this lifestyle, driving nice cars and 
having lots of money and jewellery and a bit of a glamorous lifestyle. So, they see that as an easy 
way of getting ahead and looking good.”  
 52 
South Asian youth gang intervention worker Priya describes the influence of the Punjabi 
media on the youth she sees:  
We definitely have movies and music promote violence and, you know, tell men the 
message that it’s giving is, especially the men, is to be more aggressive, how to handle 
your relationship with a woman, how he should treat family. Usually see portrayal of 
alcohol and drugs and so. It definitely plays a role, but what I'm seeing is these youth are 
definitely connected to their culture and their music. 
 
For Priya, Punjabi media shares some blame in the appeal of gangs through the role they play in 
legitimizing violence or drug use. Further, Priya suggests it goes beyond just glamorizing the 
gang lifestyle by having a more damaging socializing effect on youth, where certain behaviour is 
taught and reinforced, particularly aggression and violence.  
While many respondents suggested that aggression or violence might be a feature of 
South Asian culture and patriarchy, and can be perpetuated by the media or taught in the home, 
some are more critical of such arguments. Former gang member Diljit, who does some anti-gang 
intervention independently, cautions against cultural explanations for South Asian gang 
involvement. Diljit suggest that these theories work to develop a caricature of the South Asian 
male as being inherently violent or predisposed to aggression, the results of which can have 
damaging xenophobic and racist consequences.   
 
Racism and masculinity – gang involvement and the emasculated South Asian male 
According to many participants, racism is a form of strain, which in turn results in the 
formation of an exaggerated masculine ideal.  For Connell and Messerschmit (2005), hegemonic 
masculinity is a pattern of practices and behaviour patterns that allow the dominance of men over 
women to continue. All men are required to position themselves in relation to this ideal 
masculinity with only some men being able to successfully achieve it. For young men at the time 
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then, the persona of a strong, aggressive, and powerful leader helped alleviate the social rejection 
and feelings of powerlessness they experienced being a minority group in a largely Caucasian 
community and to claim a stake in the masculine hierarchy. In a study on Asian American (both 
South and East Asia) masculinity, Shek (2007) notes that Asian Americans tend to create 
negative self-evaluations based on the perception of failing to live up to the expectations of 
others. “Within the framework of hegemonic masculinity, Asian American masculinities are 
subordinated, as are other forms of masculinity, such as those among men of colour, gay men, 
and bisexual men.” (Shek, 2007: p383)  
As noted earlier, subcultural explanations tend to overlook structural factors that push 
youth to gangs. One such notable structural factor central to the South Asian diaspora is racism. 
Diljit, who was heavily involved in gangs during the 1990s, describes his experiences dealing 
with racism by drawing on one incident in particular that had a profound impact on his life: 
[My parents] sent me across the line to [name of school removed] which is this super rich 
school. [My parents] were like ‘well he's got all these fucking study problems and we don't 
want to send him to fuckin [name of school removed]. So, we'll send him to a school on the 
West side. The richer neighbourhood.’ And, I got fucking bullied there too and I'm just kind of 
like: holy fuck. I’m getting slapped around by all these fucking white kids out here that are 
super rich.  And what ends up happening is, there's this one kid that would always fucking beat 
the shit out of me all the time. I was fuckin’ scared to go to the fucking locker-room all the 
time. So, one day we had this dance. I showed the fuck up and a whole bunch of these 
Vietnamese kids showed up from my fucking neighbourhood. Some of them I knew... And they 
were like ‘hey man. How's it going?’ And so the older kids, that were 17 or 18, they were like 
‘What that kid's fucking bugging you?’ And they fucking pound him. These kids were all gang 
members, 16, 17 years old. When they did that for me, bam, a fucking thug light went off. I was 
like ‘I'm going to be a fucking gangster too.’ Nobody fucks with you. That's what I'm doing. 
That's what I want. 
 
For Diljit, being consistently called a “Hindoo”, a regional derogatory racial slur, as well as 
regular physical abuse played a significant role in turning to Vietnamese gangs, eventually 
leading him to form his own predominately South Asian gang as an adult. Gangs became an 
avenue to cope with experiences of racism for working class youth in the 1980s and 1990s in 
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Metro Vancouver. These gangs also allowed boys like Diljit to reclaim their masculinity in the 
face of racism. Diljit makes an important observation:  
You know there's always a notion of, you know, Apu of The Simpsons. ‘Will you like a 
Slurpee?’ [said in a thick Indian accent]. The fucking Hindoo is the fucking cab driver, as 
a nerdy doctor. You watch them in popular culture. The stumbling guy that never gets laid. 
You know what I mean? It's an emasculated male. Then Bindy comes along and he's 
fucking ripped with fucking muscles. He's got 40 fucking pounds of gold around his 
fucking neck. He's just shot three fucking people and he's laughing about it on fucking TV 
and he's got another fucking 30 Hindoos behind him, sitting down and saying ‘who the 
fuck wants to fuck around?’ Who's going to fuck around? It's an emasculated male driving 
around in a Corvette. 
 
Diljit notes that these racist images of the South Asian male hobbled young men at the time. 
Consequently, people like Bindy Johal and other predominant South Asian gangsters adopted 
hyper-masculine personalities to counter these negative stereotypes and deal with the realities of 
living in a more racially volatile time through exercising extreme violence and aggression. 
Theorizing on hegemonic masculinity has received substantial attention in gender studies, 
including the area of crime and offending. 
As Diljit notes, racist caricatures of the South Asian male in the media, like the character 
of Apu, and the racism he experienced in his neighbourhood, lead young men in the community 
to adopt hyper-masculine and aggressive personalities as well as making significant physical 
changes in both body and attire to subvert these negative ideas. Under this framework of 
hegemonic masculinity then, boys like Diljit are required to make changes deemed necessary in 
order to meet societal expectations on masculinity that they are otherwise denied or blocked 
from obtaining, which may also highlight why they join gangs. Aarti, a violence prevention 
worker, makes an important observation: 
In the 90s when you think of people like Bindy Johal, they were very distinct ethnic gangs, 
specifically South Asian ethnic, which in my analysis I feel like rose out of the racism and 
discrimination that a lot of South Asians [faced]... and this was a way of retaliation and 
gaining the power back and showing quote on quote ‘their manhood.’ 
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Diljit’s motivation for joining a gang is attributed to the typical struggles of a working-class 
youth and the racism he experienced in a predominately White community in the 1980s and 
1990s. Hyper-masculinity is a tool used by racialized men in urban and working-class 
communities to reclaim their masculinity (Rios, 2011). This however has changed in that region 
as many suburbs, like Surrey and Delta, have seen the development of large South Asian 
dominated neighbourhoods. Many respondents who live in these communities suggest that 
racism may not play as a significant role in motivating young people into gangs as it may have in 
the past. For these individuals, racism has some historical roots that are not as influential in 
driving young South Asian men to gangs today.  
 However, some respondents suggest that this is not the case in other cities, like 
Abbotsford, where a clear racial divide is imagined. For some South Asian gang workers in these 
communities, the experience of racism is still very much alive and a potential risk factor for gang 
involvement. Veer works with at-risk and gang involved South Asian youth in this more racially 
divided city. Veer suggests that schools in the West, which are predominately attended by South 
Asian students, receive much lower funding than schools in the majority Caucasian East side of 
the city. According to Veer, this has a damaging consequence for a large number of South 
Asians who are excluded from a number of recreation and academic opportunities afforded to 
their Caucasian counterparts in the East.  
The racial division extends beyond just a lack of opportunities for South Asians students. 
According to respondents in this community, feeling racially stereotyped is a common 
experience among South Asian youth in particular. As a young South Asian male in his early 
twenties, Veer acknowledges personally feeling discriminated against, arguing that: “well 
everyone thinks that if you’re an Indian male you must be a gangster. You must be on drugs.” 
 56 
Veer feels this very much a regional problem, noting that his city is a divided one. For Veer, 
police and schools are “a lot harder” on East Indian youth, especially when they offend. Veer’s 
colleague Ranbir echoes many of his thoughts on racism in the community. Ranbir notes that the 
youth he works with often indicate instances of being racially targeted by authority figures, like 
teachers and principals. Veer makes the connection to internalized feelings of racial 
discrimination and subsequent gang involvement:  
When you grow up in a city where you are racially discriminated against, you slowly start to fit 
that persona, right? So we have a lot of kids that have quoted saying that in the schools they got 
into trouble so many times, and I got labelled this so many times that I just became it, because 
there was no longer a reason not to do it…When you get called a gangbanger for so long, you 
start to believe it and that's exactly what's happening to a lot of these youth. So, it somehow 
does become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 
Similar to the theorizing of interactionists, Veer argues that young males might internalize and 
oddly embrace labels such ‘troublemaker’ or ‘gangbanger’ that are the result of racism in the 
community. Young South Asian males essentially become the thing that they are labeled – a 
gangster.  
 
Competing narratives: gangs an upper class or a working-class phenomenon? 
The experience of individuals like Diljit, who came from a working-class family 
background and dealt with racism, stands in stark contrast to many other respondents who point 
to materialism and the perception that most gangsters today come from wealthy or successful 
families. According to these respondents, class is constructed as a risk factor for gang 
involvement.  
Officer Gurjit however, who runs a community youth organization on his spare time, 
challenges the perception that South Asian gang involved youth come from affluence and wealth.  
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Whoever is telling you that they're coming from upper class families are dead wrong. …I 
can tell you for fact, personally dealing with kids, a lot of kids coming to our programs, I 
say lower socio-economic I mean middle class to low socio-economic. These are families 
who are trying to make a living by making ends meet, by working multiple jobs. So just 
because they happen to live in a nice home doesn't mean that they're not part of the labour 
class working 2, 3 jobs to make ends meet. So, but whether they're driving Mercedes and 
Beemers, and they got millions of dollars in their account, absolutely not. If that was the 
case then what's the whole point of getting into the drug business in the first place? 
 
Diljit delves deeper than Gurjit to challenge the perception that South Asian families are 
generally wealthy: 
it's superficial it's fucking illusionary. So, what do you have? You got fucking property 
prices out in Surrey, you can buy a fucking brand-new house in Surrey, for what? 6-700,000 
dollars. 66-foot lot. You got a 33-foot here, 33-foot frontage by 120 feet deep. Out in Surrey 
you get 66 to fuckin’ 77 feet frontage. You get 130-140 feet depth, width. And then you 
build a big fucking palace with fucking 90,000 Hindoos inside. That's great. Stick fucking 
grandma and grandpa on fucking welfare and then we'll sit down and send them out to the 
fucking berry farms out in fucking like Abbotsford at the age 70 and 80 to pick fucking 
berries all fucking day in the fucking sun. Come back on a school bus. You know what I 
mean? And then you got another fucking 40,000 Hindoos sitting in there fucking working 
for fucking 8, 9 dollars an hour. With all the intended fucking sexism. All the fucking shit 
that's intended, and you're a social scientist, we can problematize certain notions of the 
extended families in certain cultural frameworks. What's going on in that fucking house? 
Are they fucking rich? Or do you have a home where a bunch of [redacted] live in in 
fucking ghettos… There's a fucking big story. You got fucking 20 people fucking living in 
an extended family in that mother-fucking house, sharing expenses. That's the only way 
they can sit down here, they don't go out. They don't eat anything, they don't go to fucking 
restaurants. "Don't buy anything that's too expensive". They're fucking shopping at Wal-
Mart, sitting there working some shitty ass job. That's fucking bullshit. The fucking notion 
that we're upper class, that's a myth of the Punjabi Jat. The Punjabi Jat who's like "look, 
my family has 2000 acres in Punjab". They don't have that shit anymore. Now I think it 
translates "look, my family has a big house in Surrey." It's fucking Surrey man. Fucking 
shit town. Who the fuck wants to live in Surrey. Nobody wants to live in there…What a 
joke. In terms of these kids that are coming over, to answer your fucking question, so they 
come from upper-middle, I would challenge that first. Do they?  
 
It is important to note that Diljit does not discount the role of materialism as a culturally 
enshrined value. In fact, Diljit seems to advance the notion that materialism is an important 
principle that is valued among some South Asian families today. However, whereas some 
respondents tie materialism to wealthy families, Diljit argues that such materialism has actually 
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burdened working-class families. These narratives create more challenges for understanding the 
backgrounds of gangsters, which becomes somewhat obscure and complicated by the various 
narratives this study captures. Particularly, the question exists as to whether South Asian gang 
members come from upper-class families with relatively wealthy backgrounds or from more 
working-class backgrounds as Diljit and Gurjit suggest.  
Diljit makes another important point in relation to the South Asian diaspora, which is the 
status decline that some immigrants might experience, especially those in the Punjabi/Sikh Jat 
class. Jats are the dominant caste in the province of Punjab in Northern India and are generally 
landowners and wealthier than other castes in the region. Among Sikhs then, Jats are on the top 
of the caste hierarchy and have been the most mobile of communities having the resources and 
financial support to immigrate and settle abroad (Kaur, 1986). In a study on the self-identity of 
Jats, Kaur (1986) recognizes that some Sikh-Jats tend to emphasize the importance of land 
ownership and earning and acquiring more of it. In some cases, the self-identity of landowner 
supersedes all other aspects of their identity such as religion or military service. Diljit’s 
perspective captures the impact status decline might have on the self-identity some South Asian 
immigrants, particular the Jat subgroup. For a group, which has historically achieved great 
wealth and reverence in India, maintaining or recreating this in Canada may be difficult. For 
Diljit, the illusion that South Asian families in communities like Surrey are wealthy obscures the 
reality that these families might be struggling financially despite the houses they live in and are 
trying to maintain a positive identity of the self that confirms with their status in their home 
country. 
Ghosh (2013) notes that despite having high levels of education, many South Asians have 
shown little upward economic mobility in Canada. Nevertheless, Ghosh (2013) acknowledges 
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that evaluating the socio-economic conditions of South Asians in Canada is problematic as they 
are often treated as a monolithic whole. So rather than develop a single profile of the type of 
South Asian family that is more likely to produce a gangster son, it is important to recognize that 
there is much diversity among South Asian families in Canada which is why there appears to be 
a lack of agreement among respondents as to what such a family looks like and the role socio-
economic conditions play in gang involvement.  
 
The racialization of labour in the South Asian community and the absentee father 
Many respondents point to common risk factors found in the broader gang research, 
including peer associations, family problems such as domestic abuse, and parental monitoring 
and substance abuse among others. This would suggest that the risk factors of gang involvement 
for South Asians are no different than other racial groups according to stakeholders. For the most 
part however, research participants conceptualize South Asian culture as a risk factor. Risks 
factors along the lines of materialism, patriarchy, racism and masculinity are oriented, attuned or 
made culturally specific to South Asians. However, some respondents suggest that we are only 
scratching the surface of what might be a much bigger problem as they see it. These individuals 
believe gangs may be the result of profound experiences young South Asian male experience 
such as alienation, isolation or family struggles brought on by diasporic challenges commonly 
faced by immigrants or youth from immigrant families. This would mean that issues such as 
materialism and patriarchy are envisioned as symptoms of an underlying problem.  
One such problem that respondents have identified is the lack of male role model, 
particularly a father figure, that is present in the lives of some South Asian boys and men.  The 
absentee father has been researched quite extensively in the broader criminological gang 
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research. Much of this research stresses the complete absence of fathers and the problems 
stemming from being raised by a single mother or grandmother. For example, Anderson’s (1999) 
ethnographic analysis of the street family highlights the impact of absentee fathers on the 
offending of young African American men in inner city Philadelphia. Anderson (1999) argues 
that a strong father serves as a role model and has the ability to steer children away from gangs 
and crime. In the case of South Asian fathers, the problem is not so much of an issue of fathers 
being completely absent from the family unit but of them being viewed as emotionally 
unavailable and/or unable to spend quality time with their children because of the nature of the 
labour market and the careers they adopt.  
Similarly, respondents point to jobs that have a high representation of South Asians 
employees. In particular, the long-haul transport truck driving industry is a career path that often 
limits the availability of fathers. Galabuzi (2004) examines the racialized division of labour in 
Canada, noting the large number of South Asians involved in the transport truck industry. This is 
a major component of the South Asian diaspora. A universal problem for many Punjabi and Sikh 
immigrants in Canada is finding employment that matches their professional credentials and 
post-secondary education in India. Subsequently, these immigrants have found a niche in the 
trucking industry in Vancouver and Toronto (Johnston, 2005). The trucking industry can be quite 
financially lucrative but requires drivers to spend much of their time on the road and away from 
their families.  
According to Raman, a South Asian youth gang worker: “I feel like a lot of youth are 
involved in criminal activity because they don't have that male figure in the home or their dads 
are long haul truck drivers and they're not as home as often.”  In the absence of a father, a mother 
or grandparent plays a more substantial role in raising children. Kulvir, a case manager for an 
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organization that works with South Asian at-risk and gang involved youth, echoes these 
sentiments: “…we've also noticed that dads who are truck drivers, long haul truck drivers, a lot 
of those kids are involved in getting into gangs, because that role model of a father isn't there. 
And then mom has a hard time doing both roles because mom also has to work. So, who's left to 
look after them? It's usually the grandparents.” Typically viewed as a working-class career, long-
haul truck driving can be lucrative for some depending on the hours and numbers of jobs truck 
drivers are willing to accept and may also explain how these families can afford the materialistic 
lifestyle some respondents associate with gang involvement.  
Since mothers and often grandparents play a substantial role in childrearing, respondents 
suggest that many youth, particularly sons, gravitate towards gangs because of poor supervision 
and monitoring as well as a lack of quality time children spend with their fathers. Kulvir and 
Raman note that with the stress of spending long hours on the road, many fathers are simply too 
tired to spend time with their children, which has a detrimental impact on children through the 
weakening of family bonds. Many respondents argue that spending quality time with children at 
a young age offsets the risk of gang involvement later on. Sony, a high school principal, 
discussing the potential impact of long-haul truck driving on sons by drawing on a former 
student of his:  
I had a student last year, grade 8, who was going down that path [of gangs] and his father 
was a long-haul trucker. So, when I met mum, he brought mum in, and I explained my 
concern and explained that what he really needs is he needs his dad around more to give 
him guidance and spend time with him. His dad actually listened and basically stopped his 
long-haul trucking. Did short haul trucking in the city and then picked up the long-haul 
trucking again in the summer and took his son with him on some trips. He's been transferred 
to another school, but as far as I know, he seems to be much more on the right path now. 
 
Although Sony discusses a more positive outcome, he nevertheless makes a link between gang 
involvement and the absentee father. For Sony, the manner in which labour has become 
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racialized in the South Asian community has inadvertently heightened the risk for gang 
involvement because a strong male authority figure is absentee in a young man’s life.  
As a gang researcher, Anju works with community organizations and challenges the 
notion that South Asian gang involvement is inherent in the South Asian culture and instead 
similarly focuses on what she sees as the unavailability of parents:  
When you are a member of a diaspora and you have family members that are not available 
for their children that's the variable that produces neglect and not very well-rounded kids. 
So, the question then is, within the South Asian community you do have a lot of parents 
that are working really hard that aren't available for their kids. So, it's not the South Asian 
culture that produces it, it's their social condition. 
 
Anju elaborates further by arguing that an interaction between race and family disconnect results 
in gang involvement: “Disconnected from the home. Disconnected because you're a racialized 
subject. Disconnected just because neither here nor there culturally. Many factors, and that 
alienation is what makes youth vulnerable and vulnerability makes them susceptible to gang 
recruitment.”  
While Anju might deemphasize the role of cultural explanations, such as materialism, 
other respondents point to the relationship these cultural factors play in such disconnected 
families. Some respondents suggest a relationship exists between several risk factors. Mainly, 
they argue that spoiling children with material items is often used as a substitute for spending 
quality time by parents. South Asian youth gang worker Ranbir makes this assertion:  
Parents buy them the newest electronic gadgets, like iPods, IPad, PlayStation 4, 
headphones, instead of spending one-on-one time. They’re trying to replace those things 
with material things, instead of spending one-on-one time. But that's where it really comes 
down to; these kids are getting everything they want. They're basically spoon feed. They 
don't really understand the struggle their parents went through to get into here. They don't 
understand the importance of hard work. That's key. 
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Stakeholders like Ranbir believe that buying material items becomes an easy solution for parents 
who often do not have the time or energy to spend time with children on account of long work 
hours, reinforcing the gold-collar lifestyle.  
Anju further discusses the connection between materialism, or as she characterizes as it 
as the “bling, bling” appeal of gangs, and isolation and alienation from their families: 
The question is, why are some South Asians not attracted to the bling, bling, and what does 
this bling, bling function for and as? It functions to somehow compensate for a lack of 
recognition and it goes back to the key argument that I've always built in the research that 
I've engaged with…and that is when youths are alienated they are more vulnerable to 
joining gangs. And the vulnerability is an effect of inter-cultural challenges within in their 
own family. 
 
For respondents like Anju, gangs become an attractive option to fill two necessary voids: the 
need to perpetuate a materialistic lifestyle as well as to get a sense of belonging and acceptance, 
which they might not feel at home. Further, many respondents suggest that the problem of South 
Asian gang involvement could be reduced, if not entirely eliminated in the community, if parents 
would spend enough quality time with children.  
 
Discussion and conclusion  
 
The plethora of explanations and assumptions outlined in this chapter on the “causes” of 
South Asian gang offending probably raise more questions than answers. While respondents 
offer a multitude of different explanations, many fall under the category of “culture” by pointing 
to something distinct and inherently “different” in the South Asian community that contributes to 
the gang “problem”. Precisely, many of these perspectives point to materialism or the “gold-
collar lifestyle” as a significant problem that has created a sense of entitlement in the South 
Asian community. This perspective would suggest that South Asian culture has distinct values 
and beliefs that may overlook and permit violence in the pursuit of economic and material gain. 
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Others have tied this cultural component to the patriarchal family structure that favours, and 
often affords male offspring considerable freedom. For these respondents, the notion of the 
“prince” has blinded or caused parents to overlook the offending of their sons while allowing 
their boys to take advantage of illegitimate means (i.e. the local drug trade) to reproduce the gold 
collar lifestyle. Further, the racialized division of labour has led to the absentee father and is 
imagined as contributing to the gold collar lifestyle as money and gifts serve as a proxy in lieu of 
spending quality time with children. Additionally, other factors identified by respondents include 
the role of mass media, and the role of racism among others.  
When these narratives are placed under a critical lens two important issues emerge. First, 
the relationship between culture, particularly the orientation towards materialism, and structural 
factors identified by respondents, like socioeconomic status, is not fully clarified. Second, some 
respondents tend to pathologize South Asian culture as risky in a manner akin to how some 
subcultural theories (particularly Anderson (1999) and Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967)) have 
viewed offending by other racial minorities groups. Precisely, these accounts may actually 
stigmatize and negatively stereotype South Asians or South Asian “culture” as abnormal. 
The ‘culture/structure’ dilemma   
A common criticism of cultural deviance models is that they have difficulty situating 
their underlining proposition (i.e. that certain groups hold values and beliefs that are conducive 
to violence and offending) within the larger societal conditions of poverty and economic strain 
that further push individuals into offending or gangs. In other words, the relationship between 
‘culture’ and structure is not well understood or articulated by subcultural theorists. However, at 
least amongst this discourse there appears to be the consensus that these attitudes and beliefs 
largely develop among the economically disadvantaged, even if they belong to a specific 
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racialized minority group. A similar consensus in this regard cannot be said of how South Asian 
gangs have been conceptualized by stakeholders as multiple socioeconomic conditions are 
imagined.  
On the one hand, many participants argue that middle-class and even wealthy South 
Asians are at risk for gang involvement, an economic category of individuals not typically 
viewed as having a deviant set of values or beliefs. Yet, a handful of respondents suggest that 
South Asian gang involvement is no different than other at-risk populations as these individuals 
too come from working-class or poorer economic backgrounds. Finally, a smaller number of 
respondents suggest that both economic realities exist, essentially creating a condition where any 
South Asian male along the socio-economic spectrum is viewed as susceptible to gangs. These 
contradictory accounts pose two challenges. First, it complicates our understanding of the role 
structural conditions play as risk factors for gang involvement as evident by the multiple ways in 
which socioeconomic status is imagined. With so many divergent opinions present it is obvious 
that the problem of South Asian gangs is not well-understood or there is a lack of agreement by 
key governing stakeholders in terms of the role economic conditions play in gang involvement.  
The second challenge relates to the limitation found in the broader subcultural literature, 
which is that relationship between “culture” and “structure” is somewhat difficult to ascertain 
based on these accounts. This has largely to do with the inconsistent manner in which structural 
factors are constructed by respondents. Intuitively, it appears logical that the pursuit of 
materialistic goals or the “gold-collar lifestyle” that is attributed to components of South Asian 
“culture” may be more prominent in higher status families, especially patriarchally structured 
ones where the son is viewed as the “prince” or “golden child” on account of being the preferred 
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sex. This could help explain why some respondents believe that a value and belief system might 
develop that condones gang involvement in pursuit of wealth.  
This is where narratives such as Harjit’s, along with others, becomes important to dissect 
due to the way risk is imagined and how several structural and cultural factors can be connected 
together. As mentioned earlier, the gold collar lifestyle that is learned in the family likely creates 
an expectation on children to reproduce that wealth. For sons, who are generally viewed as the 
preferred sex in some more patriarchal households, legitimate means to achieve that monetary 
success may be blocked off or of no interest for boys to pursue, allowing them to innovate by 
joining gangs and taking advantage of illegitimate means (i.e. the drug trade) to reproduce that 
lifestyle. However, respondents do not necessarily connect these key threads together which ties 
structure to culture.  
Besides socioeconomic status, other structural factors, such as racism or the racialized 
division of labour, are linked to South Asian “culture”. For example, former gang member Diljit 
discusses how certain values that promoted a hyper-masculine identity of the self, which viewed 
gang violence favourably, were shaped as a response to structural racism and the impact this had 
on disenfranchised working-class males. The absentee long-haul truck driver father, the product 
of the racialized division of labour in Canada, is also connected to South Asian “culture”. Here, 
respondents argue that in lieu of spending quality time with a full-time father, youth are spoiled 
with material items as a substitute. From this structural family condition then, a specific value 
and orientation for achieving material wealth arises and paves the way for youth to get involved 
in gangs.  
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Pathologizing South Asian culture as “risky” 
The respondents in this study present ‘expert knowledge’, where some of these 
individuals tend to pathologize South Asian culture as inherently favourable to gang violence, a 
line of reasoning that has a rich history among subcultural theories of crime. Upon closer 
examination of this expert knowledge it is important to address two fundamental questions: how 
are certain ideas on “South Asian” culture picked up as the dominant explanation for gang 
violence; and what is the outcome when these ideas become mainstream and taken-for-granted 
assumptions on the local gang problem?  
The answer to such complex questions can be found in the manner in which problems are 
governed in contemporary neoliberal societies, which tie government to knowledge of human 
conduct derived from the social and human sciences (Burchell, 1996). This is premised on the 
idea that before a problem like South Asian gang involvement can be managed, it must first be 
known, requiring authorities to continuously think about it (Townley, 1993). Essentially, 
contemporary governance combines thinking with acting (Hardy, 2014). This means eliciting 
and fostering the support of professional experts in the community (i.e. doctors, lawyers, 
philanthropists, and other figures) to develop knowledge, which is integral to the self-regulatory 
aims of civil society (Rose, 1992; Ilcan, O’Connor, and Olier, 2003).  
Therefore, expert knowledge in this case is largely grounded on the idea of South Asian 
culture being responsible for gang violence. Thus, on the one hand there is decades-old theory on 
delinquent subcultures that promotes the idea that certain groups have values and orientations 
that are more conducive to violence and crime, while on the other, there are some authority 
figures who are disseminating knowledge that South Asian culture has contributed to the gang 
problem in Western Canada. This suggests that somewhere along the line, mainstream ideas on 
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culture have become the de facto explanations used by community activists, youth workers, or 
educators in conceptualizing risk factors for gang involvement. Perhaps in this case, culture 
becomes an easy answer to pin the offending of racialized minority groups for both traditional 
theorists like Anderson (1999) or Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967) and these experts in the 
community. However, as culture is the primary explanation for gang involvement, it is subject to 
the same criticisms attached to subcultural theories more generally.  
For the most part, these assumptions do not often get rigorously challenged, except a 
select few who take issue with pathologizing South Asian culture as risky. Buffam’s (2016) 
concept of the “cultural confession” resonates with this present analysis as many of the South 
Asian professionals in law enforcement, education and those affiliated with a community agency 
used the interview opportunity to similarly highlight perceived flaws in “culture” that caused the 
gang violence witnessed in BC. In doing so, these “cultural insiders” are able to successfully use 
“culture” to pathologize South Asians gang involvement as being inherently different than other 
groups. In this sense, aspects of South Asian “culture”, like the gold-collar lifestyle, become 
abnormal and stand in stark contrast to the dominant western “culture”. Thus, when “culture” 
becomes the de facto explanation to pathologize South Asian offending, it accentuates the 
“otherness” of South Asian individuals.  
Researcher Anju makes an important observation: 
There was a report that was written that somehow suggested that South Asian culture is 
responsible for some of the activities of gangs.  Now I think it's important to illuminate 
here that not everyone agreed [with] that and that's something I didn't agree to because I 
think that this kind of report…. it somehow gave an opportunity for media to easily find 
an explanation as to causation of gang activity. So, you're getting into an element of cultural 
racism here. 
 
For Anju, these cultural explanations, which were perpetuated by the media, seemed to become 
the generally accepted cause of gang violence. Anju believes that these types of accounts propagate 
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stereotypical and racist ideas of South Asian “culture” and obscure more relevant structural factors 
like racism or alienation that she perceives are far more significant.  Former gang member Diljit 
discusses one anti-gang forum he attended where the controversial Macleans essay writer Anu 
Bakshi was an invited speaker: 
She's like "oh well I think our community has made a lot of money". Has it really? Give me 
a fucking break. You're reinforcing notions like, what's her name? Anu Bakshi, "well our 
community's made all this money, so the only other hypotheses is that people are inherently 
violent". Like these things feed into xenophobic tendencies, these are dangerous when they 
are not properly thought out. People parroting fucking nonsense. 
 
For Diljit, these explanations fail to connect the “cultural” belief system regarding materialism to 
values that are conducive to violence. Consequently, Diljit recognizes the inability of most of these 
cultural accounts to identify the relationship between two distinct value systems; one which 
emphasizes the pursuit of a materialistic lifestyle and another that accepts the use of violence 
through gang involvement as a legitimate means to achieve it. Thus, both Diljit and Anju highlight 
the racial or xenophobic consequences when such cultural explanations dominant a community’s 
consciousness and thought processes on gang involvement, and are more critical of how culture is 
used to pathologize different racial groups.   
 
Closing remarks: limitations and directives for further research  
Notwithstanding the exploratory nature of this study, there are a few limitations present 
that need to be addressed. Most notably, when trying to understand how the problem of South 
Asian gangs has been conceptualized the perspectives of current or former gang members should 
also be included. Unfortunately, in this study, only one respondent was a former gang member. 
While this study focused more on the perceptions of stakeholders and how they respond to the 
problem, a more comprehensive account of South Asian gang offending must include the 
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narratives of those who are, or were, most entrenched in that lifestyle. After all, these individuals 
would likely know more about risk factors for gang involvement based on their personal 
experiences, life situations or motivations and beliefs. Further, the perspectives of more police 
officers, particularly South Asian ones, would strengthen some of these conclusions.  
Despite this limitation, this study makes several important contributions to the research, 
most critically, to an area of research that is noticeable limited. Research on South Asian gang 
offending in Canada is markedly scarce despite the considerable attention the phenomenon has 
received in much of BC, particularly from the media, politicians, law enforcement and the 
community in general. Further, not much is known as to how stakeholders, or those who are 
often on the frontlines of the problem, conceptualize and problematize South Asian gangs. 
Mainly, research has mostly neglected the risk factors these stakeholders identify as central to 
South Asian gang involvement. Further, whether these risk factors are indeed empirically 
accurate in explaining the phenomenon matters little for present purposes. What is important to 
note is that as long as these stakeholders conceptualize the problem in a particular way, these 
beliefs have very real consequences in terms of how they respond to the problem. Therefore, this 
study provides some tentative observations as to how South Asian gangs have been imagined by 
those who hold some influence in the community through enforcement or gang 
intervention/prevention. Future studies may want to delve deeper into examining whether these 
prevention or intervention initiatives successfully target the risk factors identified by 
stakeholders, something that could be achieved through methods like program evaluation. 
71 
 
Chapter Three: Governing South Asian gang involvement in Western Canada: Community 
as a means for both exclusion and inclusion 
Introduction 
 In several cities across BC, law enforcement agencies carry out the controversial BRE 
program (BRE). Through the voluntary participation of local businesses, the BRE program 
allows police to request identification from certain patrons and potentially have them removed 
from premises if they are deemed an ‘inadmissible patron’. Included in the category of 
inadmissible patrons are members of organized crime groups and gangs as well as those who 
associate with gang members. The BRE program is the direct result of several high-profile gang-
related shootings in public establishments that garnered extensive media attention, including 
most notably the murder of South Asian gang leader Bindy Johal in 1998 in a crowded nightclub 
and the death of innocent bystander Rachel Davis in a 2005 shooting. These types of programs 
are promoted as essential in reducing the threat posed by gangs to public safety in places alcohol 
is served.  
 While law enforcement responds to gangs through this form of exclusionary tactic, a 
gang prevention and intervention agency in a highly dense South Asian community works 
exclusively with at-risk or gang involved South Asian youth and young adults to provide them 
with counselling, mentorship, training, education, skills development and other comprehensive 
support services. Both examples represent two markedly distinct approaches in how the problem 
of South Asian gangs is governed. In this chapter I argue that one approach, the BRE program, 
involves reviving the exclusionary logic of police regulation, while the intervention program 
stresses minimal state intervention through empowering community organizations to deal with 
the local gang problem directly. These initiatives, among others, represent a dual approach in 
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dealing with South Asian gangs. This chapter will show how these contradictory approaches are 
accommodated in the governance of gangs and gang violence in the Lower Mainland of BC 
despite their competing rationalities.  
The academic literature on gang responses is fairly comprehensive, mostly centered on 
the effectiveness of such strategies. Adding to the broader literature, this analysis poses a key 
fundamental question: how are these gang strategies reflective of various logics of governance? 
In other words, how can these responses to gangs be understood in relation to key theoretical 
discourses on governance? To enhance our understanding of the intricacies of the many diverse 
gang responses, it is necessary to turn to Michel Foucault’s genealogy of governmental 
rationality. Foucault traces the development and evolution of government reasoning from its 
early pastoral form, through a period of police regulation, to finally the liberal systems of 
governmentality that exists in contemporary Western societies (Foucault, 2007). Foucault’s 
analysis provides a theoretical understanding of how such contradictory and multiple logics on 
the governance of gangs can coexist.  
 The governance of South Asian gangs and gang involvement in western Canada involves 
a complex and paradoxical assemblage of police regulation, sovereign power, and neoliberal 
practices that emphasize governing through the community and other logics of power. Precisely, 
I argue that certain programs, such as BRE, view those involved in gangs as “undesirables” and 
are essentially ‘lost causes’ that are to be excluded from participation in public social life. These 
interventions use the community, specifically private businesses, to achieve this aim. Whereas 
businesses are concerned with undesirable patrons, community-intervention programs delivered 
through gang intervention initiatives and immigrant agencies, on the other hand, constitute 
vulnerable South Asian youth as requiring ‘saving.’ The aim of these programs is to ensure that 
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at risk youth are to be included in mainstream society through various cultural, religious or social 
activities. Thus, exclusionary programs, such as BRE, emphasize the regulation of public spaces 
through more traditional and historic forms the police, or Polizei, as well as contemporary liberal 
strategies of community governance, to remove individuals from the public gaze. Conversely, 
inclusionary programing, such as the work done by gang intervention agencies and youth groups, 
emphasize governing through the community in order to responsibilize individuals into 
mainstream society but have very minimal, if any, direct involvement by the police. 
Fundamentally however, both rely on the community but the role of it is imagined differently 
and ultimately mobilized for contradictory intervention strategies.   
 In combating South Asian gangs then, a unique amalgamation of modern neoliberal 
strategies, combined with more historic elements of police regulation exist in what are referred to 
as comprehensive gang strategies. However, the logics of police regulation are not just residuals 
from the past when executed under programs such as BRE, but rather, are updated, transformed 
and realigned by contemporary neoliberal techniques of governance that nurture and mobilize the 
community and community members to think and act on the gang problem. For example, BRE 
exists based on voluntary partnerships and contractual agreements between businesses and the 
police. Thus, BRE is dependent on cooperation with community partners who play an active role 
in managing the local gang problem, a feature of modern neoliberal governance that promotes 
self-governance. Therefore, the responses to South Asian gangs represent the exercise of 
multiple logics of power and governance. The common thread that binds these initiatives 
however is that all of these strategies make use of the community to some degree, even if their 
purposes and intended outcomes and rationalities (exclusion versus inclusion) differ. 
Nevertheless, these conflicting practices complicates our understanding of the role of community 
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by the way in which both “community” and “individuals” are imagined. In other words, this 
illuminates how the abstraction of ‘community’ is mobilized for the dueling purposes of 
inclusion and exclusion.   
Using the data rich narratives of 34 authorities, including representatives of community 
organizations, law enforcement and school officials, interviewed for this study this discussion 
offers some preliminary insights on the governance of South Asian gang offending and adds to 
the scholarship on contemporary neoliberal crime control strategies. However, this chapter aims 
to provide a more meaningful analysis by simply doing more than just relating current gang 
strategies and practices to various forms of power. I also intend to examine the results and 
consequences when such forms of power are exercised. For example, exclusionary practices such 
as BRE, which seeks the removal of undesirable people from the public domain through the 
regulation of space, can result in the targeting of racialized minorities, like South Asians, as well 
as the stigmatization of certain people. Second, this chapter also makes an important empirical 
contribution to the research by examining how certain authorities have governed the problem of 
South Asian gangs in Western Canada. There is a scarcity of research done on South Asian 
gangs despite the abundance of media attention and public awareness in the communities most 
impacted by the phenomenon. Further, there is virtually no research that examines the responses 
to South Asian gangs. This research aims to address this empirical oversight by adding to what 
will hopefully become a growing body of research on South Asian gangs in Canada.  
The problem of South Asian gang involvement has received substantial local public 
attention from the media, policy makers, law enforcement and community activists and support 
workers in lower Mainland BC. As of 2006, over a hundred young South Asian males in BC 
were murdered in gang related violence over a ten-year period (RCMP, 2006). According to 
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‘Scott’, a gang unit officer interviewed for this present study, approximately 160 more Indo-
Canadian individuals have been killed since then. Gang members are responsible for a wide 
array of criminal activities, most being drug related dial-a-dope operations. Research suggests 
that South Asian gangs tend to be involved in high levels of gun violence, drug use, automobile 
theft, money laundering, fraud and extortion (Pearce, 2009). Additionally, South Asian gang 
violence has often been described as extreme in nature compared to other more structured gangs 
in Canada (Totten, 2008).  
South Asian gang violence began in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which coincided with 
the rise of notorious gang leader Bindy Johal. Johal is believed to be partly responsible for the 
increase in gang violence in the Metro Vancouver area through his lucrative criminal activities, 
which earned a profit of $4 million annually (Pearce, 2009). Although it has been nearly two 
decades since his murder, Johal’s notoriety still resonates with some young South Asian males 
who view him as a legend or folk hero for his ability to deal with racism through his hyper-
masculine and violent persona. ‘Aarti’, a violence prevention worker, makes this argument:   
In the 90s when you think of people like Bindy Johal, they were very distinct 
ethnic gangs, specifically South Asian ethnic, which in my analysis I feel like rose 
out of the racism and discrimination that a lot of South Asians [faced]... and this 
was a way of retaliation and gaining the power back and showing “their 
manhood.” 
 
Considering the substantial public attention and media coverage gang violence has received, few 
studies have examined this issue. This study aims to theorize both the governing strategies 
deployed to manage South Asian gang offending and how the phenomenon is constituted as 
governable.     
This chapter begins with an overview of the BRE program, which I argue revive the logic 
of police regulation reinforced with sovereign power, albeit in a modified and largely liberal 
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manner. I argue these programs work to exclude certain individuals from public spaces, resulting 
in challenges such as racial profiling and stigmatization. This is followed by a discussion of 
inclusionary programs, including community-based programs, mentorship programs, and youth 
groups that are oriented towards bringing susceptible people into mainstream society. Not only 
do these programs reflect contemporary crime control practices of governing crime through the 
community, but they also highlight the need to ‘save youths’ from gang. Finally, a discussion on 
how both exclusionary and inclusionary strategies reflect contemporary crime control will be 
addressed despite having such separate purposes and some associated challenges with this 
arrangement. This section aims to make sense of how both exclusion and inclusion coexist 
together through an understanding of the scope, techniques and rationalities behind the gang 
programing.  
 
 “You are unwanted here”: Exclusionary gang strategies, NIMBYism and Banishment  
 
 For those individuals who are actively involved in gangs, either directly or through 
association, some of the strategies deployed by officials work to exclude them from meaningful 
and prosocial participation in the public sphere. These measures and policy practices are largely 
premised on the ‘not in my backyard’ (NIMBY) mentality which became popular across North 
America in the 1980s and 1990s. The NIMBY syndrome is typically defined as a negative 
reaction from the public in opposition to not only needed facilities (power plants, halfway 
houses, prisons) but also people and behaviour patterns (sex offenders, gang offending) (Martin 
and Myers, 2005). At its core, laws that embody NIMBYism work to exclude potential offenders 
from public spaces through physical displacement by carrying the message that certain people 
are not welcome or wanted in those areas (Teichman, 2005). Two particular gang responses that 
77 
 
may target South Asian gang members include the BRE program, the focus of this analysis, as 
well as other types of community safety initiates like a popular foot tour/patrol program that 
operates in one Vancouver suburb. These practices elevate the role of community by having 
community members maintain a watchful eye over the crime and gang problem in their 
neighbourhoods. Further, these practices often perpetuate the NIMBY mentality by excluding 
gang members from areas such as bars and restaurants, as well as public spaces such as street 
corners and plazas.  
 NIMBYism embodies another related idea in penal sanctioning, which is the concept of 
“banishment”.  Beckett and Herbert (2010a) argue that the term “exclusion” might appear 
synonymous with “banishment”, but there remain key distinctions between the two concepts. 
Notably, exclusion is less formal and often includes being shunned by a group of peers or 
members of the community, while banishment is done more formally through a specifically 
designed policy or legislative directive. Due to its collaborative nature, I argue that programs like 
BRE reflect elements of both ‘exclusion’ and ‘banishment’ as the initiative carries a community-
wide message that certain individuals are not welcome or wanted in participating businesses, 
which is reinforced through contractual agreements between business management and law-
enforcement officials.       
  
The BRE Program (BRE) – program overview and genealogy  
Venues serving alcohol, such as bars and nightclubs, are often constituted as gang 
hotspots, particularly in the absence of marked gang territory.  A lack of turf, according to 
Tyakoff et al (2004) is one feature that is typically associated with South Asian gangs. South 
Asian gang members are believed to have a greater influence in bars and nightclubs which 
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become semi-public spaces that are imagined as their turf. In a focus group study, key 
stakeholders identify violence and alcohol as dynamic features of South Asian gang life, where 
drinking serves an important social function that promotes group solidarity and cohesion as well 
as affirming masculinity (Tyakoff et al., 2004). Consequently, there is a perception that bars and 
nightclubs might increase the chances of gang violence among South Asians due to the tendency 
of members to consume high amounts of alcohol. This, along with some high-profile murders in 
and around downtown nightclubs, fueled authorities to develop the BRE program as an attractive 
public safety initiative to curb gang violence.   
Gang unit officer ‘Ranjit’ explains the rationale behind the BRE program: 
We call it our [BRE] program. I don't know if you've heard of it. It's like the 
restaurant watch program. It's where we'll go into …we sign agreements with 
business and some of our popular restaurants in the community, where we go in 
there and if we recognize individuals that are involved in criminal activity and 
gangs, that they're ejected from those locations. And again, it's to ensure public 
safety because we have had shootings at these public venues and stuff. 
 
BRE is a controversial policy initiative that essentially allows for the removal of certain people 
deemed as ‘inadmissible patrons’ (IP) from participating bars and restaurants. Similar programs 
in other jurisdictions go by a variety of other different names, such as the Inadmissible Patron 
Program or Barwatch, and are currently in operation across the Lower Mainland in Vancouver, 
Delta, Abbotsford, New Westminster, and Victoria with plans to bring it to Surrey in the near 
future. These ejection bylaws started in Vancouver in 2007 after several high-profile murders 
and shootings at nightclubs in the downtown core. Most notable among them were the deaths of 
Bindy Johal in 1998, the murders of two men and injuries to five others in 2004 shooting, and the 
killing of innocent bystander Rachel Davis in 2005 by a known gang member.  
These incidents provided the push for the Vancouver Police Department to adopt the 
ejection program with other jurisdictions closely following suit. Although the program runs 
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independently of the police in many cities, the police still exercise considerable power through 
partnerships with businesses in the community.  The Vancouver program in particular, operates 
in partnership with several key stakeholders including the Vancouver restaurant industry, the BC 
Restaurant and Foodservices Association, Restaurants Canada, and the Vancouver Police 
Department (VDP), who claim to play a less active and more supportive role. There are currently 
130 establishments participating in the Vancouver-run program (Gahunia et al., 2018). These 
arrangements allow police services, such as the Vancouver Police Department, to extend their 
powers beyond criminal law and enforce provincial and local regulations pertaining to private 
actors.  Precisely, the BC Trespass Act, sections 1, 3, 4, 8 and 10, is the key piece of legislation 
enabling police action. In addition, the police make use of other relevant governmental 
technologies to govern those constituted as “undesirable”, including the Inadmissible Patron 
Agreement, an Authorization Agreement, and an operational reference guide which is accessible 
only to police officials.  
BRE can only be enforced when a business chooses to participate by reaching out and 
contacting the designated program liaison. Upon signing onto the program, business owners and 
management are educated and given knowledge pertaining to gang-activity in their community 
and the dangerousness posed by people involved in that lifestyle (Vancouver Police Department, 
2016). Once enrolled, businesses share a common objective with law enforcement, which is to 
maintain the safety of all staff and guests by removing certain problematic patrons. Businesses 
must display proper program signage, which also serves as a deterrent to prevent potential 
‘inadmissible patrons’ of even entering their business in the first place. As a further precaution, 
participating businesses must install a CCTV camera so that potential abuses by inadmissible 
patrons can be documented and turned over to police. The cost of implementation rests mostly 
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with businesses themselves who must pay annual dues of $1,000 to cover legal and 
administrative fees.  
Police may be called directly by businesses to deal with a potential inadmissible patron. 
Police are also given permission to enter these establishments proactively themselves without the 
request of owners or management. The criteria used by the police in Vancouver to determine 
who is an inadmissible patron includes: (1) organized crime and gang members; (2) associates of 
organized crime and/or gangs; (3) involvement in the drug trade; (4) history of serious and/or 
violent criminal activity; and (5) a history of firearm related offenses. Police use their 
intelligence and gang databases to help determine who qualifies as an inadmissible patron. 
By joining the BRE, business owners and management sanction the police (Under section 
1 of the Trespass Act) to serve as ‘authorized agents’ with the power to request ID on behalf of 
restaurant owners or employees. In the situation where a patron refuses to show ID or is deemed 
an inadmissible patron, they are asked to leave under private property and trespass laws. 
Subsequently, in the event that an inadmissible patron refuses to leave, they are considered to be 
trespassing under section 4 of the Trespass Act, and subject to arrest (section 10).  At the time of 
arrest, the police officer is no longer an ‘authorized agent’, having switched their role back to 
that of a peace officer. Notably, some officers make arrests under the Criminal Code instead by 
laying obstruction charges instead of the BC Trespass Act. This suggests that the application of 
relevant legislation may be inconsistent.  
Beckett and Herbert (2010a) note innovations police have made in trespass laws. For 
example, in Seattle police use “trespass admonishments” to prohibit certain people from being on 
public property through agreements and contracts with property owners. Like BRE, officers are 
sanctioned to act as authorizing agents to remove people from places like libraries, recreation 
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centres, public transit, school campuses, hospitals and commercial businesses (Beckett and 
Herbert, 2010b). However, the Seattle trespass admonishments differ from BRE in two distinct 
ways. First, the removal of individuals needs to be justified as authorities must demonstrate a 
lack of legitimate reason for the ejected person or persons to be on the property. Second, the 
Seattle program covers a wider net of “undesirables” including the homeless, sex workers, or 
drug addicts (Beckett and Herbert, 2010b). For BRE on the other hand, having a justifiable 
reason for being at a restaurant or bar, such as attending a social gathering or having dinner, does 
not shield a patron from ejection. Also, BRE specifically targets gang members and certain types 
of offenders as opposed to the homelessness or other marginalized groups.  
Returning to the program mechanics of BRE, although the program aims to exclude those 
involved or associated with gangs, a process exists where inadmissible patrons can attempt to 
reverse their status to prevent further ejections. For example, one complainant, who was 
designated an inadmissible patron because of previous gang associations, was able to meet with 
the Vancouver Police Department’s Gang Crime Unit and a supervisor with the Professionals 
Standards Section to resolve his status after being able to demonstrate having severed ties with 
gangs for several years (Vancouver Police Department, 2018). The complainant was given a 
‘Gang Desistance File’ letter which he must carry on his person and present to police officers in 
the event of potential future ejection. The Vancouver police department, in particular, requires 
complainants who wish to be removed as an inadmissible patron to meet with representatives 
from the Gang Crime Unit to demonstrate that they have renounced the gang lifestyle or 
dissociated themselves with known gang members. Police must consider the following criteria 
when removing an inadmissible patron status: “how prominent the inadmissible patron was in 
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the gang lifestyle or as an associate”; how long they were in the lifestyle; and how long have 
they been away or removed from the lifestyle (Vancouver Police Department, 2018).  
The ejection program in its current form is the culmination of public safety initiatives 
over the past two decades that attempt to curb gang violence in bars and nightclubs. Most 
notably, the Barwatch program, which originated in Vancouver, served as a non-profit advocacy 
organization of key stakeholders with a mandate to ensure the safety of patrons by securing a 
safe environment in bars and nightclubs. In fact, by the mid-2000s, a vast majority of nightclubs 
were active members of the Barwatch initiative in Vancouver. The public safety measures 
initially adopted by Barwatch did not necessarily emphasize the ejection of ‘problem’ patrons. 
Instead, public safety in bars and nightclubs was achieved through the use of a controversial 
software that scanned the drivers’ licenses of nightclub visitors prior to their entry in a 
participating establishment. The scanning software allowed management to collect the personal 
information of patrons found in the magnetic strip of their driver’s license, including the guest’s 
name, gender, date of birth, postal code, and driver’s license number.  
Businesses were also required to install a small camera embedded in the wall that would 
take a photograph of the patron upon entry as an added measure of verification to ensure that the 
identification matched the person who presented it. Along with personal information, other data 
collected included the date and time of each customer visit, the number of visits, and whether the 
patron had been flagged as ‘problematic’ due to a prior incident. This created a unique individual 
profile for each visiting patron, which was typically destroyed after six months if there were no 
other recorded incidents or visits by the customer. Additionally, an alert system could be set up 
to warn other participating Barwatch businesses of potential ‘problem’ patrons. Thus, akin to the 
current BRE program, certain individuals could be ejected from a business for past behaviour if 
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they were viewed as a threat to public safety. For all Barwatch members, it was mandatory to use 
this ID scanning software. However, patrons were also given the right to refuse the scanning of 
personal information and opt for the alternative measure of surrendering their ID for the duration 
of their visit. Nevertheless, in at least one formal complaint, a patron was denied entry for 
refusing to have their identification scanned and was not informed of the available alternative 
option.  
In addition to preventing minors from entering premises and reducing the potential of 
physical altercations and sexual assaults inside, the security apparatus set up by Barwatch was 
justified on the grounds of reducing gang violence in bars and nightclubs. Nevertheless, these 
measures were deemed to violate privacy laws and authorities were unable to produce viable 
statistics that showed a decrease in violence at participating establishments (Office of the 
Information and Privacy Commissioner for BC, 2009). This ultimately resulted in much of the 
program being removed or scrapped and for stakeholders to develop alternative public safety 
initiatives, paving the way for the BRE program and its innovative use of existing municipal 
trespass laws to essentially remove specific individuals from bars and restaurants.    
 
The Bar and Restaurant Program – A modern way of pursuing police regulation    
The BRE program can be understood as operating according to the logic of police 
regulation, which according to Foucault was more dominant in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Traditionally, sovereign power was typically exercised over territorial borders, for the 
purpose of preserving the state or protecting it from external aggressors.  Initially appearing in 
German law, the word Polizei (i.e. police) developed in relation to concerns about the regulation 
of internal order, and it has two relevant meanings: a condition of order in the community and as 
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well as the institution and maintenance of order in a community through jurisprudence 
(Knemeyer and Trib, 1980).  However, this conception of ‘police’ deviates from our modern 
interpretation of the police as a law enforcement agency. According to Foucault (2007), the 
police apparatus represents an assemblage of various bureaucratic institutions that function to 
directly regulate the conduct of individuals in the pursuit of public order as well as strengthening, 
securing or expanding the state and its moral functioning.  According to Knemeyer and Trib 
(1980) “it is the task of the police to maintain public peace, security and order with the 
appropriate institutions, and prevent the endangering of the public or its members.” (p.187) 
More importantly however, the BRE program represents an exercise of multiple logics of 
power. First, law enforcement acts in the Foucauldian sense of ‘police’ by regulating spaces in 
order to reduce threats to the public safety that may jeopardize the moral functioning of society 
and cause disruption and chaos in a community. Second, BRE also represents an exercise of 
sovereignty as the police may remove or arrest inadmissible patrons through power that is 
hierarchically arranged and enacted through law (i.e. BC Trespass Act or the Criminal Code) 
with power being dispersed from top to bottom (Boyle, 1997). Third, the BRE program 
represents an exercise of contemporary governing practices that creates distance between state 
and non-state actors. Precisely, BRE allows police officers to temporarily divorce themselves as 
agents of the state and become ‘authorized agents’ who are given the ability, through contractual 
agreements, to request identification from inadmissible patrons. Indeed, BRE cannot operate if 
private and independent business owners do not first initiate contact with police and enroll in the 
program.   
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BRE and police regulation  
The BRE program works to ensure public safety and to reduce the threat of gangs in the 
types of businesses that have traditionally witnessed gang violence. While historically this has 
been achieved through strict regulation and the policing of citizen’s behaviour, the BRE program 
is not so much concerned with a display of behaviour but the threat posed by gang members 
regardless of their conduct at the time of ejection. This aligns with a significant feature of police, 
which works to prohibit certain acts and take power away from those that break rules of good 
society or pose a threat to the state (Valverde, 2017). Further, state authorities penetrate the 
public domain and regulate the activities of some citizens through their removal in areas where 
gang violence could occur. The gang problem is perceived to be such a significant threat to 
public safety in BC that private businesses and the general public accept the powers afforded to 
the police, which enables them to enter these establishments and seek the removal of gang 
members or their associates, essentially regulating and controlling these dangerous class of 
offenders. This creates a physical space where people are rendered obedient since their behaviour 
is regulated. As Foucault explains, this form of power is justified for the public good, 
highlighting the role of police as a regulator of moral functioning through maintaining order in 
society.  
Moreover, the direct exercise of police regulation requires the collection of knowledge 
and the development of expertise. The police gang units are largely responsible for coordinating 
and administering the BRE program. Consequently, police gang units represent a form of 
expertise, as the structure of law enforcement is reorganized to form specialized gang units 
capable of collecting knowledge on their community’s gang problem (Herbert, 1996). This 
reconstructing of policing allows law enforcement to increase their ability in regulating, 
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monitoring and intervening in public spaces and exercising legal power over citizens. Under the 
goal of security then, developing knowledge on enemies of the state, like gangs, is critical in 
order to justify the existence of regulatory powers under programs like BRE. Further, the 
knowledge of threats posed by gangs is central to the administration of the BRE program as this 
information is often ‘taught’ to businesses by specialized gang officers upon their enrolment.  
Knowledge on gang members is seen as essential in order to inform business owners and 
management of the threats posed by gangs. Knowledge development also plays a critical role in 
the administration of the BRE program. In classical police regulations, action in the face of 
threats to public order is heavily dependent on the creation of detailed knowledge of such threats 
(Gordon, 1991). Gordon (1991) notes: “police is a science of endless lists and classifications” 
(p.10). Gang databases reflect the use of such list and classifications and play a crucial role in the 
BRE program. Indeed, the BRE program requires the collection of information on individuals 
who pose a gang threat. According to a report to the Vancouver Police Board, a determination of 
an ‘inadmissible patron’ is made using relevant police databases and information sources such as 
the Police Records Information Management Environment (PRIME), Canadian Police 
Information Centre (CPIC) and other local gang databases.  
Gang unit Scott describes the type of information law enforcement collects on such gang 
databases: 
For our purposes we look at people who have a gangster lifestyle. So that’s a person who’s 
a known gang member or associate of a gang member, or a person involved in organized 
crime, or a person who’s involved in the for-profit drug trade, or a person who’s been 
involved with firearm offenses, or a person who’s been convicted of a serious violent 
criminal offense. 
 
Scott’s characterization of a ‘gangster like lifestyle’ is ambiguous. However, previous research 
indicates that police agencies use criteria such as ‘gang-style clothing,’ displaying of gang 
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symbols, signs and tattoos or the frequenting of gang territories as indicators of a gang lifestyle 
(Klein, 2009). The BRE program requires businesses to clearly inform patrons that a strict dress 
code is in effect, which includes a prohibition against gang dress or colours (City of Nanaimo, 
year unknown). Therefore, it appears the BRE program relies on knowledge generated of threats 
that are documented in detailed gang databases as well as the more instinctual personal 
knowledge an officer or business owner has as to what a gang member or gang lifestyle looks 
like.  
When such an example of state power is exercised through police regulation, numerous 
challenges and problems arise.  Nevertheless, the program has strong support from law 
enforcement. According to gang officer Scott:  
In Vancouver, after we starting seeing the shootings and the violence, we started our anti-
gang ejection program which gives the police the authority to remove known gang 
members, and you know what? We're seeing positive, generational results of this because 
young guys are like: "hey I don't want to get involved in the gang lifestyle because I want 
to be able to go out to a nice restaurant. 
 
For Scott, police regulation is justified because it provides an important check on behaviour. Not 
only is the program perceived as being successful for reducing gang violence in bars, nightclubs 
and restaurants across the province, but has steered vulnerable youth away from gangs. 
Nevertheless, Scott’s assertion that the program can divert young men from gangs is 
questionable. Precisely, it is debatable that a potential ruined night out due to ejection works as a 
protective factor against gang involvement or can counter any forces or risk factors that likely 
push individuals into gangs in the first place. Therefore, the BRE program’s intrusive nature, 
may not be fully justified as a rehabilitative measure. In fact, the program could work to further 
isolate and exclude individuals from mainstream society, only deepening feelings of isolation 
and alienation. Indeed, the BRE program poses significant problems when such a direct use of 
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state power is executed to control for and address a problem as complex as gangs. Specifically, 
some problems that could emerge with the BRE program include the racial targeting of 
minorities, including South Asian individuals, and the initiative’s stigmatizing nature.  
BRE as an exercise of sovereign power 
 Rather than simply executing one form of power, the BRE program is an example of 
multiple logics at work. Collier (2009) suggests that while certain powers operate according to 
different logics, they can function together to produce an intended result. This is most notably 
visible in the role-switching capabilities of officers, who can go from ‘police officer’, to 
‘authorized agent’, and back to ‘police officer’ depending on the situation. As an agent of the 
state, police officers can subject an inadmissible patron to arrest if they refuse to leave the 
premises after being ordered to do so. This would require the direct exercise of sovereign power 
through the legislative directives found under the B.C Trespass Act or the Criminal Code of 
Canada. According to Collier (2009) sovereign power continues to play an important role in 
modern governance. However, before such an exercise of sovereign power is accomplished, 
officers must ask patrons to first produce identification. In order to do this, police must detach 
themselves from their role as state actors and serve as representatives of the private business, or 
as the program classifies them: ‘authorized agents’. Under this role, it appears that police are no 
longer traditional law enforcement officials, but rather, an extension of private businesses and 
may be perceived as private security.  
This is complicated and somewhat contrary to how the Vancouver Police Board views 
the role of police as authorized agents. In Report to the Vancouver Police Board, officials with 
the Vancouver Police Department attempted to clarify the debate and answer legal questions as 
to whether police can act simultaneously as private security and as law enforcement officials. 
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According to the Board Report, despite being authorized agents, police officers act 
independently from owners and managers and are not under their directive. Further, the report 
specifies that: 
While technically the officers are acting as an authorized person when they initially 
determine that a person is an inadmissible patron – by making that determination on behalf 
of the owner/occupier of the premises – and then following up by requesting the person to 
leave the premises, again on behalf of the occupier, this is not a legally impermissible 
role/function for a police officer to engage in. When doing so, the officer is not acting in 
some purely private capacity, solely in the interest of the owner/occupier, but in a dual role 
by acting in both the interests of the restaurant owner/manager and also acting in the public 
interest, in furtherance of the police’s duty to ensure public safety.” (Vancouver Police 
Department, 2016: p.4) 
 
The Vancouver Police Department justifies the notion of ‘role switching’ by acknowledging that 
an officer’s duties as a police officer are never truly abandoned and always lie in the foreground 
when they execute their responsibilities as an authorized agent. However, public documents 
show that law enforcement has been reluctant to refer to themselves as private security working 
on behalf of private businesses, downplaying the idea that they are ‘role-switching’ (Vancouver 
Police Department, 2016). Nevertheless, without proper clarification on jurisdiction through 
formal policy (which is a recommended by the Police Complaints Commissioner), this analysis 
maintains that police officers do indeed engage in role switching by adopting the role of private 
security since they are taking on responsibilities to carry out certain duties that would otherwise 
not fall under their legal authority. Precisely, officers cannot simply walk into bars or restaurants 
and remove inadmissible patrons without a program like BRE in place to gain the cooperation 
and contractual consent of proprietors. Also, adopting the title of ‘authorized agent’ carries an 
important symbolic message, which serves to accentuate the private security role of officers. 
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BRE as an exercise of neoliberal governance 
 Nevertheless, for present purposes, law enforcement’s role as ‘authorized agents’ and 
their cooperation with private businesses in the community is characteristic of contemporary 
exercises of governmental power most often associated with neoliberal societies. In this case, bar 
and restaurant staff play a proactive and central role in governing the local gang problem, which 
is generally indictive of the principle of minimal state involvement and community governance. 
Also, by serving as authorized agents, further distance is created between the state and non-state 
actors when officers carry out duties under BRE that would otherwise not fall under their legal 
purview. 
 This falls into alignment with Collier’s (2009) recommendation that analysts examine 
the relationships between the various logical forms of power and how they are transformed, 
reconfigured, or combined to address new situations and problems that arise. Collier (2009) 
draws an important conclusion, which is that neoliberalism be treated as a master category that 
transforms the logics of police regulation, discipline and sovereignty. This is evident in the BRE 
program which finds its foundational footing in contractual agreements which ultimately permits 
the deployment of multiple logics of governing. Valverde (2003) engages in a similar analysis, 
instead focusing on liquor licensing as a legal technology that permits the regulation of spaces 
and subjects in British pubs. In addition to licensing, the contractual agreements central to BRE 
serve a similar purpose as a legal technology that allows for such a contemporary exercise of 
police regulation. Therefore, BRE is a return to the logic of police regulation which is influenced 
by contemporary governing practices. Further, depending on the circumstances, arrests can be 
made through relevant legislation which is an exercise of direct sovereign power.   
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Challenges with the Bar and Restaurant program  
An important caveat, the BRE program was not designed to exclusively respond to the 
problem of South Asian gangs. Nevertheless, the racial profiling of South Asian men is an 
inevitable consequence of the program (Smith, 2013; Quan, 2012). The BRE program operates 
on its ability for authorities and businesses owners to identify inadmissible patrons and exclude 
them from these premises based on loosely defined and abstract terms like ‘gang member’, ‘gang 
associate’, or ‘gang lifestyle’. These particular imaginaries are fundamentally intertwined with a 
broader concern over the South Asian gang problem in this region.  
Many, including the Police Complaints Commissioner and the B.C. Civil Liberties 
Association, have raised concerns that demanding government issued identification, absent of a 
legislative directive, constitutes a street check or carding. The police practice of carding has had 
a long and controversial history in Canada and has recently been suspended in Toronto over 
concerns that it targets Black Canadians. More importantly, the BRE program removes carding 
as an official police practice by transforming it into a private practice since police are now 
considered ‘authorized agents’ when requesting ID on behalf of business owners. The program 
thus permits carding, despite the fact that it has been deemed problematic and discriminatory in 
official police practice. Gang unit officer ‘Ranjit’ makes this salient observation:  
We have had some challenges [with the program]. When you see a group of five or six 
South Asians walk in together, these places, unfortunately now, we do get calls: oh, there's 
five, six people could they be gangsters right? …When it's a known individual then it's no 
problem for us to ask those people to leave, but the challenge we follow sometimes is 
exactly this scenario I’m painting. We walk in there, there's five or six people sitting there. 
Now it becomes a challenge for our officers, as they don't know who they are. How do you 
determine if they meet the criteria? … You don’t want to cross that line where now people 
are being stereotyped because they’re from a certain demographic right?”  
 
Officer ‘Ranjit’ is generally supportive of the BRE program but acknowledges that racial 
profiling does occur. In order to survive, the BRE program requires the voluntary participation of 
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businesses and for their employees, management and owners to be able to accurately identify 
inadmissible patrons in order for police, as authorized agents, to request ID and potentially eject 
them from the premises. For Officer ‘Ranjit’, BRE becomes problematic when employees or 
management at these businesses request ejections from police based solely on the race of 
patrons. This poses further challenges for police who are left to essentially ‘clean up’ or manage 
the problem created by businesses by determining if individuals are indeed inadmissible.  
Officer Ranjit discusses another issue with the program that creates a dilemma for police, 
which is its unequal application: 
One issue that makes it difficult for the police to deal with…Well the purpose [of the BRE 
program] is to have the onus on the police and let us act on [the business owner’s] behalf 
as long they abide by certain rules and aren't being selective. Well some places let certain 
individuals in because they're friends with them knowing that they're involved in criminal 
enterprise and yet they want other ones to be gone. So they have to ensure that they're being 
consistent and fair in regards to how they're operating here. 
 
Thus, a program that at its core is premised on the exclusion of certain people deemed 
‘undesirable’ is likely to result in racial discrimination when operating in a community that is 
perceived to have a significant South Asian gang problem and is inconsistent in terms of who is 
targeted for ejection. Also, the BRE program illuminates some problems that arise when such a 
form of regulatory power is exercised over citizens giving police the ability to directly remove or 
even arrest potential inadmissible patrons. This exercise of power is viewed as necessary in order 
to maintain public order and safety. However, at the same time, the BRE program perpetuates the 
racial targeting of South Asian populations and has the potential to frame some South Asian 
individuals as risky populations.   
A problem related to the racial discrimination of South Asians is the stigmatizing nature 
of the BRE program. This is especially evident in the cases of those individuals who are no 
longer involved in gangs but are designated an inadmissible patron for their prior history. There 
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have been several complaints to the Vancouver Police Board Service and Policy Complaints 
Review Committee from individuals who are reformed gang members and have desisted from 
gang life. For example, one complainant had left the gang lifestyle behind for several years while 
another complainant had been ordered to leave a restaurant and referred to as a ‘criminal’ for a 
conviction for a minor offense that occurred over 25 years ago in the United States (Vancouver 
Police Department, 2018). That complainant is now a successful business owner and did not 
have any subsequent police interactions since the initial incident. However, this program has 
resulted in individuals being judged as ‘a criminal’ or ‘gangster’ first, overriding any other 
positive contributions or changes they may have made in their lives. This illustrates one major 
way an exclusionary practice such as BRE results in the stigmatization of reformed gang 
members. Despite the existence of a review process, the initial ejection can have severe negative 
consequences.  
Individuals can also be deemed an inadmissible patron if they somehow have a gang 
association. This does not necessarily mean that these individuals are involved in gangs but the 
mere association with gang members could result in their ejection. This poses numerous 
problems. First, groups like the BC Civil Liberties Association have challenged the broadness of 
the term ‘associate’ and believe the police have too much discretion and not enough legislative 
directive to make the determination as to what constitutes a gang ‘associate’. This poses 
problems when people are unfairly targeted as gang associates if they have family members, 
friends, or even acquaintances involved in gangs.  Further, it creates a ‘guilt by association’ 
stigma for those deemed as inadmissible based on their family or peer circles. To be removed as 
an inadmissible patron, individuals are required to demonstrate that they have dissociated 
themselves from people involved in the gang lifestyle. This too has negative repercussions, as it 
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can potentially isolate gang members from individuals, like family members or friends, in their 
lives. According to Beckett and Herbert (2010a), places people are banned from typically offer 
crucial opportunities for social contact and relationships. However, the BRE program sends a 
clear message: not only should gang members be excluded from participating in mainstream 
society, but also mandates the isolation of those assumed to be involved in gangs through 
association. Further, as Beckett and Herbert (2010a) found, excluded individuals experience 
status loss when being banished, amplifying feelings of unacceptance as citizens and members of 
society as a whole. As a form of social control, exclusionary practices, like BRE, also have a net-
widening effect as they may subject many individuals to punishment who would otherwise not 
experience it (Beckett and Herbert, 2010a).  
Besides stigmatizing individuals who are associates of gang members or previously 
involved in gangs, the program may also stigmatize those still actively involved in gangs. While 
it is understandable that business owners and law enforcement want to reduce the potential for 
gang violence in their communities and private establishments, the BRE program does not 
necessarily target gang violence per se, but rather, individuals who may actually be engaging in 
lawful behaviour, like going out for dinner or attending a nightclub. In a study of Seattle’s 
exclusionary orders that banned certain populations, like the homeless, from commercial and 
public places, excluded individuals felt that these types of laws were too broad as they failed to 
differentiate between actual criminal activity and the mere presence of these individuals as being 
criminal (Beckett and Herbert, 2010a). In the case of BRE, patrons do not have to engage in 
illegal, problematic or disruptive behaviour to be ejected, and may even be behaving pro-socially 
yet are still deemed inadmissible based on their presence in these businesses. Consequently, it is 
the mere label of being a gang member or associate that is offensive to police and management 
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that warrants their removal, as opposed to a specific display of illicit and criminal behaviour on 
bar or restaurant premises.  
Anju, a gang researcher who works with several South Asian gang organizations in the 
community, makes an important observation: 
When I started researching the seduction into gang life, and what I found, and it was also 
supported by many of the narratives of actual gang members is number 1: a very, very 
strong feeling of alienation, and so the alienation and one of the sort of trajectory and 
history of some of the South Asian gangs is racism. 
 
For Anju, South Asian gang involvement is the result of profound feelings of alienation, which 
in part is attributed to racism. This quote captures the potential relationship between racism and 
stigma in relation to the BRE program. Precisely, the BRE program stigmatizes gang members 
from the community, which could deepen their feelings of isolation and alienation from society 
through practices that further advance exclusion.  
This exercise of exclusion is characteristic of a century-old approach of governing 
adopted by municipalities and local governments. Valverde (2005) suggests that municipal and 
quasi-municipal authorities increasingly regulate activities of persons through exercising control 
over the use of space, including private venues like pubs. While Valverde (2005) focuses on how 
such policy is used to regulate the activities of the poor, other “undesirables”, such as gang 
members, can similarly be targeted through non-criminal policy used to control individual 
activity. Beckett and Herbert (2010a) suggest that most discourses on punishment tend to focus 
on the administration of official legal punishment when criminal laws are violated. They suggest 
that research should focus on how punishment has evolved and the ways in which civil, criminal 
and administrative law has become blurred (Beckett and Herbert, 2010a). The BRE program 
represents such a blurred exercise of punishment, one where local bylaw is used to execute penal 
control over individuals in cases where formal criminal laws may not necessarily be violated. 
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Despite not having formal policy in place, BRE is heavily promoted by municipal officials, 
including mayors and police chiefs, and involves the regulation of private businesses in order to 
carry out the specific objective of exclusion. Further, BRE, as a public safety initiative, is easier 
to enact by municipal police forces through local bylaws, like the BC Trespass Act, as opposed to 
the Federal RCMP who would have a much harder time implementing such a program. Officer 
Ranjit makes several important observations regarding the use of municipal, non-criminal law 
and why the RCMP, who operate in Surrey, have been mostly reluctant to adopt it: 
So, for perspective, the RCMP jurisdiction hasn't adopted it. So, they were a little bit 
concerned, I guess, about the legal authority these premises and their management had to 
eject people and they didn't want to get into any sort of human rights and that type of 
concern. But we've been confident at the municipal level that as long as it's not abused, we 
make sure our officers are properly trained and understand what their authority is and the 
scope of it and ultimately what the intent of it is. We have proper, we kind of utilized 
authority of the Trespass Act to be able to…because some provinces have more authority 
built within their liquor control and licensing regulations. We don't really have that in BC. 
So therefore, we have had to be a little creative and look at ways to be able to do this within 
the perimeters of the authority we have. 
 
For Ranjit, municipal police forces may not run into the same constitutional dilemmas as their 
Federal counterparts, so using local bylaw has given them the flexibility to develop and 
implement public safety initiatives like BRE. Consequently, municipal authorities might have an 
easier time regulating the behaviour and movement of “free subjects” than their Provincial or 
Federal counterparts through the use of such legally hybrid forms of social regulation.  
 
“I’m going to guide you the right way” – Inclusionary gang strategies and ‘saving’ 
vulnerable youth  
Community gang organizations – an overview of programs 
 In contrast to the BRE program, which may be used to deal with gangs more generally, 
there are community organizations in the lower Mainland BC that work exclusively with or are 
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targeted to South Asians who may be at risk or currently involved in gangs. Community-based 
gang intervention strategies possess goals that are very different from objectives of the BRE. 
Precisely, these organizations are premised on the notion that these youth can be saved from 
gangs through inclusionary measures that work to increase their participation in or connection to 
mainstream society. Rather than remove these individuals from restaurants, bars or nightclubs, 
at-risk subjects are given opportunities to strengthen their bonds to school, family, the 
community and religious institutions.  
 One such agency operates in a community with a significant South Asian population. 
This organization offers many different services for at-risk or gang involved youth up to the age 
of 30 including community education and outreach, parenting sessions, as well as one-on-one 
case work that occurs with a youth and support worker. Services are provided to youth including 
recreational activities, therapy and counselling, and school or career assistance among other 
important services. Most importantly, program caseworkers serve as a bridge between the youth 
and key actors in their lives. Veer, a frontline youth worker at the agency describes this 
arrangement: 
This organization, we usually serve gang or high at-risk South Asians. We will see them at 
least once to twice a week. We’re connected with the police, their PO [probation] officers, 
the school, to see what’s going on. Where the problem is?... We have a free counsellor that 
comes in here for them. So, we get the whole family counselling. 
 
According to Veer, the agency works to transform gang-involved or at-risk youth through the 
various resources listed above. Veer expands on his role: 
So, my role is: youth that are referred over to me. What I do is I connect with them and I 
see where these insecurities and problems are stemming from and then I try target those 
key areas. So, if it's regarding the family, I will try to get family counselling. If it's regarding 
their peer groups, we'll get them into a different school and we'll see how the grades reflect 
that and how their teachers reflect that. If they just have a lot of free time and they're doing 
nothing, we'll get them a job or we'll get them into other programs that will keep them busy. 
That's pretty much what I do. 
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Several employees interviewed with the agency stress the important advocacy role they serve for 
youth who may feel marginalized by institutions in their lives like family, school or law 
enforcement. As program supervisor Kulvir explains: “We've seen [gang violence] and just put 
into place so that the South Asian population could get the support that they needed as well, the 
youth. I mean it's really easy to kick out a kid, but to advocate for a kid does take a lot, and that's 
something that we have been doing for the youth that we've been working with.” 
Priya, a frontline worker who works exclusively with South Asian females (a position 
created over the perception that female involvement in gangs was increasing in their community) 
clarifies her advocacy role: 
I'm actually just an advocate between the school and the client. Taking them to health clinic 
meetings. So basically, I just become a support person, somebody that the youth can rely 
on, but I'm also using certain strategies and, like a framework. I come from a social work 
background, so I'm using some of my social work interventions, referring them to 
counselling, going to mental health meetings with them. Child-youth mental health for 
example. I kind of become like a resourceful person to them, at the same time have a 
mentorship relationship with them. Yeah, become like a role model in their lives, basically. 
 
According to Priya, the youth the agency serves lack a strong support system or someone willing 
to fight for them when it seems that all others may have given up on them. Priya and Veer’s 
colleague Ranbir describes how he envisions his role in the agency: “just kind of to deter kids 
away from involvement gang life and criminal organizations, and crime in general. So it's 
basically helping guide and supporting the youth to get on to the right path and sway away from 
the gang life.” For Ranbir, the role of advocate or support person is a crucial element in reducing 
gang involvement among the South Asian community.  
 In addition to this organization, there are several other programs facilitated by 
community organizations across the province. School boards operate one program in particular, 
known as Wraparound, across several cities in BC. While the program may vary in terms of how 
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it operates from community to community, it embodies one major guiding principle, which is for 
school officials or the police to identify at-risk youth and literally ‘wrap’ (hence the name 
Wraparound) services around them. Although this program is not exclusive to the South Asian 
community, the program does work in conjunction with community agencies, some specifically 
working with South Asians or immigrant populations, to assist in delivering much needed 
services. This is especially important in schools where there is a high percentage of South Asian 
students as well as a significant gang problem.  
 School principal Dan explains the general goal and services of Wraparound programs: 
They offer classes at the district education centre. They offer a chance to go to a number 
of gyms and work out with wrap employees or RCMP officers and they get involved in 
any number of field experiences and initiatives to try to connect them to the greater 
community. Often the kids who are getting involved possibly in gang behaviours or gangs, 
often haven't really tasted life outside of their community and their community is in essence 
where they stay and they don't travel far. So, we find when we get kids outside of their 
community we can open their eyes to new perspectives and new horizons. 
 
According to Dan, Wraparound, first and foremost, serves to get youth involved in the 
community. Thus, programs like Wraparound serve to include vulnerable youth in mainstream 
society through participation in normal, recreational activities, standing in opposition to gang 
measures like BRE that intend to exclude those already involved in gangs from certain social 
activities. Gurmeet, who is an outreach worker employed by a school board explains the purpose 
of Wraparound:  
Wraparound does basically what the name says. It takes a unique approach to an individual 
and wraps them around services and support that are special to that individual. So 
everything is catered and curated according to what that young person needs to achieve 
whatever goals they set out for themselves and our goals are to help them lead a healthy 
lifestyle than the one they are currently engaged in… It'll vary student to student. Whether 
it just be that connection to a healthy adult. Someone to role model. What a healthy adult 
looks like or what a healthy person looks like. That or it could be extra-curricular supports, 
providing them with whatever needs, from basic needs all the way to extravagant needs 
like food in their belly to going snowboarding in the wintertime. Like I said, I really like 
to think that we curate for each individual whatever they need. Try to listen, meet that 
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young person where they are at so we can help them identify what is it that they need to 
change the things that aren't working well for them. 
 
Wraparound is a plan of action that is calibrated for each student in order to meet his or her 
individual needs, which could include counselling and other services deemed necessary. 
Consequently, it is difficult for these services to be offered by the school board alone, requiring 
the involvement of community agencies and other stakeholders in the action plan.  Thus, 
Wraparound largely works through the support of community partners, the police and school 
officials in order to operate. Aarti, who works for an immigrant and refugee agency, describes 
her agency’s role in Wraparound. Aarti notes that her agency will be working with school liaison 
officers who will identify and refer at-risk youth for programing. Once involved, risk 
assessments will determine which youth pose a high-risk level and will be assigned a youth 
worker. Aarti outlines the supportive role her youth workers play: 
Getting to know the youth and understanding what the risk factors are that have placed 
them at higher risk for engaging in criminal or gang activity, and then what are some of 
their strengths and who are some of the prosocial people and prosocial activity that they 
engage with in their life. Work with them to identify with their short-term long-term goals 
are, and then what will happen is the youth worker will engage the people that youth 
identify as being positive people in his or her life and those people are going to help the 
youth carry out those long term and short goals. So, the youth worker is going to act as a 
facilitator between the youth and their care plan and the team, with the care team, which is 
a group of people that the youth identifies that he or she would like support from. That 
could include family members, friends, the police officers, community workers. It could 
be anybody. So, the idea is that the youth is at the centre of all of this and that we wrap the 
youth with services to support them. 
 
Aarti envisions the program as having a rehabilitative element, where high-risk youth are 
surrounded by a “basket of support” in the form of positive prosocial individuals in their lives. 
This could ultimately counter feelings of isolation and alienation youth might experience in the 
community.    
101 
 
Two additional community-based initiatives are youth programs run by South Asian 
police officers. These programs share a common premise, which is to bring South Asian youth in 
the community together, to connect them with a positive role model, and engage in various 
recreational and charitable activities designed to steer them away from the lure of gang life. In 
doing so, officers hope to increase the commitment and attachment these youth have to sports, 
academics, their family and even religion. The first program has an emphasis on academics, 
sports and family. Youth who get involved are encouraged to complete their education and 
potentially attend post-secondary education with the goal of establishing a long-term career. 
Officer Gurjit, who operates the program discusses the program: “It's a non-profit that provides 
high quality programs free of cost to under-privileged kids who are also at high risk and the 
programs primarily in education and sports.” As a non-profit organization, scholarships are 
routinely given to participating youth. As officer Gurjit discusses the purpose of the scholarships: 
“As long as the child shows up [to the programing], we're giving them a financial opportunity to 
become successful later in life. So, the money they got goes either towards their sports or go 
towards their education.”  
The second program is operated by Officer Krish and has more of a religious 
connotation. As Krish describes:  
I also have a youth group that meets every Sunday and that youth group I created just to 
have interaction with kids and keep them away from the gang lifestyle and keep them in 
the straight and narrow and get them to go to school and then at the same time get them to 
come to the temple, because that's a lost thing that happens a lot times when kids get older, 
they stop going to temple and then they don't want to go anymore because they don't think 
it's cool. So, we try to keep them coming at the same time. 
 
Krish’s program is more loosely structured and less formal than Gurjit’s but both programs have 
a strong community engagement component. Krish’s group brings youth together to engage in 
seva, the religious Sikh principle of doing service in the community. This ‘seva’ includes work 
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around the Gurdwara (Sikh temple), such as preparing and distributing food in the community 
kitchen, as well as engaging in donation and charity drives that give back to charitable 
organizations in the community. Krish outlines his motivations for starting the organization: 
The program started because a couple of parents came to me and they said: "you know 
what? Our kids, they're starting to not listen to us at home. They're not doing their 
homework at home. We do not know what to do. What can we do?" And I told them: "you 
know what? Why don't you bring them to the temple on Sundays and we'll have discussion 
about what they could do" and their main thing was, you know what, the kids are starting 
to separate from the parents, and a lot of parents, South Asian parents, they work 2, 3 jobs 
and so the kids are home all day long not doing anything or they're at home all day long 
playing videos and the parents are not there to watch them. So the parents want some kind 
of organization where the kid could go to and just connect and then get some kind of 
authority figure. 
 
For Krish, a program such as his provides youth with an avenue to connect with a positive role 
model and make proper use of their time engaging in activities that are considered more 
productive rather than using idle time to get involved in gang activity.   
 
Community governance of the gang problem  
 The gang programming offered to South Asian youth in the community is emblematic of 
contemporary crime control practices in neoliberal societies where the state fosters and mobilizes 
the community itself to tackle the local gang problem (Hannah-Moffat, 2000). Thus, when 
developing programs and strategies that aim to direct or shape the actions of individuals, 
empowering the community to govern themselves is an important feature of contemporary 
government (O’Connor and Ilcan, 2005). This image of liberal government is based on 
maintaining a boundary between the formal state apparatus (including actors and institutions) 
and civil society, the latter of which is considered to be exempt from administering the 
regulatory responsibilities associated with state power (Rose, 1999). With the shift towards 
neoliberal political rationalities, which emphasize devolution, these boundaries have been 
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transformed (Rose, 1999; Garland, 1996). This arrangement permits state authorities to govern at 
a distance by enlisting the support and involvement of non-state actors, allowing “civil society”, 
with its own set of distinct values and beliefs, to be left relatively alone and autonomous. In this 
case, the South Asian community, including agencies and actors within it, are allowed to 
function on their own and manage the gang problem, receiving support from the state through 
contractual agreements, funding or other forms of support to maintain peace and order in their 
communities through their own crime prevention techniques.   
The arrangement of neoliberal strategies is clearly evident in how the South Asian gang 
problem in the lower Mainland has been partially handled. The community organizations 
discussed above have considerable power in intervening in the lives of at-risk or gang involved 
individuals and exercising transformative power on individuals. For example, the South Asian 
gang intervention program offers educational sessions, therapy, mentorship and other services 
that are meant to responsibilize enrolled youth. Rather than imposing these measures on youth 
through direct government coercion, community organizations become tasked with carrying out 
the responsiblization process, while being supported by state actors like the police. This allows 
the state to foster such alliances so that the community can react on their own behalf, protecting 
the autonomy of civil society.  Indeed, all the community agencies discussed above have some 
form of partnership with ‘official’ state agents such as the police, courts, or school system who 
actively work to foster and mobilize the community so they can self-regulate problematic 
behaviour. This arrangement of power forms a very specific chain of action that hands 
community organizations a major stake in controlling the South Asian gang problem while 
official state actors lie on the periphery and can essentially govern at a distant. However, 
community groups must see it in their own self-interest to from such alliances (Garland, 1997). 
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In this case, these agencies seek to reduce gang membership and gang violence among the South 
Asian community so that civil society can be protected.   
 Kulvir, who supervises the South Asian anti-gang organization, addresses the goals of the 
program: 
 The reason that we're successful and that we're known is because we have done a lot of 
work in the community. We get some of the most amazing guest speakers to come in and 
speak to these parents. We've got, the thing is, we have to find them and they have to be 
South Asian, because of the language. So we've had officers, we've had doctors, we've had 
officers, we've had different professionals come in and talk about how to raise successful 
children and a lot of forums have been it takes a village to raise a youth. 
 
According to Kulvir, raising children requires an integrated approach that involves all in the 
community. For Kulvir, the responsibility over steering youth away from gangs lies not just with 
the parents but also by everyone in the community. The desire to reduce the social harms posed 
by gangs is something that is in the best interest of both community and state authorities alike. 
With the decline of Welfarism, volunteer and non-profit agencies like Kulvir’s have proliferated 
in recent years and are given considerable responsibility for assisting disadvantaged communities 
(Ilcan and Basok, 2004). Thus, community becomes a means for government itself and the state 
places limits on itself when necessary. As Kulvir argues, it takes a community to raise children, 
suggesting that community agencies such as hers have an easier time penetrating a domain like 
the family and eliciting the support of the broader community to play a role in the upbringing of 
youth. Direct intervention on the part of the state, in this regard, is much more difficult and is 
likely to be met with opposition and resistance (Ilcan and Basok, 2004).  
 The wraparound school-based initiative also provides a good representation of a crime 
control agenda that emphasizes community-state partnerships. Amarjit, a school district 
employee, describes the wraparound program as: “our most intensive program … connecting 
community support and coordinating them with multiple community partnerships, the Ministry 
105 
 
and the RCMP being one of the biggest ones. The RCMP dedicating staff towards it too and it’s 
an intervention program when kids have been identified as having risk factors.” The organization 
works collaboratively with the police, government officials and several community agencies to 
form a network of both state and non-state actors to deliver comprehensive support to susceptible 
youth. Essentially, governing the gang problem is seen to require such an arrangement, which 
includes South Asian community organizations, in order to be impactful.   
Through the community, contemporary crime control also encourages the role of expert 
knowledge in managing the risk posed by crime. Community organizations, as well as the police 
and school officials, are interested in developing and exchanging knowledge on risk factors so 
that intervention and prevention programs can address the underlying causes of gang 
involvement among South Asian youth and the problem can then be managed. This illuminates a 
major feature of neoliberal governance, which is the role of expert knowledge that is used to 
transform rationalities of crime control into specific technologies of government (Rose and 
Miller, 1992).  
Anju, a professor and community educator who works in association with several South 
Asian gang organizations, is one such expert whose research on alienation is translated into 
specific modes of action, such as public education and awareness through forums where this 
knowledge is disseminated to community members. Anju clarifies this knowledge transmission 
component of her work: 
[Name of community group omitted] also has a knowledge transition component, where 
we invite the community and community stakeholders, police, to educate community 
members that share a narrative. So, knowledge transmission is really important but also 
generating knowledge through key stakeholders… and what we’re now looking into is 
policy. And that is how are certain policies making it difficult for police to actually do their 
work in preventing, in arresting youth, which could then protect the public or other policy 
issues. 
 
106 
 
For Anju, knowledge plays a critical role in two ways: 1) it allows trained experts to develop 
knowledge on the gang problem and to then disseminate that information to the community and 
state actors (i.e. the police), and 2) to aid in policy development that assists authorities in 
combating gangs. This illustrates a central component of governmentality as neoliberal strategies 
tie government to knowledge of human conduct derived from the social and human sciences 
(Burchell, 1996). Before a problem like South Asian gangs is to be rendered governable it must 
first be known. Experts like Anju highlight the manner in which non-state actors are tasked with 
developing and exchange knowledge and information, which is then used to facilitate strategies 
of crime control. Liberal government must elicit and foster the support of the community in 
combating gangs and cannot over-regulate crime control 
Therefore, when it comes to ‘saving’ youth from the lure of gangs by drawing them back 
into mainstream society, community members and agencies nurtured by state agencies are 
deemed appropriate in carrying out such inclusionary practices as these community agencies 
bring their own values, beliefs and norms that are distinct from that of the state. As Anju 
describes, knowledge on South Asian gang offending is developed through her research and is 
then transmitted to the public through compressive public education and awareness forums, 
which is then used to develop polices used by police and other community stakeholders. The 
goal of these forums is to educate the public about gang crime so that it is done in a way that 
empowers them to govern themselves.  Thus, expert knowledge is translated into specific 
technologies that work to manage risk, another significant feature of neoliberal governance and 
crime control so that ‘problem people’ can be reintroduced into civil society.  It becomes vital 
for the community to develop their own knowledge in order to create their own strategies of 
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crime control, facilitating a condition of maximizing governance through the community while 
minimizing state involvement. 
To aid in this endeavour of self-regulation through the community, tools such as risk 
assessments are increasingly popular ways to track risk. Community agencies such as Kulvir’s 
that serves South Asian youth make use of a comprehensive 30-page risk assessment survey. 
This assessment examines several important domains including family and personal 
relationships, living arrangements, educational, attainment and barriers, employment, 
neighbourhood, lifestyle and friends, criminal history, attitudes towards offending, substance 
use, physical, and mental and emotional health, and perception of self and others among other 
important information collected. Kulvir describes the risk assessment: 
For the program that we do here, we have, like I mentioned, we do an assessment. So we 
have about thirty domains that we look at to figure out the risk level of each client…then 
after six months, I do it again so that we develop a rapport with our youth. And then again, 
stuff like criminal history. Have they been arrested? Have any conditions? Probation 
officers? 
 
Valverde (2017) highlights the relationship between knowledge and power under neoliberal 
governance as it aims to manage risk in a future-oriented and aggregate manner. Thus, the 
collection of detailed statistics and data is required so that risk factors are uncovered, tracked and 
used to prevent future offending (O’Malley, 2010). As Kulvir mentions, it is necessary to track 
changes in risk in order for her agency to then provide appropriate intervention and services.   
 
Community as a means of inclusion  
 As mentioned above, contemporary crime control emphasizes the enlistment and 
mobilization of community, where possible, to produce a comprehensive gang reduction strategy 
that aims to mentor gang members or at-risk subjects, form the necessary social bonds to control 
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their deviance, or guide them through counselling or mentorship programing. As evident by the 
programs discussed above, limited state involvement in some anti-gang programing is deemed 
necessary and beneficial.  
 Jyoti, a program coordinator who works with South Asians in an immigrant-services 
agency describes the importance of inclusion: 
I think … being involved in something or being included. Inclusion is very, very 
important for everyone, everyone. Whether someone's coming from a different country or 
even a child in a group of 30 in a classroom. Everyone must be included. And I think 
giving them options at that young age and not isolated them. Isolation is a huge part of 
why people go into that group [gangs] because they don't fit into any other group. 
 
For respondents like Jyoti, gangs often fill a void that is missing in a youth’s life. Therefore, 
giving them a sense of belonging through inclusionary measures is deemed as absolutely 
necessary. Aarti, who coordinates a violence prevention and youth program for a community 
agency, advocates further on the importance of inclusion in relationship to specific types of 
programing: 
I would say include as in being involved, like having a positive mentor. Constant mentor. 
Counselling or some type of therapeutic work. See the thing with the mentors, when they 
have positive mentor in their life, it kind of ticks off a couple of protective factors because 
the mentor would engage them in positive prosocial activities. Provide them with that 
everyday kind of mentorship, nothing very clinical and then also, and kind of decrease their 
sense of isolation by then introducing them to new activities and even people because often 
times they're very community based. So yeah, I would say those two things are important, 
like getting the counselling but having a mentor, but also you know, there's a lot of research 
that shows that when a young person feels that they have somebody in their life that gives 
a shit about them and cares about them, that that in itself is a huge protective factor. So 
with the mentorship or getting them reconnected to maybe like a family member, huge. 
 
Aarti ultimately emphasizes the need for at-risk youth to be included in civil society in order to 
steer them away from the lure of gangs, which can be achieved by these mentors and the bonds 
they develop with youth. For Aarti, community-based programs that emphasize mentorship or 
counselling can serve as a protective factor against gang involvement. Further, such programing 
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helps alleviate some of the isolation vulnerable youth may be experiencing through their 
participation in recreational activities and other prosocial activities with a mentor figure.  
Some of these inclusionary programs emphasize the need to ‘save’ youth from the 
dangers associated with gang life. This is where religion, particularly Sikhism, and religious 
institutions, like Gurdwaras, play a central role. Spiritual guidance and religious doctrine have 
become an increasingly useful tool for anti-gang organizations to incorporate into programing 
and exit strategies (Totten, 2012). The incorporation of Sikhism into gang programing illustrates 
a contemporary display of pastoral power, one that is deployed to incorporate religious 
institutions into broader efforts to manage South Asian gangs.  Pastoral authority, independent of 
the state’s, becomes integral to guiding and molding productive citizens as pastoral governance 
is premised on the salvation of souls and relies on scripture to guide individuals who may have 
strayed from the flock. However, as Lippert (2004) notes, religious dogma plays a more minimal 
role as the defining characteristic of contemporary neoliberal governance is to mobilize 
Gurdwaras, as community centres, to respond to the local gang problem and create subjects 
capable of self-regulating.  
Ajit, who started a South Asian anti-gang violence organization, organizes several youth 
groups and public education sessions that partner with local Gurdwaras. Ajit describes the 
importance of integrating Sikhism and Gurdwaras into gang programing: 
Gurdwaras are sort of major centres of our community. So, if the kids get connected and 
they take on some responsibilities to run the programs, to get involved, those kinds of 
things, and also be aware a little bit of the Gurbani [Sikh scripture], I think Gurbani is great 
if you can get connected with Gurbani. I think that gives you entirely new perspective on 
life. 
 
Ajit believes Sikh scripture, known as Gurbani, plays an integral role in steering youth away 
from gangs. For Ajit, scripture can have a transformative effect on youth by appealing to their 
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sense of morality. As Ajit describes the reverence of Sikh temples to the Sikh community, it is 
not surprising that Gurdwaras become actively involved in gang programing. As cultural and 
religious centres, with open space and a free ‘soup kitchen’, Gurdwaras are viewed as perfect 
places to host youth groups and other programs making it necessary to elicit their support in 
combating gangs. Even if religious scripture itself plays a minimal role, as officer Krish argues 
when discussing his temple-based youth program, the fact that they are held in Gurdwaras is 
significant and carries an important religious function as well as illustrating community 
governance. Officer Krish describes how coming to temple for a youth group promotes seva 
(service to the community) among participants. Further, Krish argues that coming to temple is 
something that is lost among youth, hoping that regular attendance through his group will 
encourage participants to become more actively involved at the Gurdwara. 
Gurdwaras, as community centres, play an important role in governing the South Asian 
gang problem for their ability to exercise informal social control. By including youth in a 
prosocial activity, like attending temple, these programs are believed to responsibilize wayward 
youth. Officer Krish draws on the story of one participant he encountered through his youth 
group who is transformed in such a way: 
So, I told him he should apply for the cadet program. He applied for the cadet program, he 
got accepted to the cadet program and now he just started his first month there and he just 
loves it and it was just like 360-degree turnaround for this kid now. He comes every week, 
he still kind of acts like the gangster kid but now you can see in his eye, he got a job in the 
summer time. Working, cleaning at [name of business omitted] and he does this now and he 
goes to school. So, he's on the up and up from what he was before, he was taking cars for 
joyrides without people's consent. All this kind of stuff to now he's a great volunteer. He 
hasn't got any problems that I've seen or I've read on the computer about him. He goes to 
school, he's a volunteer with me and then he's also a cadet. 
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As a guide with connections to religious institutions that promote Sikh doctrine, Krish believes 
his program has a positive and transformative effect on high-risk youth based on the example he 
cites above.  
 The exercise of pastoral power through the symbolic nature of holding these youth groups 
in Gurdwaras where participants are exposed to scripture and the highly-valued Sikh principle of 
seva, is ultimately believed to cleanse the soul and potentially save at-risk youth from the 
dangers posed by gang life. Yet this form of pastoral power is influenced by neoliberal 
governance. As Lippert (2004) suggests: “Neoliberalism, however, necessarily defers to other 
logics, including pastoral power, to render those currently incapable of self-regulation capable 
and then comes to indirectly rely on care of such entities” (p.543). Thus, Sikh temples in the 
community are mobilized in order to prevent gang involvement among South Asian youth, 
essentially creating autonomous entities capable of self-regulating conduct.  
 
Contradictory and competing practices – The existence of both exclusionary and 
inclusionary programing  
 
As a legal instrument, the BRE initiative revises the logic of police regulation through the 
creation and maintenance of spaces that are free from gang violence and disorder. These policies 
work to exclude individuals deemed ‘threats’ from particular places that have historically 
witnessed escalated gang violence due to the catalyst of alcohol consumption and the presence of 
weapons. BRE specifically emphasizes exclusion through the direct removal of gang members 
and their associates from participating in conventional, prosocial activities like going to a bar, 
drinking or dancing at a nightclub. What makes these practices modern however is that they are 
achieved through contractual relationships with private businesses owners and police authorities 
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in order to effectively exclude gang members. These arrangements provide a contractual 
framework that allows police to work around restraints on their power that prevent them from 
simply removing gang members or associates from private businesses. Instead, officers must 
enter into agreements at the start the year with business owners, forming a community-state 
partnership with the mutually beneficial purpose of reducing incidents of gang violence in their 
establishments. Although police can proactively enter these establishments and remove suspects, 
they can also be reactive and respond to calls from businesses themselves. At the same time, 
police officers retain the ability to exercise direct sovereign power by detaining and arresting 
individuals in addition to empowering business owners to self-govern by proactively calling in 
potential inadmissible patrons to police. This is evident in the role-switching ability of police, 
which allows them to alternate between the role of traditional law enforcement official and 
private security (i.e. authorized agent) and act accordingly. As a legal technology then, these 
contractual agreements expand police power by transforming them into different kinds of agents, 
both state and non-state alike, and exercising different forms of power. 
As Valverde (2017) argues, although neoliberal crime control strategies that stress less 
direct coercion have proliferated, elements of police regulation, for example, have not 
diminished but are now subject to legal limits that stress human rights, freedom and other 
neoliberal ideals. In a sense, BRE is a more contemporary way of conducting police regulation 
that aligns with valued liberal principles. Stenson (1999) posits that governmentality serves as a 
framework for contemporary governance, where sovereign power or police regulation are 
transformed, updated and realigned by neoliberal principles. Thus, modern adaptations of 
sovereign or disciplinary power are sensitive to values such as individual liberty and freedom. In 
jurisdictions with BRE programs, these initiatives have undergone some judicial scrutiny. These 
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responses to the South Asian gang phenomenon reflective of centuries of development in 
governing styles and the deployment of multiple logics, creating a milieu where mechanisms of 
police regulation are not just residuals from the past, but rather, have taken on a newer form 
alongside and influenced by neoliberal principles.  
Consequently, neoliberal principles of governance have had a major influence in how 
police regulation is practiced today. The BRE program for example, cannot be initiated without 
the prior contractual consent of individual business owners. Further, as a form of police 
regulation, BRE must be compatible with individual rights and freedoms. According to Valverde 
(2003), police regulation has not entirely gone unchecked and unchallenged. Officer Ranjit 
acknowledges some of the judicial oversight the program went through: “[the BRE] got 
challenged a few times in the courts of what authority [we had] and stuff and so we had to tweak 
a little bit but we're comfortable where we are in regards to authority around it.” This could 
suggest two things: first, that a system of checks and balances are in place to ensure that when 
police regulation is exercised, it respects values such as individual freedom and liberty. If not, 
these programs must be amended so that power is rendered compatible with liberal principles. 
Second, and possibly more logical is that the BRE program channels powers associated with 
private property and non-criminal sanctions around the use of space, neither of which derive 
from criminal law, allowing the program to essentially fly under the radar.  
  These exclusionary practices ultimately coexist with anti-gang programming that takes a 
markedly different approach and is generally antithetical to exclusion. Specifically, these 
differing measures are intrinsically inclusionary in nature and encourage at-risk or gang involved 
subjects to participate in conventional activities and social life. For example, a community 
agency and its frontline gang workers offer mentorship, extra-curricular activities, therapy and 
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other resources for youth, the wraparound school program that wraps services around at-risk 
students, and finally youth groups in the community launched by off duty police officers that 
give youth a chance to connect with role models and engage in community leadership. These 
inclusionary initiatives are characteristic of contemporary crime practices that stress minimal 
direct state intervention through governing in the community.  
 In communities that have both inclusionary and exclusionary gang strategies in operation 
there are bound to be some significant dilemmas that arise. For example, there is likely going to 
be a cross-section of individuals who are subject to both exclusion and inclusion. In the city of 
Vancouver, for instance, the BRE program operates alongside community-based gang initiatives, 
like the school wraparound or a frontline gang agency. The dilemma arises when some gang-
involved individuals who are subject to exclusion by their direct removal from a bar or restaurant 
are also eligible or currently enrolled in programing that has the dueling purpose of making them 
feel accepted and included in society. This could suggest that attempts to integrate these 
individuals into society through counselling, mentorship or increasing their involvement in 
recreational or prosocial activities is counterproductive or counterintuitive as these individuals 
are simultaneously being rejected from participating in mainstream society. This is especially 
problematic when at-risk or gang involved individuals are already feeling discriminated against 
or aliened from their communities.  
Despite these challenges there is an important question that needs to be addressed: how 
do we make sense of the exercise of various logics of power to understand how these seemingly 
contradictory initiatives, (exclusionary versus inclusionary) can coexist together?  
 
Making sense of the exclusion/inclusion divide 
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Understanding the techniques, rationalities and scope of both exclusionary and inclusionary 
practices  
 To provide some clarity as to how BRE can operate simultaneously and independently 
from programming done by community agencies that have different outcomes (i.e. inclusion) but 
ultimately tackle the same problem (i.e. South Asian gang offending), it is necessary to apply a 
methodological framework for understanding security projects put forward by Valverde (2010). 
Valverde’s (2010) analysis centres on security, a mechanism of power that is exercised over 
populations to minimize risks and dangers that threatens the safety of society. Despite being 
characterized as separate from police regulation, the BRE program can also be fundamentally 
considered a security project with the goal of reducing threats posed by gangs and gang violence 
to the population at large.  
Thus, BRE deploys a fourth foundational logic of power alongside police regulation, 
sovereign power, and contemporary neoliberal governance. As Valverde (2010) notes, the term 
“security” should be treated as an umbrella term since “security projects are fraught with 
contradictions” as multiple governance processes may exist. While Valverde’s (2010) analysis 
can be used to understand the contradictions that exist within a given program internally due to 
the multiple logics of governing present, comparisons can also be made between different 
projects that address the same problem. Therefore, to understand how such a program can exist 
in an area that occupies the same space as more inclusionary gang responses, it is necessary to 
examine the techniques, rationalities and the scope of the BRE program compared to 
inclusionary programing operated by the community. 
Political rationalities concern the moral justifications for exercising power, which in the 
case of the BRE program would primarily be for public safety, deterrence or to maintain public 
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order. Community agencies may differ in their rationalities, emphasizing instead issues relating 
to rehabilitation or reintegration while undervaluing elements of deterrence or public safety as 
justifications for programing. Governmental technologies represent the specific mechanics on the 
programmes, techniques, apparatuses, documents or procedures that are used in the operation of 
a program, such as BRE, and would include a variety of different components such as the 
educational training on gangs provided to bar and restaurant owners, the signed agreement, the 
police in structural manual, or the B.C. Trespass Act used in its administration. Technologies 
used by community agencies may be less formal but include specific operational goals, 
mandates, risk assessments, or agency policy and procedural manuals.   
What makes Valverde’s (2010) analysis so significant is her call to examine a third and 
often neglected dimension of security projects, which is scope. Scope includes the temporal and 
spatial scale as well as the jurisdiction of a program.  In this regard, BRE appears to be more 
locally confined, where authorities like the police govern the problem of gangs in the bars and 
restaurants in their designated municipalities, while the power of owners and managers is limited 
solely to their individual businesses. Contrasted with community mentorships or gang 
intervention programs, these initiatives are not necessarily restricted to specifically designed 
territory or space, providing them more flexibility in terms of where influence is exerted. Related 
to territory are the jurisdictional powers each actor possesses and the rules and procedures that 
governs their authority. For example, the police have certain powers to carry out a specific crime 
control agenda. When such an exercise of power is carried out through a program like BRE, it is 
likely to viewed as coercive given its intrusive nature, especially when it is carried out by 
uniformed authority figures. Community agencies that conduct mentorship or provide 
recreational activities as a part of their mandate are likely to be perceived as more welcoming or 
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inclusive of gang members or at-risk populations due to the more reintegrative approach to 
programing. The scope of each program can also be assessed temporarily, where despite what 
some respondents suggest, the BRE program could mostly be considered a short-term solution to 
remove perceived threats to public safety more immediately. Community programs that work 
more intimately with at-risk youth, on the other hand, are framed as rehabilitative and aim of 
addressing the underlying or root causes of gang involvement in what could ultimately be 
considered a more long-term solution and gang-reduction plan. These programs also emphasize 
early intervention by targeting at-risk youth populations, whereas BRE likely singles out adults 
and drinking-age populations.   
Thus, as Valverde (2010) argues “in analyzing the scope of security projects, then, 
temporal scale, spatial scope and jurisdiction all need to be dealt with separately. Such a three-
step analysis will reveal how certain way of governing have come to be taken for granted as 
appropriate for certain problems or across certain spaces” (p. 16). When making sense of how 
exclusionary practices like BRE can exist with inclusionary programs operated by community 
agencies, examining their political rationalities, techniques, and more importantly the scope of 
each program type offers some important insights. Precisely, both exclusionary and inclusionary 
practices will have a seat at the table when it comes to dealing with South Asian gangs as these 
programs represent the diverse rationalities on how best to respond to gangs, but are ultimately 
confided to specific jurisdictional powers and spatial and temporal restrictions in their operation.  
 
How “community” is differently conceptualized  
 One can delve deeper into political rationalities behind the influence of gang programing 
by examining the importance placed on “community”. Community plays a critical role in both 
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the BRE program (BRE) and programming done by private non-profit groups. However, in one 
instance community is used as a means of exclusion and banishment from public spaces and 
participation in legitimate social activity. Here, gang members and their associates are to be 
rejected from decent and law-abiding people and their businesses. In the second instance, 
community is used for a markedly different purpose, which is to increase the involvement of at-
risk or gang involved subjects in meaningfully participation in public life, whether that be 
through mentorship programs, involvement in temple, providing increased recreational activities, 
or other types of initiatives that keep them engaged in the community. Nevertheless, these 
dueling approaches present another important dilemma: how do both exclusion and inclusion 
complicate notions of “community”? Additionally, how are both community and individuals 
being imagined to achieve different goals? 
 There is no clear consensus as to how “community” is defined, which carries different 
meanings for different people. One characteristic of “community” is that it is functional with a 
capacity to increase people’s ability to work together and solve problems (Paveglio et al., 2017). 
For Sjöberg (2003), community provides a context for people to navigate risks that might arise. 
Further, community also involves the transmission of social values and beliefs (Fernback, 2007). 
Thus, community is a powerful concept where commonly shared values and beliefs are learnt 
and members work together to solve internal problems that arise. 
 The conflicting approaches of inclusion and exclusion represent two distinct value 
systems and political rationalities at play. On the one hand there is an approach that emphasizes a 
“get tough on crime”, conservative and punitive position, and on the other, a more liberal, 
rehabilitative orientation. In both cases then, community is seen as an essential vessel for not 
only conveying and upholding these competing value orientations, but to also serve the necessary 
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and accompanying functional purpose for risk management. Precisely, the methods of inclusion 
and exclusion where two competing beliefs of “doing justice” coexist and community is used for 
different purposes to tackle the same problem as envisioned through competing rationalities. 
Thus, under exclusion, gang members are imagined as ‘lost causes’ who should be rejected from 
the community, explaining the conditions that allow a program like BRE to exist, while inclusion 
imagines gang members and at-risk South Asian youth as ‘savable’, which is achieved through 
appropriate programing that increases their involvement in the community by the community 
itself. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 As Valverde (2005) notes, municipal governments have increasingly exercised power 
over space to regulate the behaviour of socially undesirable people. Beckett and Herbert (2010b) 
build on this analysis by suggesting contemporary punishment, through innovated use of 
municipal trespass laws, has resulted in a type of banishment of marginalized or “problem” 
groups. This chapter builds on these studies by examining a specific public safety initiative 
launched across the province of BC to deal with the problem of gangs. Not without controversy, 
the BRE program has run relatively successfully with calls for it to expand into municipalities 
like Surrey. Through agreements with bar and restaurant owners and management, police 
officers act as authorization agents, having the capacity to ask for identification of patrons and 
require them to leave if they are deemed an “inadmissible patron”. These inadmissible patrons 
are mostly gang members, gang associates, or someone involved in serious crime and weapons 
offenses. If an inadmissible patron refuses to leave he or she may be subject to arrest under the 
BC Trespass Act.  
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Although law enforcement, businesses and the general community appear supportive of 
the initiative, and believe it has reduced gang violence in and around bars and restaurants, the 
program exists as a means to exclude “undesirables” from meaningful participation in social life. 
These exclusionary practices reflect an exercise of regulatory police power, where law 
enforcement is given the ability to remove threats to public order and ensure the moral 
functioning of society. This is achieved by regulating the activities of citizens through spatial 
governance. Nevertheless, BRE does not represent a historic exercise of direct police power as 
private businesses in the community must first sign-on to the program before giving law 
enforcement such authorizing power. Therefore, BRE represents a configuration of police 
regulation backed by sovereign power that is influenced by principles of neoliberal governance 
that stresses community crime control. This arrangement empowers business owners to enact 
their private privacy rights through municipal trespass laws and permits the police to act at the 
behest of civil society.   
Rather than just be limited to exclusionary practices however, this chapter looks at gang 
responses that appear to be diametrically the opposite in terms of objectives and intended 
outcomes. Specifically, those gang initiatives that promote the notion of inclusion so that at-risk 
or gang involved individuals are brought into mainstream society. These practices reflect a more 
neoliberal form of governance that places limits on direct state intervention by providing 
community agencies the ability to govern the problem of gangs. These inclusionary practices 
diverge quite significantly from BRE for two reasons. First, these programs aim to integrated 
South Asian youth and young adults into their communities through increased opportunities for 
mentorship, sports and recreation, and counselling. Exclusion, on the other hand, works to place 
limits an individual’s social activities. Mainly, going out for a dinner, drinks or dancing at a bar, 
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restaurant or nightclub. Second, many of these inclusionary practices integrate culture, or at the 
very least are sensitive to racial and cultural differences of South Asian gang members or at-risk 
individuals. In the case of BRE as an exclusionary measure, the issue of race has been a point of 
contention as it has been suggested that discrimination and stereotyping has become an 
unfortunate by-product of such a policy initiative operating in ethnically diverse communities.  
Despite these differences, inclusionary and exclusionary practices both share one 
important characteristic, which is eliciting the support of the community when dealing with the 
problem of gangs. Community serves a different function for each type of practice. Under 
inclusion, community has a truly rehabilitative and corrective function first and foremost. Here, 
community is used to help lift South Asian youth or adults out of gang life by keeping them 
engaged through activity, counselling, mentorship or other support services. Additionally, 
solving a problem like South Asian gang involvement requires eliciting the support of the South 
Asian community itself and South Asian professionals. On the other hand, aligned with more a 
more “tough on crime” agenda, policy makers and law enforcement elicit the support of 
businesses owners in the community for BRE to achieve the opposite of inclusion. Here, 
community becomes a means for exclusion, where business owners can help rid police of gang 
violence in their neighbourhood by banishing individuals perceived to be a threat to public 
safety. In summary, both inclusion and exclusion represent distinct political ideologies at work 
and is reflected in a gang strategy where the community plays an important role.   
This chapter makes an important contribution to the literature. First, it expands on 
existing theory on contemporary punishment and governance. In their piece, Beckett and Herbert 
(2010a) suggest future study examine how punishment has evolved into newly innovative and 
legally hybrid techniques that make use of banishment to remove undesirable people from social 
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spaces. The BRE program represents such a legally hybrid technique in penal technology 
through its ability to exclude gang members and their associates from public spaces. This chapter 
also makes an important discovery through the admission of Officer Ranjit, which is that the 
BRE program allows the police to carry out the controversial practice of carding. This essentially 
means that practices viewed a racially discriminatory continue to operate under the radar through 
a security project that elicits the support of the community as opposed to being exercised through 
formal police procedure and practice.    
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Chapter Four: Bindy Johal and the duelling legacies of folk “devil” and sympathetic 
“hero” 
Introduction 
 
“When we sit down and think about race relations in this country and our community, 
shit we look at people like fucking Bindy and say: "hey. Did he do something for our 
community?" Did he? Like moralism aside, put the ethical, moral shit [aside], let's just 
deal with power relations. And so, when you look at South Asian young men today, this 
guy becomes fucking icon. He becomes a fucking God in the imagination of the 
emasculated South Asian male. All of a sudden, they're like "oh right. We can fucking do 
this". – Diljit (former gang member) 
 
“Every grade 8 kid is talking about [Bindy] as he is some hero who defied the police and 
got killed and his interviews are online and people are looking it up and these grade 6,7 
kids are always searching them up and bringing him up. So, one thing I decided is never 
ever to use his name or react to his name” – Simran (secondary school teacher)   
 
In the lower Mainland of BC, one name evokes a wide-range of emotions and stirs a 
community’s social anxieties. Bhupinder Singh Johal, commonly referred to as Bindy Johal, was 
the notorious leader of a predominately South Asian gang in the 1990s. Johal operated one of the 
most dangerous and deadly organized crime groups around Metropolitan Vancouver before 
being killed in a crowded nightclub on December 20, 1998. Although 20 years have passed since 
his death, Johal’s influence resonates with some in the community in a variety of different ways. 
The quotes cited above represent two distinct narratives as to how Bindy Johal’s legacy is 
typically constructed. On the one hand, former gang member Diljit equates Bindy as an iconic 
figure to youth for his ability to counter pervasive stereotypes of South Asian men and breaking 
through a formidable power structure in society. Others, such as educator Simran, believe Johal’s 
legacy has tarnished the South Asian community and endangers youth today by drawing them to 
gangs. Nevertheless, these perspectives are connected on the premise that Bindy Johal remains 
an influential, albeit controversial figure in the local South Asian community in BC.
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Drawing on the narratives of key authorities, including community gang intervention 
workers, school officials and law enforcement representatives, this chapter offers preliminary 
insights into the creation of this local legend. Central to this analysis are the following questions: 
how do moral entrepreneurs and agents of social control imagine Johal as a social figure? How 
have these conceptualizations influenced practices of governance as a reaction to his legacy? I 
argue that Johal has largely been conceptualized in two conflicting ways: first, as a contemporary 
folk devil who has corrupted South Asian youth by glamourizing the gang lifestyle, and second, 
as a sympathetic or even heroic figure who fought against a system of racism and threats to 
South Asian masculinity that plagued working-class South Asian males in the 80s and 90s. 
Further, by examining how Bindy has been imagined by prominent officials as a folk devil, we 
are able to understand the community-wide reaction to Bindy through specific interventions that 
attempt to deglamorize his appeal among youth while introducing new socially acceptable heroes 
and mentor figures to take his place. Nevertheless, tying the two competing perceptions together 
it is evident that the moral panic that has erupted these past three decades over Johal might 
actually mask a greater and deep-rooted crisis surrounding South Asian masculinity and class 
that is much harder to tackle by moral entrepreneurs.   
To understand the duelling legacies Johal seems to produce, it is necessary to turn to the 
literature on moral panics and folk devils, as well as the theorizing on masculinities and crime. 
The moral panic literature highlights how social problems, and more importantly for present 
purposes ‘problem people’, are constructed, perceived and reacted upon (Hall et al., 1978; 
Cohen, 2011). To further enrich this analysis, some of the literature on hegemonic masculinities 
and crime will also be examined, as this body of theorizing provides important context as to the 
conditions that have cemented Johal’s status as a heroic figure in the community. Further, this 
chapter makes an important epistemological contribution to the broader literature by examining 
 125 
 
an issue that has received limited scholarly attention, which is the issue of South Asian gang 
offending. This study adds to what I hope will be a growing body of research on South Asian 
gang involvement in Canada by focusing on arguably the most infamous South Asian gangster in 
Canadian history. In this regard, this study examines the significance a single individual might 
play in the collective consciousness of entire community and the fears, anxiety and even 
reverence some might have for a figure who has reached ‘mythical’ status.    
This analysis begins with a history of Bindy Johal’s life, chronicling his early beginnings, 
his life as a notorious gang leader, and his eventual demise. This is followed by a review of key 
debates among the literature on moral panics and masculinities and crime. The literature review 
leads to the heart of this analysis, which is to understand how a local legend was created. In these 
subsequent sections, I examine two widespread yet contradictory narratives of Johal: the anxiety-
inducing folk devil and the lauded folk hero, who is credited for having done some “good” for 
the South Asian community. I argue that the emphasis on Johal as a morally repugnant 
boogeyman subsequently conceals the structural factors that more significantly influence gang 
involvement among South Asian men, namely a crisis of racialized masculinity.  Nevertheless, 
understanding these diverse perspectives sheds light on how the community has reacted to him 
either through countermeasures that aim to reduce his appeal, such as educational school-based 
programing. This analysis concludes with some closing thoughts and direction for future 
research.  
 
The rise and fall of Bindy Johal 
 Bindy Johal’s storied history is both sensational and captivating and has drawn the 
attention of a generation of South Asian boys, some of whom were not even born when he was 
killed. In fact, Johal’s story served as the loose inspiration for the main protagonist/antagonist in 
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Canadian filmmaker Deepa Mehta’s movie Beeba Boys (Good Boys), bolstering his position as a 
cultural ‘legend’ or ‘hero’ for some in the South Asian community. Where most gang and 
organized crime leaders would be hesitant to appear on media and draw attention to their illicit 
activities over fear of jeopardizing their financial interests, Johal became a fixture on the nightly 
news openly threatening his enemies. Having this visibility worked to legitimize Johal’s status as 
a folk hero for his ability to directly threaten harm onto his enemies, disparage police and 
challenge authority.  
Born Bhupinder “Bindy” Singh Johal in Punjab, India, Johal immigrated to Vancouver as 
a small child in the early 1970s (Langton, 2013). As a youth, Bindy was labelled a “problem 
child”, being particularly defiant to authority figures. Ajit, a South Asian youth gang advocate, 
discusses a major source of Johal’s early problems: “people like Bindy Johal, he had a learning 
problem. He was a failure at school.” According to Ajit, Bindy’s apparent learning disability 
caused him to be bullied, which in turn, motivated him to get involved in gangs. Secondary 
school teacher Simran offers further insight into his troubled early years and what may have 
pushed him into gangs:  
Why did Bindy Johal get into gangs? Same story. Single mother, never home, worked at 
a hospital with my mother-in-law and basically wasn't accepted, had physical [issues], he 
was a small kid who basically wanted to gain some weight and people used to pick on 
him. He didn't have very good language, English language skills… mom was a 
hardworking, single-parent mother. Working in the kitchen in Vancouver General 
Hospital. 
  
Simran paints a bleak picture of Johal’s early life being raised by a single, working-class mother, 
which was compounded by learning disabilities, academic challenges, and a physical appearance 
that likely served as the catalyst for Johal’s involvement in gangs due to bullying.  
 Johal’s earliest brush with police was at the age of 18 in 1989 when he kicked his vice-
principal in the groin, an offense for which he was expelled and convicted of assault, spending 
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60 days in jail (Hall and Kines, 1998a). The co-accused in that incident was Faizal Dean, a 
member of the Los Diablos street gang who was believed to have introduced Johal to gangs. The 
Los Diablos originated as a largely Hispanic gang, but was eventually dubbed the “East Indian 
Mafia” since 80 percent of its members were South Asian by the late 1980s. South Asian 
gangsters, including Bindy Johal, overtook Los Diablos as older Hispanic leaders were 
incarcerated or killed, taking advantage of a void left in their presence (Journalist unknown, 
1998). As a member of Los Diablos, Bindy and his fellow gang members primarily focused on 
car theft, home break-ins and eventually petty cocaine trafficking (Hall and Kines, 1998b).  
 It was in this gang that Bindy met the Dosanjh brothers, Jimmy and Ron, who would 
become high level underworld kingpins after the Los Diablos disbanded in the early 1990s 
(Middleton, 2002). Having been a teenager, Bindy admired gang leader Jimmy Dosanjh and was 
quoted saying: “[Jimmy] was a big shot…people feared him…what he wanted he got.” 
(Middleton, 2002). This likely drew Bindy into the Dosnajhs’ gang and he would go on to sell 
cocaine for the brothers. However, after murdering a local representative of the Columbian 
cocaine cartel in a dispute, Jimmy Dosanjh was incarcerated and awaiting trial. This provided 
Bindy an opportunity to take over the Dosanjh enterprise and grow his own reputation as a mafia 
boss (Middleton, 2002). During this time, Bindy drove expensive cars, built his physique at the 
gym, and earned considerable wealth from the group’s illicit activities.  
Johal may have been reluctant to hand back the lucrative business and relinquish his 
position when Jimmy Dosanjh was eventually released from jail, which quickly soured their 
relationship, resulting in the brothers taking out a contract hit on Bindy (Middleton, 2002). 
Luckily for Bindy, the hired hitman double-crossed the Dosanjhs’ and sold the information back 
to Johal who in turn arranged the killing of the brothers. During this time, both Ron and Bindy 
appeared on television openly threatening each other (Middleton, 2002). Nevertheless, it was 
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Bindy who would succeed in the conflict as Jimmy was murdered in February of 1994 and Ron 
less than two months later. The killings escalated the war between Bindy and his followers with 
those of the late brothers. In an unfortunate incident, Johal’s neighbour, Glen Olson, was shot to 
death by Dosanjh associates when he was mistaken for Bindy while out walking his dog.  
Olson’s death signalled a turning point as police officers launched what would be the 
city’s largest criminal investigation at the time (Middleton, 2002). This investigation resulted in 
Bindy, and several of his associates, including high-ranking South Asian gang member Peter 
Gill, being arrested and tried in the murders of the Dosanjh brothers in 1995. At the time, the 
criminal trial was Canada’s longest and one of its costliest at $2 million but resulted in their 
acquittals (Middleton, 2002). In another twist more so fitting a movie, juror Gillian Guess was 
subsequently charged and convicted of obstruction of justice after she admitted to having an 
affair with Johal’s co-accused Peter Gill (Hall and Kines, 1998a). Guess was the only juror to 
acquit Johal and was likely swayed by Gill to produce an outcome favourable to Bindy. This 
case also served the dubious distinction of being the first and only known incident in Canadian 
legal history of a juror having a sexual relationship with a defendant.  
Having walked out of the courtroom scot free, Johal was emboldened in his position as 
gang leader. Still in his twenties, Johal continued building his empire, earning about $4 million 
annually (Pearce, 2009). Among other activities, Johal’s most troubling was a murder for hire 
businesses referred to as the “Elite”. As head of the ‘Elite’, Bindy’s hit squad would earn 
between $15,000 to $20,000 per contract killing (Bolan, 2004). Johal was suspected of a number 
of killings, assaults, extortions and kidnappings in the years that followed. Having tried to break 
his ties to crime, Johal’s mother convinced him to go stay with relatives in India and some 
believe that Johal seriously contemplated leaving gangs altogether at this time (Hall and Kines, 
1998a). Nevertheless, the draw of fast money generated by gangs did not sway Johal. Bindy’s 
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luck appeared to be running out as a number of his associates were killed and the police were 
finally able to apprehend him on more serious extortion and kidnapping charges stemming from 
an incident with a rival Asian gang (Hall and Kines, 1998a). After being released from prison in 
1998 for a separate assault and weapons charge, but prior to the start of the trial for extortion and 
kidnapping, Bindy Johal was shot with a single bullet in the back of the ear at a nightclub as he 
stepped away from his bodyguards to dance. Johal died later that morning in hospital at the age 
of 27.  
For years police had no solid leads, despite the fact that Johal was murdered in front of 
300 witnesses. In fact, at the time of his death there were multiple suspects and rival gangs with a 
grudge to bear against him. This included the local chapter of the Hell’s Angels motorcycle 
gang, who had been involved in a violent dispute with Johal just days earlier, and the Lotus gang, 
a rival Asian gang who were believed to have killed him in retaliation since it was one of their 
members that was kidnapped in Johal’s pending criminal trial. Ultimately, it was one of Bindy’s 
own associates, the late Bal Buttar, who came forward six years later. Having claimed to have 
found God, and now crippled and completely blind due to a separate shooting, Buttar 
acknowledged ordering the murder in response to Johal increasingly irrational and violent 
behaviour. The turning point according to Buttar was Bindy allegedly murdering friend and 
associate Derek Shankar over what was perceived to be a minor dispute with Johal (Bolan, 
2004).  
The salacious story of Bindy Johal and his compelling rise and ultimate downfall 
captured the attention of a generation of people in the lower Mainland of BC. Despite being dead 
for twenty years, Johal has the ability to evoke a wide range of emotions and imagery among 
individuals. From the more mythic and heroic figure who overcame racism and other systemic 
barriers to the dangerous boogeyman who continues to corrupt and lure young South Asian boys 
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to gangs, these perspectives contribute to the creation of a local legend. Further, his story helps 
explain the various reactionary measures that are deployed to diminish his appeal.   
 
Examining the literature on moral panics, folk devils and heroes, and hegemonic 
masculinities and crime 
This literature review is split into two thematic sections. The first theme centres on key 
debates within the moral panic literature, which enriches the subsequent analysis by 
underscoring the significance of Johal’s legacy as a folk devil and responded to him as a 
boogeyman figure. The second section examines the theorizing on masculinities and crime with 
emphasis on the experiences of racialized men. This cross-section of work legitimizes the 
differing perspectives that exist and view Johal as either a folk devil or more of a sympathetic 
folk hero or even anti-hero.   
 
Part I: Moral panics and folk devils 
 
 The literature on moral panics and folk devils provides valuable insights into how a 
figure like Bindy Johal might stir a community’s fears over gang violence. More importantly, 
this body of work sheds light on the diverse nature of contemporary moral panics, which has 
moved to an analysis of a generalized moral stance; how gang members become labelled as folk 
devils; and the complicated and blurred distinction between the folk hero and folk devil.  
 
Tapping into society’s fear: Moral panics and the construction of problematized people 
The manner in which certain people become defined as problematic and the societal 
reaction to them was the focus of Stanley Cohen’s seminal text Folk Devils and Moral Panics. 
At the heart of Cohen’s analysis is the concept of a moral panic, which he classifies as occurring 
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when “a condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to 
societal values and interests” (Cohen 2011: 1). For Cohen (2011), a moral panic requires the 
selection of a suitable target and a consensus that this target is not a single, insulated entity but a 
part of the dark side of society which requires immediate action. This is the folk devil, a group of 
people or a specific individual (i.e. Bindy Johal) who represents evil personified (Goode and 
Ben-Yehuda, 1994). These individuals serve as vital reminders to the public of what we should 
not be and are easily blamed when problems, such as crimes, arise and dominate the media 
narrative (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994). Further, the folk devil is easy to identify and viewed 
as an existential threat to the morality of a decent society (Cohen, 2011).  
Hall et al., (1978) provides an additional analysis of moral panics by focusing on what 
may cause them. In his analysis of muggings, Hall et al., (1978) suggests that law enforcement 
and the media likely amplified the threat posed by muggings in 1960s and 70s Britain as a way to 
conceal some of the economic insecurities felt by the public. Thus, it became easier to 
pathologize British-Black youth as being responsible for the perceived rise in muggings and 
increase the presence of police as a way to distract the public from poor economic conditions, 
while creating recognizable folk devils to pin crime on (Hall et al., 1978).  
Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) advanced moral panic analysis by establishing a set of 
criteria of which they can be evaluated. This includes concern over a potential or imagined 
threat; hostility in the form of moral outrage directed at the perceived threat or folk devils; a 
consensus that something must be done to address that threat; disproportionality in the sense that 
the subsequent public reaction or concern is not proportional to the actual harm or threat posed 
by the folk devils; and finally volatility which signals that a moral panic can just as easily 
disappear as it appears (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994: p157-159).   
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Cohen’s (2011) theory is based on the reaction to series of riots and related incidents 
between 1964 and 1966 in a British coastal town associated with the Mods and the Rockers 
(M&Rs), two rival subcultures comprised of white, working-class youth. For Cohen (2011), the 
M&Rs were perceived as a threat by society at large and their anxiety that juvenile delinquency 
and youth rioting was getting out of hand. The fashion, styles, and fads these subcultures 
adopted, and their very public feuds and conflicts meant that the M&Rs would occupy the 
position of folk devil and garner a very specific reaction from authority figures (Cohen, 2011). 
Cohen (2011) suggests that immediately after the riots, the media played an important role in 
exaggerating and distorting the threat posed by the M&Rs, predicting that such events would 
continue to occur, and communicate stereotypes about the groups that lead to a process of 
symbolization. This meant that the word ‘Mod’ or ‘Rocker’ would become symbolic of a certain 
status (i.e. delinquent), and specific objects, such as hairstyle or clothing, would transform into a 
badge of delinquency. Thus, through the process of exaggeration and symbolization, the media 
plays an important role in making the image of the delinquent sharper than reality leading to an 
overexaggerated reaction by agents of social control who passed policy and legislation that was 
disproportionate to the actual threat the M&Rs posed to the public (Cohen, 2011).  
 
The diverse, fragmented and more predictable nature of the modern moral panic 
Contemporary moral panics are different than the way Cohen originally imagined. 
Garland (2008) cautions against holding moral panics to such rigid parameters such as those 
advocated by Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994), noting that they come in a variety of shapes and 
sizes and can vary in intensity, duration and the impact they have on society. Gardner (2008) 
makes an important observation of moral panics today, which is that the societal reaction is far 
from uniform. Further, Hier (2008) suggests that Cohen (2011) erroneously characterizes moral 
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panics as the result of a threat to universally agreed upon moral boundaries and that individuals 
react in some consensual fashion. Thus, contemporary moral panics are hindered by counter-
reactions where some individuals challenge the claims made by alarmists (Gardner, 2008). In 
some cases, these counter-experts may speak on behalf of targeted folk devils, resulting in 
contemporary moral panics resembling “culture wars” or a struggle between diverse groups. For 
example, victims’ rights groups are often met with counter-claim makers who may be more 
supportive of prisoner or offenders’ rights. Therefore, panics over certain people and behaviours 
could potentially yield multiple divergent viewpoints, some that are more traditional and hostile 
towards these targets and others that are more sympathetic. For Hier (2008), as soon as a moral 
panic develops, led by a particular set of individuals and interest groups, other dissenting voices 
emerge that provide counter claims and may challenge their validity.  
Cohen (2011) himself recognizes the need to adjust his original theory to reflect 
contemporary changes, suggesting the replacement of the concept of ‘moral panic’ with that of a 
‘generalized moral stance’. For many, moral panics are no longer considered to be so volatile 
and temporary with a generalized moral stance being more predictable and born from a seamless 
web of social anxieties that exist in society (Cohen, 2011). These generalized moral stances are 
reproduced and sustained by the media that promote what values need to be protected. An 
example of such a generalized moral stance relates to the anxieties around radical Islam in a 
post-911 America. For nearly twenty years since the World Trade Center attacks, the fear of 
radical Islam has been a source of public anxiety that is particularly spurred on by the media 
when a suspected terrorist incident occurs. This suggests that contemporary moral panics, and 
the folk devils that emerge from them, can have a more long-lasting influence on the public and 
remain a part of the public consciousness for prolonged periods of time.   
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Measuring irrationality and the move to risk and governance  
One of the fundamental assumptions of moral panic discourse is that the believed harm 
posed by folk devils is actually disproportionate to the actual harm they produce (Cohen, 2011). 
This was further explored by Hall et al., (1978) who noted that the reaction to muggings in 
Britain in the 1960s and 1970s was disproportionate to the actual threat based on the number of 
incidents captured in police statistics.  Similarly, Cohen (2011) argues that the genuine threat 
posed by the Mods or Rockers was far less significant than what the media and moral 
entrepreneurs originally conceptualized when lobbying for social control measures. However, 
Hier (2008) directs researchers to shift from an analysis that centers on the ‘disproportionality’ of 
moral panics, and to refrain from measuring related concepts like ‘irrationality’ since many of 
these assessments require scholars to rely on their own normative judgements and value systems. 
Instead, Hier (2008) suggests a more substantive moral panic analysis which focus on the 
responses or reactions elicited when such folk devils or moral panics are developed.  
As ‘social constructionism’ literature proliferated, essentially claiming a stake over 
discourse that was typically dominated by moral panic theorizing, scholars became interested in 
understanding how people respond to problems and problem people that arise. According to Hier 
(2008), governance studies has increasingly become a popular area to examine the relationship 
between politics, moralization, risk and responsibility and how these elements impact responses 
to folk devils through technologies of risk management. This is something Cohen himself 
acknowledges in the most recent updated edition of Folk Devils and Moral Panics where he 
notes the move from moral panic analysis to one that focuses on a risk society. For Cohen 
(2011), the social space in which moral panics live are now filled with general social anxieties, 
fears and insecurities that are more characteristic of a risk society. This suggests that 
contemporary analysis need not focus on classifying situations as indicative or moral panics or of 
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people as folk devils, but instead how these risk situations (i.e. gang involvement) and risky 
people (i.e. gang members) are reacted to or acted upon. For Ungar (2001), contemporary moral 
panics in a risk society do not necessarily have to have a visible and identifiable folk devil, but 
stem from general anxieties that exist from our hypersensitivity to perceived hazardous and risky 
situations, relating to the “generalized moral stance”. Nevertheless, when it comes to the fear of 
crime, specifically gang violence, a clear example of a ‘folk devil’ or ‘devils’ is much easier to 
identify. The next section examines how gangsters are often imagined as folk devils by certain 
authorities or the general public.   
 
The creation of an “enemy”: Gangs and the moral panic literature  
 The framing of gang violence and individual gang members as moral panics and folk 
devils respectively has received extensive empirical attention. According to Cohen’s process of 
symbolization, gangs have the ability to raise people’s anxieties on the basis of being a threat to 
public safety, leading to a call of action against them (Meehan, 2000). Others have suggested that 
the fear of gangs should be differentiated from the more general fear of crime, as gangs can often 
produce more intense moral panics and evoke stricter action than ordinary offending (Lane and 
Meeker, 2000).  
Using Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s (1994) five characteristics, Cyr (2003) outlines the 
moral panic gangs can produce. There is public concern that gang violence threatens public 
safety which is typically disproportionate to the actual level of threat gangs pose to the general 
public. This is often fueled by sensational media coverage, causing criminal justice actors to 
mobilize and respond more stringently to gangs, which is largely supported by the public. 
Further, gang members as folk devils are often depicted as boogeymen and are easily identifiable 
for their dress, gang signs and other relevant symbols, and are subject to hostility from the 
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public. The fear of gangs is also considered volatile and can be replaced with a new type of fear 
that enters the public consciousness.  
 Zatz (1987) examines the actions of police in 1970s Phoenix towards Chicano youth gang 
members as indicative of a moral panic. For Zatz (1987) the police largely manufactured the 
problem in order to initiate oppressive action against these minority gang members, which was 
viewed as disproportionate to the actual threat posed by these gangs. Further, police largely 
exaggerated the number and size of gangs in their community, a key feature of moral panics, in 
order to initiate oppressive gang suppression operations (Zatz, 1989). McCorkle and Miethe 
(1998) conduct a similar analysis in Las Vegas where a hysteria over gangs in the late 1980s 
caused a moral panic despite any upward trends in gang violence. These studies provide a 
valuable look into how gangs generally are understood as moral panics. However, they negate an 
important feature, which is if an entire moral panic is centred on a single figure, a boogeyman of 
sorts that evokes fear and anxiety amongst a community. In this sense, the central moral panic 
around South Asian gang involvement focuses on one particularly notorious gang leader that has 
become an identifiable name and face to attach to the moral panic surrounding gang violence that 
exists in a community.  
 
The Folk hero/Folk devil distinction  
If the folk devil stirs society’s fears, anxiety and disdain then, a folk hero or heroes would 
elicit emotions that are antithetical to their ‘devilish’ counterparts. For instance, folk devils are 
often characterized as being a threat to societal morality, of which moral panics ensue. Folk 
heroes, on the other hand, may uphold principles of morality or may act in a morally justified 
way, garnering respect and admiration. Klapp (1954) was one of the earliest sociologists to 
theorize on how heroes and villains are conceptualized, suggesting that once one of these labels 
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is applied to a person, it will impact their status and influence how they are treated. For Klapp 
(1954), heroes tend to be considered leaders, champions, protectors, and other positive qualities, 
while villains tend to be viewed as criminals, cheats, or traitors. However, Klapp’s (1954) 
typologies are quite outdated and overtly racist towards racialized minorities, and his tendency to 
develop rigid categories of hero and villain fails to account for much complexity and ambiguity 
that exists in how certain people are perceived. This is essentially true when one person’s ‘hero’ 
may be on the receiving end of another person’s scorn.  
The scholarship related to deviance admiration remedies this to a degree by focusing on 
how criminals or deviants become admired or even considered heroic. Kooistra (1989) examines 
how criminals may be converted into heroes. In some cases, these criminals include thieves and 
killers, who while clearly breaking the law, are sometimes later viewed as social heroes, with 
their exploits captured in the media for decades thereafter (Kooistra, 1989). When trying to 
explain the source of admiration, Kooistra (1989) posits that cultural group values, such as 
loyalty and courage, may be transfixed to these figures. However, sociological perspectives point 
to structural factors, with folk hero-criminals often exemplifying a symbolic resistance to 
perceived social and economic injustices (i.e. the archetypal Robin Hood figure). Often, the 
injustice precedes the criminal acts and serves as a motivator for their actions (Duncan, 1991).  
Similar to folk devils, several scholars note the impact of the media in creating and 
promoting heroic figures (Drucker and Cathcart, 1994). However, while the concept of “folk 
devils” has received extensive sociological consideration, the concept of a “folk hero” has not 
enjoyed as much attention among the moral panic literature. Flinders and Wood (2015) argue 
that from current research on heroism that “it is difficult to discern any theoretical consistency, 
and attempts at developing conceptual or analytical frameworks for analyzing folk heroes or 
societal “euphoria” in the vein of moral panics and folk devils literature are virtually non-
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existent” (Flinders and Wood, 2015: p.643). Flinders and Wood (2015) attempt to remedy this by 
adopting Cohen’s theoretical framework to examine how individuals transition from hero to 
villain (and vice versa). They examine “crowd joy”, a condition that stands in contrast to moral 
panics, where intense positive emotions, such as happiness and felicity become dispersed among 
people attending a shared event or experiencing a similar condition. Folk heroes play an 
important role in eliciting this euphoric experience, and are often ascribed qualities such as 
remarkable or expectational, and generally admired. Drawing on former US President Barack 
Obama, Flinders and Wood (2015) suggest that the initial euphoria generated from his historic 
election win ultimately dwindled in subsequent years through a process of demonization that led 
to him being framed as a folk devil by some. 
Despite Flinders and Wood’s (2015) attempt to analyze folk heroes under the framework 
of moral panic analysis, further research is needed that is sensitive to the fragmented and 
complicated nature of more contemporary moral panics. As discussed above, for every individual 
or group of individuals classified as a folk devil, there are other counter-claim makers who may 
be sympathetic to these labelled people. In this case, the line between hero and villain may not be 
so easily established. Flinders and Wood’s (2015) analysis does not recognize this morally 
ambiguous gray area, where one person’s villain may have more heroic qualities to another. For 
these theorists, heroes and villains have a clear set of distinct characteristics, where folk devils 
are reminders of what we should not be and heroes “are the embodiment of our values and 
aspirations” (Flinders and Wood, 2015). Nevertheless, figures like Bindy Johal may not clearly 
fall into a clear category, blurring the line between hero and villain based on an individual’s 
perception.  
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Part II: Masculinities and crime  
 
 In addition to the literature on moral panics and folk devils, theorizing on masculinities 
and crime assists in understanding how a notorious gangster may be conceptualized in more 
positive terms. Indeed, if Johal is considered a ‘hero’ by some, the literature on hegemonic 
masculinity and crime, particularly when it relates to racialized men, is especially important to 
review.  
 
Violence as an outcome of masculinity  
 Police data supports the fact that men are overwhelmingly the perpetrators of violence 
(Hall, 2002). This has led to an abundance of theorizing on male violent offending with most 
focusing on violence as a tool to respond to traditional threats and challenges to manhood and 
maintaining masculine dominance. Theorists like Connell (1995) draw on the concept of 
‘hegemonic masculinity” to explain men’s monopoly over physical violence. For Connell 
(1995), the ‘threatened male’, who is quite vulnerable, is juxtaposed with the more domineering 
and oppressive alter ego. In other words, man has a diverse set of subordinated masculinities that 
lie in the shadows of a more dominating one. The oppressive personality is considered 
‘hegemonic’ since dominant culture and ideology dictate its institutional supremacy over women 
and some subordinate men (Connell, 1995). Precisely, hegemonic masculinities ensure that men 
reproduce a power structure in society that keeps those who do not meet this masculine ideal 
subjugated, with violence being one tool that can achieve this. Yet violence is not always 
necessary, as culture and institutions often assist in maintaining this hegemonic male power 
structure and keeping non-hegemonic masculinities subordinated through cultural consent. 
However, ‘legal’ and ‘street’ violence, along with economic discrimination, are important 
features of maintaining the dominating status quo (Connell, 1995). Violence may serve as a 
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counter measure when men feel wronged as a way to reclaim a sense of justice they feel they are 
owed (Chodorow, 2002).  
Thus, hegemonic masculinity provides some men a pattern of practices that allow them to 
maintain control and dominance (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005). Men who fit the 
hegemonic masculine ideal essentially assert their dominance and superiority over others and 
secure their legitimacy (Haywood and Mac An Ghaill, 2003). Carrigan et al., (1985) clarify that 
hegemonic masculinity is not just about power relations among men and women, but also the 
relations among different classifications of men (i.e. heterosexual versus homosexual, Caucasian 
versus racialized men, or upper-class versus working-class men). Consequently, hegemonic 
masculinity has been used to understand the violence men commit against other men and not just 
women (Harris, 1999). Consequently, not all men will be able to embody this masculine ideal as 
only a small minority can successfully enact it (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005). 
Nevertheless, hegemonic masculinity sets forward a set of culturally established ideals of 
what it is to be a man, and requires all men to position themselves in relation to it (Connell and 
Messerschmidt, 2005). Morrell (1998) best describes this position: “the concept of hegemonic 
masculinity provides a way of explaining that though a number of masculinities coexist, a 
particular version of masculinity holds sway, bestowing power and privilege on men who 
espouse it and claim it as their own.” (Morrell 1998: p.608).   
Hegemonic masculinity has been used to understand certain types of criminal behaviours, 
including gang offending. Gangs are often perceived as the easiest way to achieve manhood for 
disenfranchised males (Bloch and Niederhoffer, 1958). In this sense, working class males, who 
represent a large number of gang-involved persons, are expected to live up to hegemonic societal 
expectations while dealing with their lived reality (Hooks, 1995). Failing to measure up to this 
masculine ideal because of their social position, they rely on alternate behaviour that matches the 
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values promoted by hegemonic masculinity as a way of achieving their ‘manliness’ (Hagedron, 
1998). In this sense, these alternative sets of behaviours (like displays of toughness) allow 
disfranchised working-class males an opportunity to stake a claim and renegotiate their position 
in the pursuit of manhood (Luyt and Foster, 2001). Messerschmidt (1997) suggests that gangs 
provide working-class boys a vehicle to deal with experiences of structural powerlessness, which 
encourages hypermasculinity as an antidote to threats against self-esteem. Thus, gangs are an 
important expression of marginalized masculinity (Vigil, 1982).  
Some research examines the experiences of racialized males and marginalized 
masculinity. Blocked from access to resources that allow them to perform the dominant role of 
breadwinner, Chicano men in particular may rely on physical force or control over women in 
order to assert masculinity (Baca Zinn, 1982). The streets are often where poor urban racialized 
men are able to claim a stake on the masculine hierarchy and reclaim lost status through the use 
of hypermasculine behaviour and gang symbols, dress and language (Rios, 2011). For some 
researchers, certain Latino gang members have their own variation of masculinity that is 
influenced by a cultural machismo orientation (Guttman, 1996). This form of masculinity is tied 
to a man’s social status, respect, money, violence and sexual prowess (Baird, 2012). Connell 
(1995) argues that this exercise of counter-masculinity is a form of protest for marginalized men 
who rework the hegemonic system and do masculinity in accordance to their station in life. In 
sum, the manner in which masculinity is exercised by some men of colour is due to their social 
and economic exclusion and subject to their own cultural interpretations (i.e. Latin American 
machismo). This suggests that there is no single version of masculinity and the way it is 
exercised is dependent on different contexts and adjustments (Frost, 2010). A related concept, 
subordinate masculinity, also captures a way of doing masculinity that includes behaving in 
criminal and deviant ways (McFarlane, 2013). According to Connell (2002), subordinate 
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masculinity includes a set of behaviours and masculine identities that poses a threat to the 
supremacy of hegemonic masculinity.  
 
Racialized men and masculinity: How South Asian men do masculinity  
 Connell’s (2005) contributions on hegemonic masculinity have been criticized for failing 
to explain how class and gender intersect (Hall, 2002). More importantly, theorizing on 
masculinity in this regard neglects an analysis on race and how it interacts with both social class 
and gender. Yim and Mahalingam (2006) argue that the field of cultural studies has largely 
studied masculinity from a Euro-centric male biased position.  For present purposes, theorizing 
on South Asian male masculinity has been largely ignored in the broader literature or relegated 
to the general umbrella of Asian identity. Unfortunately, this negates key differences that might 
exist between the experiences of various racial groups within the Asian category.  
Much of the research on South Asian men and masculinity centres on their emasculation. 
In a study on British Muslim men, Kalra (2009) notes the two discourses that apply to these 
individuals, one that emphasizes patriarchy and aggression, and another that focuses on 
effeminacy and academicism. George and Rashidi’s (2014) research with domestic violence 
service providers and activists in the Greater Toronto Area is notable for their findings regarding 
the emasculated South Asian male. They suggest an emasculation process occurs for men who 
immigrant to Canada from India or Pakistan, where women have an easier time finding menial 
jobs and become primary breadwinners, causing the ego of some South Asian men to take a 
beating (George and Rashidi, 2014).  Further, cultural studies that focus on men in India find that 
masculinity for South Asian men embodies the ability of men to protect family, as well as 
preserve the honour and purity of women and caste identity (Gilmore, 1990; Malhotra, 2002; 
Dube, 2001).  In a series of documentaries, filmmaker and visual anthropologist Harjant Gill lists 
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heteronormative attributes necessary in the performance of masculinity for Punjabi men. These 
attributes include aggression, power, and an authoritative figure who protects and provides for 
his family and is given full control over their lives (Public Service Broadcasting Trust, 2011).  
Further, in a study on how masculinity is constructed in Punjabi cinema, Gill (2012) notes that 
the Punjabi male is typically expected to conform to idealized standards of the Jatt man. One 
such standard is the mobility of the male body and the transition from rural to urban spaces, or in 
other words, the move from rural Punjabi to urban cities abroad like Toronto or Vancouver, 
which is often interpreted as a rite of passage. In a study of rural men from Punjab India, a region 
that many gang-involved youth from BC descend from, Young Yim and Mahalingam (2006) 
found support that these men endorsed machismo or traditional masculinity beliefs. However, 
few studies have examined how South Asian masculinity may relate to gang offending since the 
research on South Asian gangs has been generally limited to how diasporic challenges South 
Asians face in host countries impact the performance of masculinity.  
In one of the few studies on the way in which masculinity is exercised by some young 
South Asian men in BC, Frost (2010) highlights the concept of a “Surrey Jack”, a category of 
males that live and do masculinity differently. For these young men, who are more likely to get 
involved in gangs, masculinity acts as a form of counter-protest to the dominant hegemonic 
standard and is set apart based on their readiness to use violence, the manner in which females 
are treated as sexual conquests, and their dress and style. The ‘Surrey Jack’ stands in contrast to 
the ‘Brown boys’ who are more likely to align their masculinity to the hegemonic standard 
established by their white peers (Frost, 2010). Masculinity, as done by the “Brown boys” is 
displayed through sport (as opposed to physical violence) and will only act aggressive when they 
interpret being disrespected. (Frost, 2010). Frost (2010) concludes: 
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These boys’ conceptions of their ethno-racial identities are bound up with their 
understandings of masculinity, how brown has evolved as an alternative way of “doing 
male” which not only contests a white hegemonic masculinity but confronts versions of 
Punjabi masculinity embodied by their fathers as well as the media’s representation of the 
typical Indo-Canadian man or “Surrey Jack” which has emerged in Surrey as a form of 
subordinate protest masculinity” (p. 213). 
 
This literature helps illuminate the manner in which Bindy Johal’s legacy is framed in a more 
positive light for his form protest masculinity. In the proceeding sections it will become clear 
that two narratives seem to dominant the Bindy Johal legacy, one where he is perceived as a 
corrupting force, and another where he can be admired for breaking racial barriers on South 
Asian masculinity.    
 
Creating a legend in Johal: hero or villain? 
 
“One thing I decided is never ever to use his name or react to his name” – Johal as the 
contemporary folk devil 
 The way Bindy Johal is generally understood by some is best captured in this quote by 
retired gang enforcement officer John:   
In the day [gangs] were very organized and there was a sense of, they kind of all got 
along, it was good for business not to fight and war and they were making lots of money. 
But when you get people like Bindy Johal and Raj Cheema and some of these guys come 
into the game, they're just complete killers. There was no honour among thieves as there 
was. It just turned into murder and mayhem. 
 
Having joined the gang unit around the time of Bindy’s criminal trial, Officer John witnessed 
first-hand the height of Johal’s influence and power as gang leader. For Officer John, Bindy, 
along with his associates, were not ‘ordinary’ gang members, but something far worse and 
sinister. Johal is the type of individual who lacks any honour and is simply a murderer.   
As a result of his behaviour, Johal becomes the centre of a moral crusade launched by moral 
entrepreneurs like Officer John, who problematize Johal as a ‘new breed’ of gangster. This new 
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breed is far more nefarious, with Johal taking centre stage and representing a threat to young 
boys who will similarly follow in his footsteps. This tendency to frame a threat as “new” or 
different and hence more dangerous by agents of social control is a common element of moral 
panics around crime (Hall et al., 1978). Further, Hall et al., (1978) notes how the police tend to 
amplify moral panics, something Officer John appears to do in his analysis of Johal. Thus, Bindy 
becomes the folk devil associated with the moral panic over South Asian gangs, lacking any 
positive attributes that other gang members from other groups might be afforded. Without any 
redeeming qualities, Johal is something to fear far after his death for the hold he has on boys who 
idealize him and want to be him.  
Simran, a high school teacher who co-developed a Punjabi languages curriculum, 
perfectly captures the community’s sentiments towards Bindy Johal: 
I also think that a lot of gang activity is glamorized online. Like I know our kids, like we're 
trying not to use the name Bindy Johal in our area. Every grade 8 kid is talking about him 
as he is some hero who defied the police and got killed and his interviews are online and 
people are looking it up and these grade 6,7 kids are always searching them up and bringing 
him up. So, one thing I decided is never ever to use his name or react to his name. 
 
Simran’s comments highlight two important elements in how Bindy is considered a folk devil. 
First, the media plays an important role in glorifying and glamorizing gangs and Bindy Johal in 
particular. Indeed, there is a general fear that the media, including “South Asian gangsta rap” and 
movies loosely based on Bindy Johal’s life (i.e. Beeba Boys), are glamorizing gangs and drawing 
youth to them (CBC, 2015). Thus, when placing culpability for why Bindy is admired and 
emulated by youth, the media often shares a heavy load of blame for glamorizing him.   
Former gang member turned youth worker Paul elaborates on Simran’s concerns that 
Johal’s influence is reflected in the local culture, likening to the gangsta rap culture in the United 
States:  
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Well here in the West coast, we've had so many high-profile South Asians killed. So it's 
Tupac and Biggie Smalls analogy right? So, you know, everybody always wanted to follow 
in the footsteps of Tupac or Biggie, so you kind of have that mindset that mentality with 
Bindy Johal, and it didn't get any better when Bindy was killed. 
 
“Gangsta rap” originated in Los Angeles in the 1980s and 1990s, reflecting gang violence in 
communities like Compton (Ludeke, 2006). In essence, this music captured the Black experience 
growing up in more volatile neighbourhoods and their relationship with police. Thus, “Gangsta 
rap” often becomes a scapegoat when explaining the violence in a community, even though the 
primary consumers of this music are White, middle-class boys (Ludeke, 2006). Drawing on the 
infamous murders of two rap superstars, and the generation of young boys who grew up listening 
to their music and adopting the culture, people like Paul try to make sense of why Bindy Johal is 
so appealing to boys in BC. Additionally, Paul argues that this “gangster rap” culture is 
reproduced in Western Canada by the Punjabi community and is largely responsible for the gang 
violence. Thus, Bindy Johal is a mythical figure akin to Biggie Smalls or Tupac Shakur (albeit 
without the musical talent) who is the figurehead of South Asian gang violence in the Greater 
Vancouver Area.   
 A second element to draw out of Simran’s comments is the symbolic significance of the 
name ‘Bindy Johal’ itself. For Simran, it is important his name is not uttered in her classroom 
and that if it is, she does not have a reaction to it. This is relevant because by naming the ‘folk 
devil’, Simran recognizes it may somehow give Bindy power and legitimacy in the eyes of the 
susceptible youth she sees in her classroom. Further, it is important for Simran to not display the 
apprehension she has when the name “Bindy” is evoked through a negative reaction. Symbolic 
interactionists have argued that names convey meaning and that people react to certain names in 
different names based on the meaning it has for them (Charmaz, 2006). As folk devils are meant 
to evoke a reaction and stir the anxieties of decent, law-abiding citizens, Simran believes it 
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necessary to adjust her behaviour to minimize the harm that Johal has already inflicted on the 
community. Thus, the name ‘Bindy Johal’ has a negative connation and induces anxiety among 
people like Simran, who consciously tries to avoid using it.  
 Simran avoids talking about Bindy or even saying his name in her class. Yet others are 
not so reluctant, choosing to warn youth about the risks associated with admiring such a 
polarizing figure. In this sense, these authorities believe that Bindy’s activities must be exposed 
and his legacy challenged.  Harjit, a community activist, discusses how he deals with Bindy 
Johal when interacting with high school students he comes across in his advocacy work:  
Bindy Johal, his name keeps coming up, and rightfully so, because a lot of youth that 
contact me are still aware of him. Like, I'll go to high schools, twenty years after the fucking 
guy has been dead, and they're like: Hey, Bindy Johal, he's the man. He's the man. He put 
us on the map. Bro, he didn't put you on the map, he put you on the pavement. You're going 
to live a lifestyle that's going to get you shot or killed. 
 
According to Harjit, Bindy serves as an important cautionary tale for youth. Here, Harjit aims to 
deglamorize Johal’s activities and folk hero status by relying on the fear of death or bodily injury 
in order to prevent youth from following in his footsteps. Harjit also differs from Simran in that 
he somewhat recognizes the relevancy of Bindy Johal’s name, who he points out, should 
rightfully come up in any discourse related to the South Asian gang problem. For Harjit, it seems 
that saying the ‘devil’s name’ and identifying him is an important step in delegitimatizing him 
and countering the hold he may have on a generation of young boys.     
 Similarly, Officer Ranjit believes it is crucial to counter Bindy Johal’s folk hero status by 
sending youth the message that following in his footsteps may lead to death: 
We went through that initial iteration of these groups going back to the Dhosanj’s and 
Bindy's and they became like cult like figures to these people. Like a lot of these kids want 
to emulate them and think that: "oh yeah it's the girls. It's the power, it's the money." And 
then we're always hammering the other aspect: "where are they? They're all dead before 
they're 25. So if that's the lifestyle you choose, you know, it's great for a little bit to think 
your king, but where are you going to end up long term?” 
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Officer Ranjit notes the influence Bindy Johal has on boys today and the direct threat his legacy 
poses in terms of pushing South Asian youth into gangs and continuing the cycle of violence. 
Officer Ranjit counters Johal’s status by appealing to the rationality of youth by deconstructing 
Johal’s folk hero status and whether an early death is worth the short-term benefits. In other 
words, Johal’s ability to achieve money, power, respect and women, ultimately comes at a cost, 
something that youth need to be fearful of prior to emulating Johal. In a program called the 
“Truth About Gangs” police officers use shock pictures of Bindy Johal himself, naked but 
covered from the waist down, dead on a morgue table with the imagery of tubes and bloodstains 
as a strategic method to scare youth away from gangs (Bailey, 2008). Presenting pictures of 
Johal in schools across the Vancouver area is often met with some harsh reactions by some 
teachers but is justified as necessary by police as to not “sugar-coat” the costs of the lifestyle to 
students and where Johal ultimately ended up. This form of scare tactic becomes one method to 
dismantle the glamorous lifestyle Johal’s legacy might produce.  
Some respondents had personal stories and anecdotes about Bindy Johal himself, noting 
how members of their family could have gone down the same troubling path. Simran makes this 
personal connection to Bindy apparent: 
Bindy Johal went to the same high school my husband graduated from. He tried to recruit 
my husband in grade 12 and that's a story he has shared with me…back in the 80s and my 
husband went to the same school and he invited him, my husband, a lot of times to come 
to his house and [say]: “I'm going to introduce to these people and you can make money.” 
And my husband didn't make those choices. He didn't really go. 
 
For Simran, being able to draw on the experience of a family member gives her the ability to 
speak with some authority about the damaging impact Johal could have had on her husband. Had 
her husband made the “wrong” choices, Simran likely believes that his life, and by extension 
hers, would have likely unfolded quite differently. This ability to personalize the dangers posed 
by Bindy and connect a recognizable face to him, cements Johal’s ‘folk devil’ status. In this 
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sense, no one is safe from the harm that the folk devil can inflict. Anita, who runs a community 
safety program, also shares a personal connection Johal has with her family: 
It's really interesting from what I've seen. My husband's family, three boys grew up. They're 
all professionals…yeah, a South Asian family. Three boys grew up. They're all 
professionals. They all went to University and my husband played football with Bindy 
Johal. Bindy's one of the most notorious South Asian gangsters and my husband was on 
the force and arrested Bindy and the Dhosanj brothers. Was on the SWAT team for [name 
of police service omitted]. Was involved heavily with the gangs and it was really interesting 
when Bindy Johal was taken out, these police officers were relieved because he was killing 
a lot of people. 
 
Like Simran, Anita’s husband grew up with Johal and could have likely ended up in a similar 
situation. However, Anita stresses how her husband’s life as a law enforcement official stood 
diametrically opposed to Johal’s life as a gangster. Here, Anita frames her husband as a hero, one 
who was able to respond through coercive force and deal with the menace posed by the folk 
devil. Further, Anita makes another important observation, which is that she speculates that 
Johal’s death may have actually been positively received by police and something to be morbidly 
celebrated. In this circumstance, the slaying of the folk devil was seemingly believed to have 
ended gang violence. Nevertheless, as many respondents suggest, Bindy Johal is still someone to 
fear long after his death. Both Simran and Anita use personal examples to illustrate the scope of 
Johal’s power. In this sense, respondents have first-hand knowledge of the threat Johal posed 
through the lived experiences of loved ones.   
 Others try to further solidify Johal’s folk devil status by associating him, or others around 
him, with some of society’s other evils. For example, community activist Harjit links Johal, 
along with his rivals the Dhosanj brothers, to terrorist organizations: 
You might not know this but a lot of the original gangsters, like Bindy Johal and these 
guys, their fathers were involved at a certain level, or supporters of things like Babar 
Khalsa, the Khalistani movement…They were all for the 1984 retaliation attacks and stuff 
like that. We're talking about a lot of the original gangsters, the Dhosanj brothers were part 
of the United Sikh Federation or sorry the Sikh Youth Federation. So, these guys have 
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backgrounds in separatist kind of mentalities or their families at least did, or they're 
involved at a cultural or even a religious level. 
 
Consequently, the folk devil becomes something far more dangerous and fearful when the scope 
of their deviance is broadened in such a manner or connected to a secondary criminal activity 
besides gang offending (i.e. terrorism). Indeed, the Khalistani movement, which advocates for a 
separate Sikh state in northern India, has had a long history in Canada (Razavy, 2006). The 
bombing of Air India Flight 182, which was alleged to have been planned and carried out in the 
Vancouver area by known Sikh separatists, claimed the lives of many Canadians. Thus, by 
associating gang violence and Bindy Johal with the general anxiety the community might have 
towards the Khalistani movement, Harjit works to amplifying the moral panic and truly solidify 
Johal’s status as the folk devil. Johal is not just responsible for gang violence but in some ways, 
is now somewhat indirectly responsible for the problem the community has within its own 
dangerous religious and political movements.    
 These narratives paint a picture of Johal’s legacy that is steeped in violence and has the 
capacity to serve as a corrupting force on a generation of boys who may be lured into gangs. The 
community’s anxiety over Johal is evident in people like Simran who consciously avoids naming 
him for the power his name still holds. Nevertheless, despite framing Johal as a folk devil, one 
that the current cycle of gang violence the community is experiencing is somewhat responsible 
for, a counter-perception exists that is somewhat more positive and even more sympathetic. 
    
“[Bindy] becomes a f**king god in the imagination of the emasculated South Asian male” – 
Johal as a contemporary folk hero  
The dominant narrative in the Lower Mainland of BC seems to be that Bindy Johal is a 
boogeyman-type figure that has a strong hold on boys in their community even after 20 years 
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since his passing. Yet despite Johal’s legacy being framed in this way, there are a few people 
who view Bindy more positively or at the very least, more sympathetically. This includes a 
group of respondents who acknowledge the challenges Bindy had to overcome as a racialized 
minority male, as well as a generation of young me who view him as a ‘heroic’ figure. Former 
gang unit officer John, highlights the Bindy Johal effect: 
I was a police officer in South East Vancouver, which is the South Slope, it's predominately 
a South East Asian community down there. So, for five years in uniform I worked in that 
area. I got to know a lot of the young kids I met as teenagers, evolved into unfortunately, 
that lifestyle. They kind of followed in the footsteps of Bindy. Bindy was actually famous, 
somewhat of a role model for a lot of the young South Asian kids unfortunately. They 
didn't go after positive role models. They saw him in the news every night and the saw him 
as some type of cult superstar or something, I don't know. 
 
Officer John notes Johal’s celebrity status as being a primary motivator for youth to get involved 
in gangs. As most youth like to emulate their favourite athletes, movie stars or pop singers, Johal 
has influenced a number of boys to join gangs. Like officer John, fellow gang officer Scott 
provides some more detail on Bindy Johal’s folk hero status. Officer Scott describes Bindy 
Johal’s entrance into the gang scene in the early 1990s: 
We see this almost mythical evil figure in Bindy Johal. And Bindy Johal is engaged in the 
drug trafficking field and he's up against the Dhosanj brothers and there's this video clip 
that I have of Bindy challenging the Dhosanj brothers on the six o'clock news and the 
Dhosanj brothers getting back at him and then there's violence. So, what happens within 
the Indo-Canadian community, and this is still to the day to a certain extent, that Johal's 
got this sort of mythical following among young people, because he's this guy who 
basically he's not playing the typical if you will, traditional quiet, studious, law abiding 
Indo-Canadian young guy. He's breaking the mould and he's going to be the bad ass 
gangster. And so, kids really look at that and the glamorization and he got away with a 
murder. 
 
For people like Officer John, Bindy Johal has developed a cult hero status and is a role model for 
a generation of young South Asian males. Johal has become a local cultural icon appearing in the 
mass media and has drawn their admiration. John imagines the “typical” South Asian male as 
quiet and studious, representing the traditional way South Asian males might be constructed by 
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dominant White narratives. This image ultimately serves to subordinate their masculinity and 
becomes a baseline for which South Asian men are judged and compared. Thus, Johal largely 
broke free from these stereotypical notions of the submissive South Asian male who is expected 
to study hard and be quiet, instead, choosing the gangster life. As Officer John notes: “even in 
the time of Bindy and such, every day in the paper they were kind of defaming South Asian 
males as being the bad boy.” Therefore, it seems Bindy Johal was able to transform the way 
South Asian males would be seen by the community in general or through media representations. 
South Asians now became “risky”, “dangerous” or “bad”, a narrative that some may have 
embraced as it is more reaffirming of their masculinity.   
What makes Johal be appealing to youth today? Former gang member Diljit, who knew 
Bindy Johal personally, explains his appeal to young men today: 
So Bindy comes along and he's fucking ripped with fucking muscles. He's got 40 fucking 
pounds of gold around his fucking neck. He's just shot three fucking people and he's 
laughing about it on fucking TV…It's an emasculated male driving around in a Corvette…. 
Forty chicks lining up at a bar to suck his [redacted]. "Hey take a number. Take a number, 
girls".  Guy turns into a fucking legend. In terms of race, it's really interesting in terms of 
race relations how these things…how does this work? And it fucking made a difference. 
Fucking white folks stopped fucking around with fucking East Indians after that. They 
we're like "okay maybe I'll just keep my mouth shut next time I'm thinking of calling you 
a Hindoo". When we sit down and think about race relations in this country and our 
community, shit we look at people like fucking Bindy and say "hey. Did he do something 
for our community?" Did he? Like moralism aside, put the ethical, moral shit, let's just deal 
with power relations. And so, when you look at South Asian young men today, this guy 
becomes fucking icon. He becomes a fucking god in the imagination of the emasculated 
South Asian male. All of a sudden, they're like "oh right. We can fucking do this.    
 
There is a lot to unpack with Diljit’s observations but there are two major elements to draw out. 
First, Diljit points to a larger problem associated with masculinity for racialized men. Indeed, 
Asian and South Asian men in particular have been constructed as less masculine under a 
hegemonic system where White males are considered dominant (Shek, 2007). However, Asian 
male sexuality research is mostly derived from the experiences of gay and bisexual men and 
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racist sexual partner preferences (Callander et al., 2015). Nevertheless, Bindy Johal was able to 
adopt a hyper-masculine personality and use violence in order to benefit from and claim a stake 
among the masculine hierarchy that would typically put him, and others like him, in a 
subordinate position. Bindy Johal’s masculinity is affirmed by not only how he acts but through 
significant changes to the body and appearance. Respondents note how Bindy transformed his 
body from his thinner beginnings as a young man to one that was considerably more muscular 
and had a particular dress and style that is admired by others.  
Thus, as the folk devil has a set of symbols associated with him in dress and style, Johal’s 
muscular physique and gold jewelry become symbols for a generation of young South Asian men 
who view him as a hero, representing what South Asian masculinity should look like. Further, 
while quite crude in his language, Diljit comments about Johal’s sexual exploits, and his ability 
to attract a large number of female sexual partners, stands in contrast to another way South Asian 
men might be emasculated. Precisely, some note how South Asian men might be desexualised, 
considered less sexually desirable or even feminine (see Balaji, 2012). Thus, as an ideal type, a 
hypermasculine personality requires an overly sexualized component where women are treated 
as sexual conquests, allowing subordinated South Asian males to break free from damaging 
stereotypes typically attached to their sexuality.  
This could explain Johal’s massive appeal to young South Asian men who may struggle 
with their masculine identity and aligns with Frost’s ideas (2010) that South Asian males in 
Canada have to do masculinity differently. For Bindy, masculinity was a form of counter-protest 
to the dominant hegemonic standard that he could not meet due to his working-class, minority 
background. Masculinity for Johal included a readiness to use violence, a hyper sexual 
personality through numerous sexual partners, and a particular dress and style that would be 
imitated by young South Asian males for decades to come.  
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A second element to draw from Diljit’s observation is that Bindy Johal’s appeal may 
largely stem for his ability to challenge a society perceived as racist. Diljit and Johal were raised 
during the same time period and under similar social and economic conditions, having both 
experienced challenges associated with racism. Diljit notes how Johal would shut down racists 
who had bullied boys like them and called them racial slurs, such as “Hindoo” a regional 
derogatory term. The term “Hindoo” was used to characterize a large number of mostly Sikh and 
Pakistani men who migrated to North America for work in the 19th and 20th centuries. As 
Thangaraj (2012) notes: “anti-miscegenation laws and public codes forced these men to form 
bachelor communities; these ‘Hindoos’ were read as perverse, licentious subjects unsuitable for 
citizenship.” Thus, the slur “Hindoo” was carried decades over to continue the tradition of 
demasculinizing South Asian men. Johal’s folk hero image was predicated on his ability to fight 
back against the domineering racism at the time.  
Anju, who volunteers with several South Asian communities makes a similar connection 
between Johal and his response against bullying and racism:  
So, I think there's a big history of that and Bindy Johal, you know, was often excluded in 
clubs, while White people were allowed in. And so, he felt he needed, or others also of his 
caliber needed the bling, bling to gain more recognition. So, there is the racism that is 
manifested through bullying. There is the lack of recognition because of race, the exclusion 
and then the need to have this bling, bling compensates for that inferiority that's socially 
constructed around South Asian.  
 
Anju elaborates on much of what Diljit discusses as to how racism may have contributed to 
Johal’s gang lifestyle. For Anju, being excluded from the community constitutes a form of 
bullying, which likely pushed South Asian men like Bindy Johal to gangs as a collective 
response in the first place and subsequently led to their involvement in the drug trade.  
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that South Asians still experience exclusion 
from businesses in the Vancouver area and that this “bullying” likely persists. Most notably, B.C. 
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Human Rights Tribunal awarded three South Asians $10,000 each for successfully being able to 
show they had been denied service on the basis of race, colour, and ancestry (Smith, 2013). 
These complainants noted the differential treatment between Caucasian customers and 
themselves. Based on Anju and Diljit’s remarks, it seems Johal’s legacy is cemented in his 
ability to overcome some racial barriers that remain a common part of the South Asian 
experience today. Further, like Diljit, Anju mentions how gold and jewellery became symbols of 
status for Johal and solidified his position, yet she believes that the jewellery (characterized as 
bling, bling) worked to compensate for the social exclusion he experienced. Nevertheless, 
Johal’s continuing appeal for some likely stems for his ability in penetrating spaces that South 
Asians are typically excluded from.    
Some respondents suggest that Johal was the victim of bullying. Ajit, who represents a 
South Asian gang awareness organization, comments on what motivates young people, including 
Johal himself, to join a gang:  
Some of them don't apply themselves very well. Some of them have learning problems. 
People like Bindy Johal, he had a learning problem. He was a failure at school. Kids were 
teasing him. So that's why he became a gangster.  
 
For Ajit, Johal’s learning problems and the bullying it produced is the reason he became a 
gangster. Therefore, bullying, discrimination and social exclusion are described as major 
motivators behind Johal’s turn to crime according to respondents. Simran notes other challenges 
Bindy experienced:  
As I talked about, why Bindy Johal got into gangs, same story. Single mother, never home, 
worked at a hospital with my mother in law and basically wasn't accepted. He had physical 
[challenges]…he was a small kid who basically wanted to gain some weight since people 
used to pick on him. He didn't have very good language, English language skills. 
 
Thus, youth who may be subject to similar bullying, exclusion or feel racially discriminated 
against might view Johal’s legacy more favourably or at the very least, be sympathetic to him.   
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Lena, a secondary school teacher also elaborates on Bindy’s appeal to the school boys 
she comes into contact with and ties several ideas together: 
They want to be known as somebody. They want to be seen as someone that is important 
right? … So that sense of racism, they want to escape that and just be known, and wow 
Bindy Johal is important. And I bring out the name Bindy Johal is one of these lions, right? 
Legends in the 80s that kids know. They all know that person and they might not like what 
he did but they point to the fact that everybody knows his name. That he's still considered, 
right? He put the South Asian population on the map in a different way and I think some 
of the things Bindy Johal said was about racism, it was about this idea of taking back the 
power. I completely disagree. I usually tear apart that argument in class but it's interesting 
to note that that does matter to some of our students. That they do want to be known as 
something other than just what the larger society sees them as. 
 
The rise of Bindy appears to parallel the experiences of African Americans and the growth of 
oppositional “gangster rap” where disenfranchised young men learned the message of “taking 
back the power” and standing up to racist institutions like the police (Lusane, 1993). Lena 
mentions how the city of Surrey is typically viewed negatively by others and that South Asian 
students have expressed how they feel discriminated against or treated differently because of the 
community they live in. Lena recognizes that Johal’s criminality is not lost among his admirers, 
but suggests that people are willing to overlook his behaviour because he became a part of the 
local cultural zeitgeist.  
 
“looking at our past, looking at positive role models” – The reaction to and combating the folk 
devil 
Cohen would assume that the reaction to folk devils like Bindy Johal is as important as 
the threat they pose, and that this reaction is often disproportionate to the actual level of harm 
they inflict. If the underlying fear is that youth are going to emulate him by joining gangs, the 
reaction must be to essentially dismantle Johal’s legacy and perceived heroic status among 
youth. Indeed, two educational school-based programs, in part, achieve the very purpose of 
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deglamourizing Bindy Johal. Safe Schools representative Jaspal provides some context behind 
the justification for such programing: 
You come out to Surrey and every kid will know who Bindy Johal is, even though the 
young fellow died in 98. He died in 98, the Dhosanj brothers died shortly before him. So, 
every brown cat knows more about Bindy Johal than they do about Ujjal Dosanjh, federal 
health minister. Ujjal Dosanjh, for a short time was a Premier. How about Tara Singh Har, 
does anybody know him? Harjit Sajjan, how come you guys don't know these cats? 
 
According to Jaspal, all youth in his community know Bindy Johal, but few can identify other 
predominate South Asian figures who have made more positive contributions in their 
community. These figures include former and current politicians and Sikh activists and others in 
the areas of journalism, sports, and the arts. Two school-based initiatives are used to counter the 
negative “Bindy effect”, a condition where he is viewed as a hero to some youth, and replace 
him with more positive “heroes” and mentor figures to admire instead. These school-based 
initiatives include a Punjabi languages course and a mentorship program with an emphasis on 
learning about Sikh and South Asian pioneers from fellow youth mentor. The Punjabi language 
course is offered in one school district and was initially launched in a “problem” inner-city 
school, and has many different components to its curriculum. Most notably, the course brings in 
guest speakers from a variety of professional backgrounds who should fill the role as mentor due 
to their positive contributions in the community.  
 The purpose of the course is simple: teacher Simran believes that many students have 
lost something that can be found in the classroom, which is a connection to their heritage and 
culture. Simran helped launch this course because she felt there was a need to address the 
problematic path she felt boys in her school, in particular, were headed. Simran envisions the 
course as an opportunity to connect youth with influential South Asians in the community, as 
opposed to them clinging onto the legacy of a dead gangster. Rather than becoming the next 
Bindy Johals, Simran brings in positive South Asian role models, like athletes, media personnel, 
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political figures, law enforcement, and other individuals she refers to as pioneers in the 
community. These guests do workshops and other activities with students to try to motivate them 
towards a positive and gang-free path among other course objectives. Further, these role models 
may help alleviate some of the alienation or isolation some youth might have by serving as 
positive role models and resources for youth to turn to. Here Simran explains the justification for 
the program: 
So, these programs are basically the people on the other side that are trying to pull these 
kids backwards in our direction and I'm seeing that they are effective because these kids 
now have a different perspective. They can ask questions…They only look at the lifestyle 
of the gangster, Bindy Johal, he made this much money. He drove a nice car. Well we bring 
in the dialogue from, okay where is he now? What happened? Consequential, what happens 
when you make these choices? What happens to the family? What happens to, you know, 
some gangsters have kids that are never going to see their fathers? So, we bring that aspect 
through these programs and we also present that there's other ways of making money and 
still be a good character person and be a good contributor to the community. 
 
For Simran, these Sikh or South Asian pioneers play an important role in potentially pushing 
youth in a particular direction by encouraging them to make a positive contribution in their 
community. These people become the ones to emulate as they embody success and other 
prosocial features that Bindy Johal could never offer. Further, Simran believes it is important to 
counter the materialistic appeal gangs might have on some youth by pointing to Johal’s murder 
and whether pursuing wealth as he did is ultimately worth an early death. For Simran, if these 
youth want to be successful, there is no need to emulate Johal as wealth can be acquired through 
more traditional ways South Asians have achieved success as immigrants (i.e. studying and 
working hard), thus conforming to their ‘model minority’ status.  According to Simran, Johal’s 
legacy is typically associated with wealth and the course could offer solutions on better ways to 
earn money while leaving a positive legacy behind. Nevertheless, this perspective does not 
capture the appeal Johal has as a heroic figure by some for his perceived ability to stand up to a 
racist society and the barriers he may have broken on South Asian masculinity. That aspect of 
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Johal’s appeal may be hard to erase. Therefore, the reaction to Bindy Johal in this case may not 
address one of the core components of his legacy that youth might find quite appealing.   
The Punjabi languages course is not the only way the community has reacted to Bindy 
Johal’s legacy; mentorship programs also achieve the purpose of erasing his ‘heroic’ appeal to 
some degree. Simran and her colleague Lena have also been influential in developing and 
implementing a mentorship program through schools.  
It's usually like a two-month program like in April, May…basically the classes that are 
selected are the kids that have been identified by the [removed] School district, by the 
teachers, we have RCMP liaisons as well, that identified the kids that they want to work 
with. So it's not just the kids themselves, it's the class…and there's a physical component 
but then there's also a learning component very much about identity, respect and last year 
it was focused on the South Asian component through a book called the Hundred Year 
Journey, which talked about South Asian pioneers …So same idea but looking at our past, 
looking at positive role models, especially through a cultural lens and seeing how the kids 
can kind of see that and building of community. So, it's all about community, it's all about 
identity, it's all about culture, kind of all wrapped up to one, but it's not just a leadership 
initiative. The backbone of it is to target these at-risk youth that we don't want them to see 
go down that path. 
 
This mentorship programs adopts a Sikh-centred curriculum which focuses on the contribution of 
Sikh pioneers in Canada over the last century. In some ways, this program complements the 
languages course. Indeed, these pioneers are the opposite of Johal and are meant to instil cultural 
pride among youth and connect them with older youth who adopt a leadership role. The program 
is delivered to a selection of students in grades 11 and 12 who are taught and trained under this 
Sikh pioneer curriculum, based on a book that details the contributions of Sikh Pioneers in 
Canada. These students in turn teach this material to younger students in feeder elementary 
schools.  
For Cohen’s (2011) initial theory, the reaction to the folk devil is just as important as the 
actual source of the anxiety but is often disproportionate to the genuine threat posed by the 
source of the panic. In this case, one could assume that any programing that is aimed at 
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deglamorizing Bindy Johal would constitute an overreaction or be classified as excessive. 
Indeed, this is certainly the case with police-school partnerships that results in programing where 
pictures of Bindy Johal’s dead body are used to scare students away from gangs. Nevertheless, as 
noted earlier, Cohen adjusts his theory by replacing the concept of “moral panic” with that of a 
“generalized moral stance”, a position that is less volatile, more predictable and stems from a 
seamless web of social anxieties in society (Cohen, 2011). However, what is not fully understood 
is the relationship between a “generalized moral stance” and that of the “folk devil”.  
This leaves several important questions unanswered, most notably: if a generalized moral 
stance is no longer temporary but more of a subtle fixture that plays on the general anxieties of 
the public, are the reactions to folk devils then also somewhat less exaggerated or amplified? 
This would explain why a figure like Bindy Johal, who has been dead for over twenty years, 
remains on the public’s consciousness for as long as he has, stirring their fears that young men 
are following in his footsteps and joining gangs. The negative generalized moral stance that 
Bindy tends to evoke among some would mean that any reaction to him, in an attempt to 
deglamorize his legacy, does not necessarily have to be considered disproportionate to the actual 
harm Johal presents. In other words, since moral panics today are not as volatile, presumably any 
responses to them could also not be necessarily considered an overreaction because these threats 
no longer require an immediate response. Instead, reactions to folk devils today may be more 
thought out and have more long-term goals designed to ease the prolonged anxieties they 
produce. 
This seems to be the case with the mentorship and Punjabi languages course, which are 
hard to classify as an overreaction to a fear that Johal is seducing young South Asian boys into 
gangs. In fact, it is difficult to determine if these programs are created solely in response to 
Bindy, or if it is just a small motivator behind a complicated strategy to reduce gang involvement 
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in general. Since I argue that the reaction to a generalized moral panic no longer needs to be 
considered an exaggeration since the very nature of panics have changed, becoming more 
generalized and steeped in society’s on-going anxieties over issues such as crime and gang 
violence, the educational programs are viewed as reasonable, long-term solutions in reducing 
South Asian gang involvement.  Nevertheless, these programs are inspired by a need to reduce 
Johal’s heroic status, elevate his “devilish” identity, and encourage youth to adopt more positive 
role models to idolize, and to do so in what are accepted as reasonable practices like mentorship 
or through classroom learning.  
 
Bindy Johal: A complicated legacy  
 From the interview participants it seems Bindy Johal’s legacy is framed in two distinct 
ways. On the one hand he is viewed by some as a contemporary folk devil, a figure that has 
inflicted great harm in his criminal activities and has sullied the reputation of the South Asian 
community in Western Canada. For these individuals, Johal’s legacy remains harmful long after 
his death as his gangster status has been glamorized by the media and seduced a generation of 
young South Asian males to follow in his footsteps. This perception stands in contrast to one that 
is a bit more sympathetic to Johal, which does not ignore his criminal activity, but finds a way to 
draw out any “good” that he has done for the South Asian community. Precisely, these 
individuals believe Johal was able to overcome racial barriers that plagued working-class South 
Asian males in the Metro Vancouver area during the 1980s. By exerting an exaggerated 
hypermasculine personality, one where displays of aggression and hypersexuality, along with 
developing a muscular physique, driving nice cars and wearing gold, became symbols of the 
newly emancipated South Asian male, free from his subordinate position among the masculine 
hierarchy. Consequently, some young men view Bindy as a hero for this very reason.  
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Thus, the way in which Johal’s legacy is framed appears to be clearly divided by the 
category of respondent and contingent on the professional background of the research subject. 
For example, individuals who would be classified as agents of social control, those want youth to 
conform to societal pro-social norms and represent the interests of the state (which in this study 
includes police officers and school officials) tend to view Johal as a contemporary folk devil 
figure. However, those who are involved in more community-based programing adopt a more 
liberal and sympathetic view towards Johal. Therefore, a clear pattern emerges among the 
category of respondents.  
As a folk devil, Johal conforms to Cohen’s definition of what constitutes a moral panic, 
since he represents a person who is defined as a threat to societal values and interests, which in 
this case is the seductive threat he poses to South Asian youth who join gangs because of him. 
Johal serves as that targeted enemy who represents the dark part of society, of whom Goode and 
Ben-Yehuda (1994) classify as evil personified. Thus, Johal, who has dominated the local media, 
from news reports, to movies and local “gangsta rap”, has developed a level of notoriety in the 
community, making him an easy and suitable target to pin gang violence on and deemed an 
existential threat to the community’s moral functioning. However, even Cohen recognized that 
contemporary moral panics have changed but did not explain how our reactions to folk devils 
might also differ under this newly conceptualized “generalized moral stance”. This could explain 
why the anxiety Johal evokes among some has not dissipated long after his death as the fear over 
gang violence has persisted for the past twenty years.  
Additionally, traditional moral panic analyses suggest that a consensus exists as to who or 
what constitutes a threat. This would mean that the general belief in the lower Mainland of BC is 
that Johal’s legacy is one of great harm. However, as this analysis shows, no such consensus 
exists according to how Johal’s legacy should be framed. As Gardner (2008) notes, a societal 
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reaction to individuals and situations is no longer uniform and that contemporary moral panics 
are somewhat counterbalanced by alternative and competing reactions. Here, some authorities 
might challenge claims made by those alarmists who view Johal as a threat to young men. People 
like former gang member Diljit note the positive aspects of Bindy Johal’s legacy which is farmed 
in relation to challenges on race and masculinity South Asian males are commonly burdened 
with.   
Therefore, Johal’s legacy is complicated because he does not fall perfectly into the 
category of hero or villain. As noted by Klapp (1954), heroes are often characterized as leaders, 
champions, and protectors, while villains tend to be viewed as criminals, cheats or traitors. In 
some ways, Johal is able to penetrate both categories depending on an individual’s perception of 
him. Views of Johal as a more sympathetic or even as a heroic figure relates to the body of 
literature that concentrates on the idolization of criminals or deviants in society. Related to 
Duncan’s (1991) analysis, Bindy Johal has achieved a cult or folk hero status for his symbolic 
resistance to perceived racial injustices that have befallen countless South Asian men before and 
after him. Thus, Johal’s gang crimes are often framed as the results of an injustice predating his 
involvement in gangs. This idea is suggested by Anju: 
Well it starts off with the bullying. Many of the South Asians gangs started because of 
racism. That they were beaten up, young Sikh boys that had their patkas [Sikh turban for 
young males], a 13-year-old would be kicked by a 17-year-old. Total humiliation and so 
Sikhs wanted to, or South Asians primarily Sikhs, wanted to actually defend themselves 
and they got together. Initially they were gangs to protect themselves and then you get into 
illegal drugs. So, I think there's a big history of that and Bindy Johal. 
 
According to Anju, Johal’s involvement in gangs was the result of racial bullying that he, and 
many other South Asians (with Sikhs in particular) experienced and used gangs as a means to 
defend themselves. Anju believes that the criminal components of the gangs, such as drug 
offenses, came after, suggesting the need for gangs would not exist if bullying was not a factor in 
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the first place. Anju’s account sheds light as to how a criminal could still be admired. When 
Johal’s actions are viewed as being born out of racial injustices, it becomes easier to romanticize 
his actions as being somewhat noble or even heroic and for the “greater good” of a racialized 
community. However, for some, Johal’s actions are deemed too damaging and harmful to ever 
view positively. This aligns with the general argument that morally ambiguous gray area exists 
as to which criminals might be perceived.  
 While it appears that these two competing narratives exist independent of one and 
another, they might actually share an important relationship. Essentially, the construction of 
Johal as the “villain” or folk devil associated with South Asian gang violence overlooks what 
could likely be a more complicated crisis involving masculinity. In this sense, reacting to Johal, a 
specific face to pin South Asian gang violence on, is much easier than tackling a more pervasive 
problem that South Asian young boys and men might be experiencing as racialized minorities. 
As Johal is perceived by some to reaffirm South Asian masculinity, which is typically relegated 
to a subordinate status, this aspect of his appeal is much harder to diminish to a generation of 
boys who might be experiencing similar racial discrimination and other perceived threats to their 
masculinity on account of their minority status. Further, it is difficult to ascertain whether current 
programming, as a reaction to Johal, tackles this very crisis of masculinity. 
 This connection between a “manufactured crisis” trumping a very real and more systemic 
one forms the basis of Hall et al., (1978) analysis. For Hall et al., (1978), a moral panic 
surrounding a new wave of muggings was manufactured by elites and agents of social control to 
maintain the hegemonic economic and social order at a more turbulent time. Precisely, rather 
than the public focusing on the recession, a successful campaign was launched that targeted 
Black youth as the folk devils associated with a perceived wave of violent m
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Britain in the 1960s and 1970s. This “crisis” ultimately worked to divert the public’s attention 
away from the economic problems of the time.  
Under a more nuanced interpretation of Hall’s et al., (1978) main arguments, it is evident 
that Johal similarly serves as a scapegoat that can easily be blamed for young South Asian men 
joining gangs. However, authorities who frame Johal as a folk devil might be doing so less 
purposefully than what Hall et al., (1978) suggests occurs in his analysis of muggings. In other 
words, the moral panic surrounding Johal’s long-lasting appeal might not be a manufactured 
crisis used to divert the public’s attention, but an organically developed crisis that misplaces 
blame for gang involvement on the so-called head of the South Asian gang problem. 
Nevertheless, the perception that Johal is responsible for luring South Asian youth to gangs 
inadvertently conceals a much a greater crisis surrounding masculinity, something Johal 
ultimately stood to reclaim when it was threatened. Thus, in this case, South Asian masculinity 
serves as the overarching crisis that is being unnoticed by some authorities in favour of an 
explanation for gang involvement that squarely lands at the feet of a dead gangster, albeit done in 
a much less malicious and calculated way by authorities than how Hall et al., (1978) originally 
envisioned it.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Bindy Johal story is remarkable for its Hollywood-like plot twists and intrigue, 
which chronicles the rise of a working-class Punjabi boy in BC to the upper echelons of the 
Vancouver drug trade. Consequently, it is not surprising that Johal’s legacy still resonates in 
Western Canada where two discourses have shaped his legacy. One perspective recognizes the 
moral ambiguity that surrounds Johal but frames his legacy as some sympathetic hero, or more 
adeptly an “anti-hero”, who stood up to a racist system that subordinated the masculinity of 
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South Asian males. The other perspective has a more negative reaction to Johal, viewing him as 
a folk devil in the classic sense established by theorists like Cohen. These individuals believe 
Johal continues to corrupt young South Asian males, who have largely romanticized his legacy 
and adopted his lifestyle, continuing the cycle of gang violence they are witnessing in their 
communities. The reaction to Johal’s legacy then is to deglamorizing his image by using positive 
South Asian role models and “pioneers” to stir youth towards admiring heroes that have legacies 
not steeped in gang violence and criminality. The Punjabi languages courses and mentorship 
programs achieve this very purpose and are offered to students in schools where South Asian 
gang involvement is deemed a ‘problem’.  
 While it appears that Bindy Johal is suitable actor to fill the role of the ‘folk devil’, one 
that can easily be associated with South Asian gang involvement, any contemporary moral panic 
analysis must be cognizant of the manner in which such panics manifest themselves today. This 
explains why there is no consensus on his legacy and a moral gray area exists. Precisely, 
alarmists, who argue that children are being led down the same dark path as Johal through the 
glamorization of his life, are met with counter-claim makers who attempt to recognize this 
appeal as the result of systemic challenges facing young brown males who can relate to Johal’s 
struggles. Further, the fear over Johal as some boogeyman is characteristic of a generalized 
moral stance towards gang violence and offending. As the fear is not generated by erratic and 
volatile bursts of panic that call for immediate action, which are often characterized as an 
overreaction, but rather, the fear remains a part of the community’s conscious and general 
anxiety over gang crime for a more sustained period of time.  
This study makes an important contribution to the moral panic literature. While research 
on folk devils is plentiful, few studies have examined how one particular person can serve that 
role, especially someone like Bindy Johal who has emerged a key figure in the history of South 
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Asian gang offending in Canada. In fact, despite his reputation in local media or the community 
in general, Johal has received very little attention in the rest of Canada and has not been the 
focus of much research. This study attempts to remedy this gap by understanding the various 
ways in which he might be perceived, and thus reacted upon. In this sense, programing that 
attempts to remove Johal’s appeal to vulnerable youth are often best understood in the context of 
general anxieties a community has over crimes such as gang violence. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion  
 
Summary of Chapters 
 
 This dissertation is a collection of three interrelated articles on the issue of South Asian 
gang involvement in western Canada. Below is a breakdown of each article including the main 
research question(s), key arguments, and some noteworthy findings.  
Chapter 2 - Re-examining the issue of “culture” as a risk factor for South Asian gang 
involvement in Western Canada 
 Chapter one explores how community stakeholders, including the police, gang support 
workers, educators and other authority figures, conceptualize risk and risk factors for South 
Asian gang involvement. The emphasis here is not to explain why South Asian youth join gangs, 
but rather to focus on how respondents imagine and problematize this demographic and their 
involvement in gangs more generally.  In drawing attention to this phenomenon, the discussion 
illuminates how respondents, as experts and governing agents, produce the problem they are 
enlisted to govern. Central to how they understand South Asian gangs is the notion of ‘culture.’  
My interviewees frequently relied on culture as an explanation for why South Asian boys and 
men felt the need to participate in gangs.  
A number of my respondents pathologized South Asian “culture” as risky. This aligns 
with a common criticism levied against subcultural theories for their tendency to further 
marginalize racialized minorities and rely on racist tropes of some groups as being culturally 
prone to deviance. Second, these accounts conflate the relationship between “culture” and 
“structure”. Yet this narrative relating to South Asian “culture” as being naturally criminal 
appears to be regional in the sense that it is largely confined to BC.  
South Asian gang involvement has largely been understood under the umbrella of 
materialism and a particular “gold collar lifestyle”. This perspective suggests that South Asian 
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boys, who are typically bestowed the title of “prince” on account of being the preferred sex in 
some more patriarchally structured South Asian and Punjabi households, are socialized at an 
early age by their parents to pursue a materialistic lifestyle. With their deviance overlooked or 
even supported, boys are often showered with expensive clothes, shoes, electronics, and cars and 
are then expected to continue this lifestyle. This is problematic as legitimate means to achieve 
that wealth, such as education and hard work, are often not emphasized by parents to sons. Gang 
involvement then is conceptualized a delinquent solution to achieving that desired wealth that is 
pushed. In essence, respondents understand South Asian “culture” as inherently criminal or 
deviant on account of its highly materialistic orientation.   
 Along with the cultural explanation of South Asian gang involvement are structural 
factors that are also imagined as influential. Racism and masculinity, a theme later examined in 
further detail in the fourth chapter of this volume, are constructed as legitimate risk factors for 
gang involvement. Particularly, some attribute gang involvement as a response to racism 
experienced by marginalized boys. This racism is believed to be more influential in the past in 
Vancouver during the 1980s and 1990s, but is also considered relevant by some today in more 
racially divided communities. Racism as a risk factor relates to the idea that South Asian gang 
violence is the response to feelings of emasculation and subordination some racialized men 
experience. Another structural factor that is commonly addressed stems from the racialized 
division of labour and how South Asian men have largely adopted careers in the long-haul 
trucking industry. In this case, fathers working long-hours on the road are believed to fail at 
parenting on account of not being able to spend quality time or monitoring the behaviour of sons. 
These structural factors share an important relationship with cultural factors that needs to be 
further examined, a common criticism of the subcultural perspective found in the literature.  
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Chapter 3 - Governing South Asian gang involvement in Western Canada: Community as a 
means for both exclusion and inclusion 
 South Asian gang involvement, and gangs in general, appears to be conceptualized as a 
significant problem in Lower Mainland BC. Consequently, a comprehensive approach in 
response has been initiated by community actors with the support of officials such as the police. 
Two examples of responses are provided that illustrate how ‘community’ is mobilized as a 
mechanism for inclusion and exclusion.  While the first relies on a racialized image of an ‘ideal’ 
patron to justify the exclusion of suspected gang members and other socially undesirable people, 
the other emphasizes their inclusion through ethno-specific initiatives and programs designed to 
encourage feelings of belonging. The specific exclusionary and inclusionary practices reflect the 
multiple and contradictory logics of governance deployed to manage South Asian gangs in B.C.   
  First, a controversial bar ejection program (BRE) allows police to remove gang members, 
their associates, and other types of offenders, from bars, restaurants, and nightclubs that have 
signed contractual agreements with the police to participate. This program has been deemed 
discriminatory for racially profiling South Asian patrons. Premised on the objective to reduce 
gang violence in places that serve alcohol, BRE is a public safety imitative that makes use of 
local municipal bylaws and informal policy and agreements to eliminate certain undesirable 
people from participating in meaningful social activity. Thus, at its core, the BRE reflects an 
exclusionary measure that isolates “bad people” from the public sphere. 
 These exclusionary practices operate in tandem with measures that have contradictory 
objectives and outcomes. Precisely, certain community-based initiatives advocate for the 
inclusion of gang members or at-risk populations through programming that brings them back 
mainstream society. For example, several community organizations and agencies work 
exclusively with South Asian populations to provide programing such as mentorship, 
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recreational opportunities, and counselling. These practices are meant to integrate these 
individuals and turn them into responsible citizens, which is only achieved if they feel included 
and given opportunities to participate in meaningful social activity. Thus, at its core, inclusionary 
practices such as these stand diametrically opposed to practices like BRE that intend to exclude 
these very people from society. Under programs like BRE, those involved or affiliated with 
gangs are “undesirables” or “lost causes”, that are to be excluded from social space, while under 
inclusionary gang strategies, these individuals might need “saving” and are to be included in 
society.  
 To better understand these contradictory governing logics, I rely on Foucauldian analysis 
of power and governance to shed light on their co-existence. Mainly, the governance of South 
Asian gang involvement involves a complex assemblage of various forms of power, from more 
historic forms of police regulation and pastoral power, to contemporary neoliberal practices that 
emphasize governing through the community. While inclusionary practices that are operated in 
the community reflect contemporary neoliberal governance through the community, exclusionary 
practices under BRE do so also. Indeed, the BRE program appears to be an exercise of police 
regulation, where public space (i.e. private businesses) is managed to maintain the moral 
functioning of society. However, rather than be a true reflection of an antiquated form of power, 
contemporary police regulation at its core still adheres to neoliberal principles of self-
government. Precisely, through agreements, business owners play a significant role in managing 
the gang problem on their own. The state, which limits direct intervention here, mobilizes and 
fosters the community itself so that civil society remains autonomous, reinvigorating police 
regulation to support neoliberal aims. Therefore, these multiple logics of governance allow both 
exclusion and inclusion to occur as long as they are mobilized through neoliberal imaginings of 
community.   
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Chapter 4 – The Creation of a local legend: Bindy Johal and the duelling legacies of folk devil 
and sympathetic hero 
 This article examines the social construction of a legacy, in particular the creation of a 
folk devil, and the effects of this legend on the phenomenon of South Asian gang involvement.  
The story of Bindy Johal lies at the heart of this analysis. Johal is a controversial figure in BC’s 
South Asian community due to his legendary status derived from his rise as a troubled teenager 
to one of the most notorious and deadly gangsters in Vancouver history. Nearly twenty years 
since his death, Johal’s name still evokes a wide range of reactions from the public. The research 
questions central to this analysis are: how has Johal been conceptualized by authorities and how 
have these conceptualizations influenced practices of governing others?  
The manner in which Johal’s legacy has been constructed points to two divergent 
narratives. First, Johal’s name is anxiety inducing to many for his ability to still draw young 
South Asian men to gangs. This legacy views Johal as a bogeyman and someone to fear whose 
memory should be erased from susceptible boys who want to emulate him and his lifestyle to this 
day. Thus, Johal is linked to the traditional concept of a folk devil, one that stirs a community’s 
anxiety over the moral panic surrounding gang violence. This image of Johal has produced 
several different reactions, including the reluctance over using his name or blaming him for some 
other problems that exist in the South Asian community other than gangs. Further, the local 
Punjabi media, such as music videos, are perceived to glamorize Johal’s gang lifestyle. More 
importantly however, the reaction to Johal specifically has resulted in two school-based 
programs that aim to diminish his appeal among youth by introducing mentor figures and other 
role models that should replace Johal.  
However, this legacy competes with a second one that does not necessarily view him as a 
monster, but rather views Johal as a sympathetic anti-hero. This construction of his legend is 
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based on the notion that Johal was able to reclaim a position on a hegemonic masculine hierarchy 
that typically eluded South Asian males due to factors such as racism. This battle to overcome a 
subordinate masculine status was achieved through the use of violence, overt sexual prowess, 
and a physical appearance, dress and style that allowed Johal, as well as other South Asian men 
who idealized him, to do masculinity differently. This romanticised version of Johal earns a level 
of admiration even long after his death.   
I argue that these dueling legacies do not operate in isolation but share an important 
relationship. The moral panic over Bindy Johal as the folk devil associated with the gang 
violence in BC obscures a far greater crisis captured in the second perspective Johal seems to 
evoke. Precisely, a crisis over South Asian masculinity seems to be replaced in favour of a panic 
that is far easier to react to. Mainly, by viewing Johal as a boogeyman, and initiating programing 
accordingly, the crisis young South Asian men might be experiencing relating to masculinity is 
overlooked. This line of thinking is similar to the analysis presented by Hall et al., (1978) on the 
policing of crises.  
Synthesis of arguments   
 
This dissertation examines the involvement of South Asian youth and young adults, 
primarily males, who are getting involved in gang violence in many parts of the Lower Mainland 
BC. These three standalone articles advance the argument that South Asian gang involvement in 
Western Canada is largely perceived and responded through the lens of culture. In other words, a 
cultural milieu that exists that is distinct to this region and contains its own set of explanations, 
collection of folk devils/heroes, and responses to gang involvement that is unique. Police officer 
Surjit discusses how this problem appears to be a local one: 
I was chatting about the exact thing with a friend of mine and I'm like why is that I don’t 
hear the same issue in anywhere else? Like gangs yes, Toronto gangs, we all know what's 
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going on. But the South Asian community, why don't I hear the same stories from 
Brampton or Toronto or anywhere else?  Why is it concentrated in lower Mainland? 
 
For Officer Surjit, the problem does not seem to be replicated elsewhere in communities that 
have large South Asian populations. Thus, the gang phenomenon examined is unique to BC or at 
least perceived that way by stakeholders. For example, while culture has been used to explain 
gang offending for decades, issues like the “gold collar lifestyle”, to my knowledge, have not 
been used to explain the gang offending of other racialized minority groups, particularly African 
Americans. Indeed, Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967) use culture to explain violence in African 
American communities and suggest that child rearing and social conditioning produces values 
and orientations that are favourable to violent crime. Anderson (1999) provides a more 
contemporary cultural analysis by arguing that gang violence amongst African American men in 
urban communities is the by-product of economic strain as well as a failure to adopt “middle-
class values”. Instead, middle-class values are replaced with the “code of the street”, a distinct 
value set that is conducive to the interpersonal use of violence. To date, the culture of violence 
thesis has not been extended to analyze gang violence within South Asian communities.  
Yet amongst my research participants, ‘culture’ is not only used as an explanatory risk 
factor for South Asian gang offending, but is also used as a descriptor to characterize a distinct 
“gang culture” that has emerged in that region, one that has a rich history in the BC.  For 
example, notorious gangsters like Bindy Johal or the Dosanjh brothers remain these distinctly 
local legends that evoke a wide range of emotions among the local population. Beyond that 
region however, many are not familiar with these names or do not elicit as much anxiety or 
admiration as it does within BC. Finally, some gang responses, such as those involving 
community organizations that work exclusively with South Asian youth or even the school-based 
mentorship and Punjabi languages course, incorporate culture or employ South Asian workers to 
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deliver programming that is sensitive to the racial and cultural needs of youth. Again, these types 
of services appear to be exclusive to BC, where there is a perception that South Asian gang 
involvement is a significant problem. Each chapter of this dissertation examined one aspect of 
this distinctly Western Canada phenomenon.  
 This leaves an important question: how have these ideas on South Asian “culture”, the 
creation of multiple legacies around cultural icons like Bindy Johal, or the subsequent responses 
to South Asian gang involvement developed and transformed into a distinctly local 
phenomenon? While these questions are beyond the scope of this analysis, there are some 
tentative explanations that could point to some answers. First, respondents assert that within the 
South Asian community in B.C., racism is a far more significant problem than elsewhere in the 
South Asian diaspora.  High school law teacher Inder makes this point:  
Indo-Canadian gangs developed, like this is in the 90s, the primary reason back then was 
racism. There was this idea that people were getting treated differently because they were 
brown, right? I don't know why it's different here than other areas but I can say based on 
what I just said, there has been a history of gangs that were originally, when they were 
created were created for reasons for: "hey you know, we're facing racism. Let’s band 
together and lets kind of help each other out." …… And that's always been there since the 
early 90s. And then we also had high profile gangsters, South Asian gangster that were 
here that were in the media, that people saw on TV that were idolized by a lot of young 
kids because they're like: "oh that guy's, these people are so cool." So, you have that whole 
aspect of it.  
 
Inder’s arguments are a recurring theme throughout this dissertation that situates gangs within a 
context of racism and discrimination South Asians experienced in the Vancouver area, with 
figures like Bindy Johal serving an example of such an outcome. Some suggest that BC has a 
greater problem with racism than other areas of Canada. Ironically, many of my interviewees 
invoked this racism by perpetuating the idea that a distinct South Asian ‘culture’ produces 
violent males like Johal. Johal serves the personification of the “gold-collar lifestyle” and allows 
culture to be used to pathologize South Asian men as inherently violent or prone to gangs. 
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Subsequently, programing reflects some of these local concerns. For example, Officer Ranjit 
explains how a certain demographic of South Asian men, with gold chains and steroid bodies, 
are often targeted by business owners seeking their removal by police under the bar and 
restaurant rejection program. In this sense, a generation of Bindy Johal doppelgangers, who want 
to live the gold collar lifestyle that he embodied, are targeted and removed simply for “looking 
the part” of a gangster.  
These ideas suggest that there is the perception by some that the South Asian community 
in Lower Mainland may have developed its own “culture” of gang offending, with Bindy Johal 
serving as a key cultural figure. Officer Ranjit discusses the gang culture that he believes has 
been created in BC: 
There’s almost this culture and the tradition that started here with the Bindy's and the 
Dhosanj’s. It created this subculture of gangs and they made movies about it. You know 
Indo-gangs, all this kind of stuff, that's where a lot of these young guys start. Intertwine 
that with the African American experience and it's created this cultural phenomenon here. 
 
Officer Ranjit relates this unique South Asian gangster culture to African American gangster 
culture in the United States, believing South Asian gang culture is similarly pushed on youth 
through the media (i.e. gangster rap).  
 This might explain how South Asian gang involvement became viewed as a uniquely 
Western Canadian phenomenon, but how do these ideas get transmitted and adopted in the 
community? The local Punjabi media appears to play a significant role in continuing the dialogue 
and advancing the very narratives captured in this study. Buffam (2016) notes the influence of 
local Punjabi media, through newspapers and magazine editorials, as being a confessional space 
for the South Asian community to air their grievances and denounce the sins of culture. 
Similarly, some respondents note the powerful influence of the South Asian media in their 
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community. School teacher Simran notes the importance of the local media in carrying out the 
message: 
Gangs are a big problem. It's a huge problem. We have talk shows every day on radio. 
Parents going on air and saying hey my son, he's going to be killed. And there was one 
gangster last week who was killed and his father was on Red FM talking and asking and 
pleading with the police to save him. Someone do something. And he got killed, he got 
murdered.  
 
Punjabi radio has become an important vessel for South Asians in the community to air their 
grievances against “culture”, the police, and the community itself for failing to address the gang 
problem. This could suggest that some of the very narratives captured in this study are debated, 
discussed, and further advanced through the media.  For example, through the media, “culture” is 
used to explain South Asian gang offending, or it is used to spread the cautionary tale of Bindy 
Johal.  
However, the media also plays an important role in not only advancing these discourses 
but shaping and influencing community responses, particularly those that are involved in 
inclusionary practices discussed under chapter 3. Anti- South Asian gang violence advocate Ajit 
discusses his organizations involvement with the media: 
So, we approached the media, Indo-Canadian media is very strong here, and we approached 
them and they were very cooperative, and they started bringing in parenting programs, they 
started bringing in resource people for parenting skills, spend time with the child, spend 
time with your kid, with youth, and take interest in their schooling. Take interest in his 
sports, all those kinds of things. And we were, most of us, were on the radio, TV conveying 
this message.  
 
Ajit’s organization depends on the media to get its message out as well as play an important role 
in influencing parenting practices. As argued in chapter 2, to maintain the autonomy of civil 
society, the state mobilizes and empowers the community to govern itself (Rose, 1992). Rather 
than appear coercive by eliciting parental authority directly, community actors like Ajit are 
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supported by the state to mobilize families to parent better. Thus, the media plays a central role 
in reaching parents and aid in responding to the problem.  
 In summary, there is the perception by some respondents that BC has a distinct “gangster 
culture”. This might explain why themes around South Asian “culture” like the gold-collar 
lifestyle, seem to be regional explanations for gang offending. Further, predominate gangsters 
like Bindy Johal are also a part of this local “gangster culture”, where their legacies are not well 
understood outside the region. Finally, the media plays an important role in two ways: 1) through 
music or other forms of media the gangster culture is believed to push youth to gangs, and 2) the 
Punjabi media, through the radio or television, allows the community to engage in dialogue, 
including denouncing culture, and also influencing the community to govern the problem itself.  
One limitation in this study that is worth noting is that it could have explored the broader 
historical context around the Khalistani movement as it was identified by one respondent as an 
important element of the South Asian “gang problem”. Future research would benefit by 
engaging in a deeper analysis of the history of that region tied to the controversial Sikh separatist 
movement and the lasting impact of the related Air India bombing, which likely stirs similar 
social anxieties in British Columbia. This could clue us in to why problems centred on 
masculinity and gang violence might be the product of a local geographic condition that is 
unique to that region.   
 This project makes several important contributions. The lack of scholarly work on South 
Asian gang involvement has resulted in a deficiency of academic analysis of the issue. My 
dissertation remedies this oversight by examining the insights of stakeholders who perform 
central roles in governing the problem. This study adopts a reflexive approach by trying to 
understand the phenomenon through the meaning it has on these authorities, rather than trying to 
explain the problem through a process of grand theorizing. This means that some of the 
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conclusions drawn from the narratives are not meant to be definite explanations on South Asian 
gang involvement but rather a discussion of how authorities interpret various dimensions of the 
problem. The results of this study could be used for introspective purposes by stakeholders so 
that these assumptions are challenged, debated or adjusted so that they are able to effectively 
respond to the problem. Further, this study also contributes to the burgeoning literature 
examining the role of community in the governance of crime.  In so doing, the analysis will add 
to the body of literature on contemporary neoliberal crime control strategies where the state 
fosters and mobilizes community agencies and actors to deliver programing.  
 Further research may want to expand the scope of this analysis to include other South 
Asian communities outside of the province of BC to examine how or whether similar tropes 
about South Asian culture are deployed to explain violence and crime in other geographic 
contexts. This includes Brampton, Ontario, South Hall, England, or even Punjab, India. For 
example, some believe Punjab has a major youth drug problem, a crisis that has received 
extensive media and political attention (Kaur, 2017; Kumar at al., 2017; Sharma et al., 2017). It 
would be interesting to note if parallels exist in how local authorities in Punjab, including law 
enforcement, drug treatment providers, or advocates, frame risk for drug addiction. For example, 
if drug use is tied to materialism or a particular lifestyle that is identified as a distinct part of 
South Asian ‘culture,’ this would suggest that BC may not be as unique in terms of how risk is 
imagined. Precisely, culture may be a de facto explanation for authorities who are faced with 
tackling a perceived social problem that exists in their communities. There is much utility in 
exploring this line of inquiry and expanding to other South Asian communities where social 
problems are attributed to amorphous constructs like culture at the expense of any attention to 
structural variables. 
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APPENDIX A. Research participants and their organizational backgrounds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name ORGANIZATION 
Diljit Former gang member/community advocacy 
Priya Community agency  
Raman Community agency  
Veer Community agency  
Ranbir Community agency  
Jyoti Community agency  
Anita Community agency  
Raj Community agency  
Taran Community agency  
Ajit Community agency  
Ash Community agency  
Harjit Community activist  
Kulvir Community agency  
Aarti Community agency  
Anju Community agency/advocacy 
Paul Community agency  
Gurjit Law enforcement  
John Law enforcement  
Surjit Law enforcement 
Scott Law enforcement  
Krish Law enforcement  
Ranjit Law enforcement  
Navdeep School district employee 
Sony Vice Principal  
Jessie Principal  
Jaspal School district employee 
David Principal  
Dan Principal 
Amarjit School district employee 
Gurmeet School district employee 
Simran Teacher 
Jass Guidance counsellor  
Lena Teacher 
Inder Teacher 
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APPENDIX B. Interview Guides 
Community Organizations 
 
Interview #: 
Date of Interview:  
Start: 
End: 
Duration:  
 
 
 
QUESTIONS 
 
1. Tell me about yourself. 
a. What is your organization’s name? 
b. What is your position here? 
c. How long have you worked in this type of position? 
d. Describe the clientele this organization serves? 
e. Describe the scope of what you do with these clients? 
f. Do you identify yourself as belonging to any community?  
g. What type of training did you go through to do this kind of work? 
 
2. Lets talk about South Asian gangs. 
a. How would you define a South Asian gang? 
b. What part of South Asia specifically do these youth, or their families, come from? 
c. Are South Asian gangs prevalent in your community? 
d. If so, how big of a problem are South Asian gangs in your community? 
e. What type of illegal activities do these gangs engage in? 
f. What is the age range and gender of a majority of these gang members? 
 
3. The following questions focus on risk factors associated with gang delinquency. 
a. What type of youth do you believe are at the most at-risk for joining a gang? 
b. If you could pick the top three factors you believe increase the risk for gang 
involvement, what would they be? 
c. If these three risk factors increase the likelihood a South Asian youth is going to join 
a gang, what are three protective factors you believe may prevent youth from getting 
involved in gangs? 
d. What are some of the problems facing South Asians today? 
e. Is there a relationship between these problems and gang involvement? 
 
4. Lets talk a bit more about the personal lives of at-risk South Asian youth or adults who 
might join a gang. 
a. How would you characterize the family life of South Asians who might get involved 
in gangs? 
b. Do you believe there is a relationship between the family lives of at-risk South 
Asians individuals and gang involvement? 
c. What type of neighborhoods or communities do these gang members live in? 
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d. What type of friends do these gang members have?  
e. What type of influence do you believe peers might have in gang involvement? 
 
5.  The following questions focus on anti-gang initiatives 
a. What is your role in anti-gang programing? 
b. What are some strategies used to prevent youth from joining gangs? 
c. What are some of the programs used to deal with youth already involved in gangs? 
d. Describe some of the needs of the South Asian community? 
e. Describe some of the needs of South Asian gang members? 
f. How are these needs addressed through the programing you offer? 
g. How are anti-gang strategies sensitive to racial or cultural needs of gang members? 
h. Do you believe current programing meets the needs of South Asians gang members? 
i. In your opinion, what are some of the best ways to respond to South Asian gangs? 
j. Do you believe the current strategies used are effective in addressing risk factors? 
k. Do you work with other community organizations, police, citizens, and government, 
in anti-gang programing? 
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Educational Officials  
 
Interview #: 
Date of Interview:  
Start: 
End: 
Duration:  
 
 
QUESTIONS 
 
1. Tell me about yourself. 
a. What is your position at this school? 
b. How long have you worked in this type of position? 
c. Describe the student body in this school? What is the ethnic composition of this 
school? 
d. What motivated you to become an educator? 
 
2. Lets talk about South Asian gangs. 
a. How would you define a South Asian gang? 
b. What part of South Asia specifically do these youth, or their families, come from? 
c. Are South Asian gangs prevalent in school? 
d. If so, how big of a problem are South Asian gangs in your school and the broader 
community? 
e. What are some of the problems facing South Asians today? 
f. Is there a relationship between these problems and gang involvement? 
 
3. The following questions focus on risk factors associated with gang delinquency. 
a. What type of individuals do you believe are at the most at-risk for joining a gang? 
b. If you could pick the top three factors you believe increase the risk for gang 
involvement, what would they be? 
c. If these three risk factors increase the likelihood a South Asian is going to join a 
gang, what are three protective factors you believe may prevent them from getting 
involved in gangs? 
 
4. Lets talk a bit more about the personal lives of at-risk South Asian youth or adults who 
might join a gang. 
a. How would you characterize their family life? 
b. Do you believe there is a relationship between the family lives of at-risk South 
Asians individuals and gang involvement? 
c. What type of neighborhoods or communities do these gang members live in? 
d. What type of friends do these youth have?  
e. What type of influence do you believe peers might have in gang involvement? 
 
5.  The following questions focus on anti-gang initiatives  
a. Does your school offer any kind of programing related to gangs? 
b. Do you have any training in dealing with gangs and gang members?  
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c. What are some strategies used to prevent individuals from joining gangs that are 
currently used in school? 
d. What are some of the school programs used to deal with youth already involved in 
gangs? 
e. Describe some of the needs of the South Asian community? 
f. Describe some of the needs of South Asian gang members? 
g. How are these needs addressed through the programing offered? 
h. How are anti-gang strategies sensitive to racial or cultural needs of gang members? 
i. Do you believe current programing meets the needs of South Asians gang members? 
j. Describe the Wraparound program. 
k. In your opinion, what are some of the best ways to respond to South Asian youth 
gangs? 
l. Do you believe the current strategies used are effective in addressing risk factors? 
m. Do you work with other community organizations, police, citizens, and government, 
in anti-gang programing? 
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Law Enforcement  
 
Interview #: 
Date of Interview:  
Start: 
End: 
Duration:  
 
 
QUESTIONS 
 
1. Tell me about yourself. 
a. What is the police organization you work for? 
b. What is your position here? 
c. How long have you worked in this type of position? 
d. Describe the scope of what you do? 
e. What motivated you to work as an officer? 
 
2. Lets talk about South Asian gangs. 
a. How would you define a South Asian gang? 
b. What part of South Asia specifically do these youth, or their families, come from? 
c. Are South Asian gangs prevalent in your community? 
d. If so, how big of a problem are South Asian gangs in your community? 
e. What type of illegal activities do these gangs engage in? 
f. What are some of the ages of the youth who get involved with these gangs? 
g. Are South Asian gang members predominately male? 
 
3. The following questions focus on risk factors associated with gang delinquency. 
a. What type of youth do you believe are at the most at-risk for joining a gang? 
b. If you could pick the top three factors you believe increase the risk for gang 
involvement, what would they be? 
c. If these three risk factors increase the likelihood a South Asian youth is going to join 
a gang, what are three protective factors you believe may prevent youth from getting 
involved in gangs? 
d. What are some of the problems facing male South Asian youth today? 
 
4. Lets talk a bit more about the personal lives of at-risk South Asian youth. 
a. How would you characterize the family life of gang members? 
b. Do you believe there is a relationship between the family lives of at-risk South 
Asians individuals and gang involvement? 
c. What type of neighborhoods or communities do these youth live in? 
d. What type of neighborhoods or communities do these gang members live in? 
e. What type of friends do these youth have?  
f. What type of influence do you believe peers might have in gang involvement? 
 
5.  The following questions focus on anti-gang initiatives 
a. What is your role in combating gangs? 
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b. Did you receive any specialized training to deal with gangs and gang youth? 
c. What are some strategies used to prevent youth from joining gangs used by police? 
d. What are some of the programs used to deal with youth already involved in gangs by 
police? 
e. Describe some of the needs of South Asian youth? 
f. How are these needs addressed through the programing you offer? 
g. How are anti-gang strategies sensitive to racial or cultural needs of youth? 
h. In your opinion, what are some of the best ways to respond to South Asian youth 
gangs? 
i. Do you believe the current strategies used are effective in addressing risk factors? 
j. Do you work with other community organizations, citizens, and government, in anti-
gang programing?  
k. If so, describe the type of relationship you have with these other stakeholders?  
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Former Gang Members 
 
Interview #: 
Date of Interview:  
Start: 
End: 
Duration:  
 
 
QUESTIONS 
 
1. Tell me about yourself and your experiences in a gang 
a. How old are you? 
b. How old where you when you joined the gang? 
c. When did you exist the gang? 
d. Since leaving the gang what do you do?  
e. Why did you join a gang? 
f. What was your criminal history like when you belonged to a gang? 
g. What was your family life prior to you joining a gang? 
 
2. Lets talk about South Asian gangs. 
a. How would you define a South Asian gang? 
b. What part of South Asia specifically do these youth, or their families, come from? 
c. Are South Asian gangs prevalent in your community? 
d. If so, how big of a problem are South Asian gangs in your community? 
e. What type of illegal activities do these gangs engage in? 
f. What are some of the ages of the youth who get involved with these gangs? 
g. Are South Asian gang members predominately male? 
 
3. The following questions focus on risk factors associated with gang delinquency. 
a. What type of youth do you believe are at the most at-risk for joining a gang? 
b. If you could pick the top three factors you believe increase the risk for gang 
involvement, what would they be? 
c. If these three risk factors increase the likelihood a South Asian youth is going to join 
a gang, what are three protective factors you believe may prevent youth from getting 
involved in gangs? 
d. What are some of the problems facing male South Asian youth today? 
 
4. Lets talk a bit more about the personal lives of at-risk South Asian youth generally. 
a. How would you characterize the family life of an at risk youth? 
b. What do you think is the relationship between the family lives of these youth and 
gang involvement? 
c. What type of neighborhoods or communities do these youth live in? 
d. What type of friends do these youth have?  
 
5.  The following questions focus on anti-gang initiatives 
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a. Since existing gangs have you been involved in any outreach or anti-gang 
programing? 
b. What are some strategies used to prevent youth from joining gangs? 
c. What are some of the programs used to deal with youth already involved in gangs? 
d. Describe some of the needs of South Asian youth? 
e. How are anti-gang strategies sensitive to racial or cultural needs of youth? 
f. In your opinion, what are some of the best ways to respond to South Asian youth 
gangs? 
g. Do you believe the current strategies used are effective in addressing risk factors? 
h. Do you work with other community organizations, police, citizens, and government, 
in anti-gang programing? 
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APPENDIX C. Introductory Script for Interviews 
 
Hello, my name is Manjit Pabla and I am Ph.D. candidate at the University of Waterloo in the 
Department of Sociology and Legal Studies. Under the supervision of Professors Peter 
Carrington and Rashmee Singh, I am conducting interviews to understand community responses 
to South Asian gangs in the Greater Vancouver Area for my dissertation research.  
 
If you agree to participate, I will ask you questions about what you think of the South Asian gang 
phenomenon and your experiences and expertise related to the services you provide for gang 
members. I believe the interview should approximately one hour of your time.  
 
I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance 
through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee. All information you provide in the 
interview will be completely confidential. Your name and any information that could identify 
you will not be used in the final project and any publications from it. The following interview 
will be tape-recorded and with your permission, I may use any quotations you provide verbatim. 
You may refuse to answer or skip any question you choose to or withdraw participation at any 
time without consequence. Should you wish to stop the tape at any time please indicate so.  
 
Before we begin, do you have any questions? 
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APPENDIX D. Information Letter  
 
JUNE 2016 
Dear potential participant: 
My name is Manjit Pabla and I am a Doctoral candidate in the Department of Sociology and 
Legal Studies at the University of Waterloo under the supervision of Drs. Peter Carrington and 
Rashmee Singh. This letter is an invitation to consider participating in a study I am conducting as 
part of my degree. I would like to provide you with more information about this project and what 
your involvement would entail if you decide to take part. 
Over the last fifteen years, there has been considerable attention placed on the problem of South 
Asian gangs in the Greater Vancouver Area by law enforcement officials, politicians, anti-gang 
organizations and the South Asian community itself. Despite the concern over South Asian 
gangs, there have not been very many academic studies on the subject matter. Therefore, the 
purpose of this study is to understand how the problem of South Asian gangs has been 
understood by key stakeholders and subsequently managed through anti-gang initiatives and 
programming.  
This study will focus on how certain stakeholders understand the problem of South Asian gangs 
by identifying risk factors for gang involvement. This is achieved by interviewing those who 
work on the frontlines of anti-gang programing. Therefore, I would like to include your 
organization as one of several to be involved in my study because of your work in delivering 
such programing.  
Participation in this study is voluntary. It will involve an interview of approximately one hour in 
length to take place in a mutually agreed upon location. You may decline to answer any of the 
interview questions if you so wish. Further, you may decide to withdraw from this study at any 
time without any negative consequences by advising the researcher.  With your permission, the 
interview will be audio recorded and later transcribed for analysis. If you request, I will send you 
a copy of the transcript to give you an opportunity to confirm the accuracy of our conversation 
and to add or clarify any points that you wish. All information you provide is considered 
completely confidential. Your name will not appear in any dissertation or publication from this 
study, however, anonymous quotations may be used. Data collected during this study will be 
retained for 5 years in a locked drawer in my office. Only the two professors supervising this 
research and I will have access. There are no known or anticipated risks to you as a participant in 
this study. 
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If you have any questions regarding this study, or would like additional information to assist you 
in reaching a decision about participation, please contact me at 416-995-4380 or by email at 
m49singh@uwaterloo.ca. You can also contact my supervisors, Dr. Peter Carington at 519-888-
4567 ext. 2029 or email pjc@uwaterloo.ca and Dr. Rashmee Singh at 519-888-4567 ext. 3020 or 
email r78singh@uwaterloo.ca.  
I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance 
through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee.  However, the final decision about 
participation is yours. If you have any comments or concerns resulting from your participation in 
this study, please contact Dr. Maureen Nummelin in the Office of Research Ethics at 1-519-888-
4567, Ext. 36005 or maureen.nummelin@uwaterloo.ca. 
I hope that the results of my study will be of benefit to those organizations directly involved in 
the study as well as to the broader research community. 
I very much look forward to speaking with you and thank you in advance for your assistance in 
this research project. 
Yours Sincerely, 
 
Manjit Pabla 
Student Investigator 
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Appendix E. Consent form 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
By signing this consent form, you are not waiving your legal rights or releasing the 
investigator(s) or involved institution(s) from their legal and professional responsibilities.  
 
I have read the information presented in the information letter about a study being conducted by 
Manjit Pabla of the Department of Sociology and Legal Studies at the University of Waterloo. I 
have had the opportunity to ask any questions related to this study, to receive satisfactory 
answers to my questions, and any additional details I wanted. 
I am aware that I have the option of allowing my interview to be audio recorded to ensure an 
accurate recording of my responses.   
I am also aware that excerpts from the interview may be included in the thesis and/or 
publications to come from this research, with the understanding that the quotations will be 
anonymous.  
I was informed that I may withdraw my consent at any time without penalty by advising the 
researcher.   
This project has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo 
Research Ethics Committee. However, the final decision about participation is yours. 
Participants who have concerns or questions about their involvement in the project may contact 
Dr. Maureen Nummelin, the Chief Ethics Officer at 519-888-4567, Ext. 36005 or 
Maureen.nummelin@uwaterloo.ca."  
With full knowledge of all foregoing, I agree, of my own free will, to participate in this study. 
YES   NO   
I agree to have my interview audio recorded. 
YES   NO   
I agree to the use of anonymous quotations in any dissertation or publication that comes of this 
research. 
YES   NO 
Participant Name: ____________________________ (Please print)   
Participant Signature: ____________________________  
Date: ____________________________ 
